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ABSTRACT 
 
Ian Murphy: Beyond “Over-the-Top” Television: Circuits of Media  
Distribution Since the Internet 
(Under the direction of Richard Cante and Michael Palm) 
 
 My dissertation analyzes the evolution of contemporary, cross-platform and international 
circuits of media distribution. A circuit of media distribution refers to both the circulation of 
media content as well as the underlying ecosystem that facilitates that circulation. In particular, I 
focus on the development of services for streaming television over the internet. I examine the 
circulation paths that either opened up or were foreclosed by companies that have been pivotal in 
shaping streaming economies: Aereo, Netflix, Twitter, Google, and Amazon. I identify the 
power brokers of contemporary media distribution, ranging from sectors of legacy television—
for instance, broadcast networks, cable companies, and production studios—to a variety of new 
media and technology industries, including social media, e-commerce, internet search, and 
artificial intelligence. In addition, I analyze the ways in which these power brokers are 
reconfiguring content access. I highlight a series of technological, financial, geographic, and 
regulatory factors that authorize or facilitate access, in order to better understand how 
contemporary circuits of media distribution are constituted. I consider access as a regulatory 
issue, a foundation of business models, a design concern, and as a function of interoperability 
that facilitates communication amongst platforms, devices, and other systems of networked 
technologies.  
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Introduction 
Overview: Distribution from Broadcast to Broadband 
My dissertation analyzes the evolution of contemporary, cross-platform and international 
circuits of media distribution since the internet. A circuit of media distribution refers to both the 
circulation of media content as well as the underlying ecosystem that facilitates that circulation. 
In particular, I focus on the development of services for streaming television over the internet. I 
examine the circulation paths that either opened up or were foreclosed by companies that have 
been pivotal in shaping streaming economies: Aereo, Netflix, Twitter, Google, and Amazon.1 
Television—and in particular streaming television over the internet—serves as a useful point of 
entry for cataloguing and analyzing the levels of upheaval in post-internet circuits of distribution 
for popular entertainment. Television is situated between the power structures of Hollywood and 
Silicon Valley, and the changes inherent to internet television therefore become a testament to 
the level of influence that each sector has over the other.   
In addition, I describe and analyze the maturation of the underlying contemporary 
ecosystem for media distribution. Within this system, particular circuits of distribution are 
characterized by a convergence of legacy media sectors—in particular those involving 
television—with a multitude of developing formations of networked technologies. These 
convergences encompass everything from social media platforms to automated advertising 
systems, from personalization and curation algorithms to geolocation tracking software, from 
                                                 
1 Aereo is now defunct and did not directly wield power or influence that comes close to Netflix, Twitter, Amazon, 
or Google. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decision in which Aereo was involved was a pivotal moment in the 
development of streaming television over the internet.  
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live local broadcast feeds to global streaming initiatives, from major corporate entertainment 
regimes to informal networks of content access, and from artificial intelligence to the so-called 
Internet of Things. This dissertation is broken into a series of four case studies, one per chapter, 
to document and analyze the technological, economic, sociocultural, and regulatory stakes of 
contemporary content distribution.   
The first chapter focuses on ABC v. Aereo—a 2014 U.S. Supreme Court case about 
unauthorized retransmission of local broadcast signals over the internet by Aereo, a streaming 
service startup—in order to establish how federal regulatory policies for legacy media like 
broadcast television continue to shape the conditions for contemporary media distribution. In the 
second chapter, I analyze Netflix’s international expansion of its streaming service and highlight 
another pivotal issue for online distribution: geoblocking, or the regional fragmentation of 
content access throughout the world. The third chapter examines Twitter’s foray into 
livestreaming, in order to document how social media companies are experimenting with 
integrating broadcast programming into preexisting platforms and services that distribute more 
than just television. The final chapter presents a case study about a dispute between Amazon and 
Google over the compatibility of cross-platform streaming media in the “smart home.” These 
two corporations are each building all-purpose distribution ecosystems, of which their streaming 
media platforms and devices are only a small part. This dissertation thus builds a distribution 
circuit that begins from an older media formation—over-the-air broadcasting—and culminates in 
an analysis of how the circulation of television fits into a much larger distribution ecosystem that 
extends far beyond traditional media industries. 
There are two core components that together inform my conception of post-internet 
distribution circuits. First, I identify the power brokers of contemporary media distribution. They 
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range from sectors of legacy television—for instance, broadcast networks, cable companies, and 
production studios—to a variety of new media and technology industries, including social media, 
e-commerce, internet search, and artificial intelligence. Second, I identify the ways in which 
these power brokers are reconfiguring content access. I highlight a series of technological, 
financial, geographic, and regulatory factors that authorize or facilitate access, in order to better 
understand how contemporary circuits of media distribution are constituted. Moreover, my 
analysis details how distribution circuitry comes to be increasingly interconnected. I consider 
access as a regulatory issue, a foundation of business models, a design concern, and as a function 
of interoperability that facilitates communication amongst platforms, devices, and other systems 
of networked technologies. In the next two sections, I expand on distribution power brokers and 
then content access, situate them within existing debates about media distribution, and explain 
my own intervention into these debates. 
Online Streaming and New Power Brokers of Media 
The second decade of the twenty-first century has seen an acute increase in commercial 
online video streaming services. Broadcast and cable networks certainly have helped influence 
the shape of these services. So too have the various multichannel video programming distributors 
(MVPDs), the umbrella term given to cable, satellite, and telecom companies that provide 
televisual content to consumers. At the same time, a set of new stakeholders have emerged from 
social media, e-commerce retailing, search, cloud computing, and video gaming, among other 
tech-based industrial sectors. Each of these sectors contain some important connections to 
television. Social media companies like Twitter thrive by aggregating their platform traffic into 
“audiences,” offering gateways for content providers and advertisers. E-commerce retailers like 
Amazon—and in its first iteration as an online disc rental service, Netflix—established inventory 
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for selling and renting physical media forms like DVDs, as well as a working interface and 
infrastructures for data collection and storage. Google parlayed its dominance in search to 
provide, alongside data analytics firms and other facilities that manage internet traffic, crucial 
backbones for the distribution of data rich media, like video. Internet-enabled video gaming 
consoles offered set-top boxes that provided some of the initial alternatives for porting content to 
the television set beyond those means dictated by cable companies. In addition, video games and 
social media offer important gateways to a younger generation of television fans, the so-called 
cord cutters and cord-nevers.  
I focus on identifying the key actors for media distribution circuits and situating them 
within the broader distribution ecosystem. One upshot of this focus is that it renders distribution 
visible. Distribution has been largely understudied relative to consumption and production. This 
dissertation thus joins in existing academic debates that argue for the importance of continuing to 
foreground distribution in studies of media and popular culture. For instance, Josh Braun (2015) 
notes that people have little sense of the path that media takes in getting to us when we access 
content through mobile devices or our televisions: the nature of the delivery path, what types of 
businesses and entities are involves in the transmission, what sorts of algorithms are 
recommending content to us and why, what data is being generated in the act of distribution (the 
search for content, the transmission of content, and so on), and what is being done with that data. 
This dissertation, then, is in part an act of discovery and description, of uncovering these 
“invisible” linkages that remain concealed through some combination of complicated technical 
pathways; interface design; marketing and other business strategies; and legal policies.  
This dissertation extends Braun’s approach by moving beyond his focus on news media. 
This dissertation focuses on a wide range of companies and distribution paradigms to capture the 
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interconnectedness—and the complexity—of contemporary distribution. The cases center on 
different kinds of companies: a now defunct technology startup, Aereo; an international 
entertainment corporation, Netflix; a social media platform, Twitter; and two multinational tech 
conglomerates, Amazon and Google. Individually, each case study spotlights how specific 
content producers, distributors, regulatory bodies, technologies, material infrastructures, and 
consumer-users are arranged in circuits of distribution. Collectively, the case studies illuminate 
how circuits of media distribution are increasingly embedded within emerging systems of 
networked technologies. Each case study isolates distinct portions of contemporary circuits of 
distribution to analyze some of the unique ways that individual companies—namely Aereo, 
Netflix, Twitter, Amazon and Google—have influenced the development of content circulation.  
Moreover, identifying the sectors and entities paramount to contemporary distribution 
reveals the still relevant influence of mass media sectors. The distribution circuits analyzed in 
this dissertation are all hybrids of both older, mass media formations and emergent broadband 
models. This focus on hybridity extends calls from Andrew Chadwick (2017) for media research 
to account for how “older” and “newer” media practices intersect, where such distinctions 
matter, and where they no longer matter. Chadwick uses hybridity to explain the media’s role in 
political life and political communication. My dissertation takes steps in extending these 
contexts. For instance, I focus on how hybridity complicates the legal interpretation and 
economic exploitation of media policy. In addition, each of the companies in my case studies 
facilitate modes of circulation that are both authorized and unauthorized—as well as formal and 
informal—to one degree or another in ways that are explored further in the chapters. Thus, my 
dissertation conceives of distribution circuits as hybrids while also moving beyond broadcast 
(“older media”) and broadband (“newer media”). 
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Identifying the actors and entities who facilitate circulation—the corporate circuitry—
also entails classifying them in some way. It is important to recognize not only who the critical 
players in contemporary distribution are, but also what they do. How these companies operate—
and what kind of companies they are—can have profound economic and regulatory implications.  
Debates over classification typically fall into binaries. Businesses are framed as either platforms 
or publishers (Gillespie 2010), technology companies or media companies (Napoli 2016), 
conduits or distributors (Kimball 2015). Recent debates about net neutrality center in large part 
around distinctions between Title I telecommunications services and Title II information 
services. Traditionally in the United States, the former categories—platform, tech company, 
conduit, telecom service—bear much lighter regulatory burdens than the latter categories. Such 
categories thus become attractive to Silicon Valley companies who claim they are in the business 
of facilitation, or who serve “merely” as intermediaries, even as they move more aggressively 
into commissioning, licensing, or producing programming and other forms of content. This 
dissertation moves these debates forward by illustrating the extent to which such binary 
categorizations are misleading, as the companies in this dissertation perform a number of roles—
indeed, a “hybrid” of roles—across multiple contexts in contemporary distribution circuits. 
Reconfiguring Content Access 
Identifying and analyzing the power brokers addresses who or what controls distribution. 
I use this section to define how I deploy the term distribution in the first place. In this 
dissertation, distribution encompasses the processes of commercialized digital content 
circulation, as well as the underlying technical, regulatory, and commercial infrastructures that 
facilitate and otherwise structure that circulation. Within this extremely broad rubric, I focus in 
particular on how Aereo, Netflix, Twitter, Amazon, and Google strategize about content access. 
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Specifically, I concentrate on how these companies gain access to content themselves, how they 
build their streaming services for access by consumer-users, and which sectors of the distribution 
circuit they target and operate in (for instance, platforms, consumer electronic devices, software 
applications, content ownership, and geographic markets).  
Distribution, as Curtin et al (2014) note, has served as the cornerstone of financial 
success for content industries like Hollywood. This success is built on business models that 
stagger access to content, so that content is only available in certain places at certain times for a 
certain predefined duration. The proliferation of delivery platforms, screens, and streaming 
services complicates how media and tech companies conceive of access. For each of the 
companies in this dissertation, access itself becomes the fulcrum point around which such 
companies operate. They built streaming services (Aereo and Netflix), open social media 
platforms (Twitter), and entire distribution ecosystems (Amazon and Google) with distinct 
strategies for convincing people to use or join, keeping people inside, encouraging people to use 
in certain ways, and preventing people from entering or using in other ways. Access thus 
becomes a useful point of analysis for understanding how post-internet distribution circuits are 
constructed and operate.  
I analyze access in four ways. First, access is a regulatory issue, both in terms of legal 
statutes and licensing agreements between content rights holders, distributors, and consumers. 
Second, managing access is a fundamental principle for the business models of these companies. 
Third, access is a matter of design, whether through content curation, recommendation 
algorithms, how consumers control or otherwise interact with content, or mechanisms of 
monitoring and policing content flows (or “content moderation”). Finally, access is a question of 
interoperability across platforms, devices, and other systems of networked technologies. 
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Together, these four conceptions of access help to explain how businesses deploy technologies to 
control the conditions under which distribution takes place. Below I briefly elaborate on how I 
foreground each conception in a single chapter; however, all four are present across all chapters.  
Considering access in terms of regulation directly relates to the task of classifying 
distribution actors. For one, the capacity to reconfigure access is inextricably tied to the roles that 
the corporate circuitry play as, for instance, intermediaries of circulation or as active producers 
or publishers. This relationship between access and the role of distribution channels looms large 
in discussions over the regulation of media that are germane to this dissertation, including 
Jennifer Holt (2016) on cloud policy, Danny Kimball (2015) on net neutrality, and Philip Napoli 
(2017) on the policy distinctions between media companies, social media platforms, and online 
content aggregators. This dissertation adds to the study of regulation by foregrounding a largely 
ignored policy, retransmission consent, in the first chapter. Aereo attempted to argue in court that 
it was merely facilitating the retransmission of broadcasts by its users, rather than actively 
circulating the feeds, to defend itself against the charge that it did not obtain consent from 
broadcasters to do so. Requiring such permission by leveraging the retransmission consent policy 
has become an incredibly lucrative revenue source for broadcast networks. However, making 
money from retransmission consent represents a failure of regulatory oversight, as broadcast 
networks have coopted power over content access by overriding the protections that such 
policies were meant to implement. While I foreground this particular policy in the first chapter, 
the general concern over regulatory failure and its relationship to the circulation of television 
programming (and other digital content) permeates all of the case studies to some degree.  
Regulatory concerns over access are intertwined with the business models that streaming 
services employ. By and large, these revenue models govern access to content both between 
9 
  
businesses (through the terms of licensing agreements) and between businesses and consumers 
(through paid subscriptions, for instance). Attention in academic research to business models of 
contemporary distribution tend to either note how media companies are experimenting with new 
revenue models (see Curtin et al 2014) or become entrenched in old ones (see Mann et al 2014). 
In this dissertation, I focus on how issues of access can create simultaneously conflicting 
financial incentives. For instance, online streaming services face complicated questions about 
how differential access to content relates to revenue. In the Netflix case, geoblocking erects 
digital fences around the company’s content libraries across the world, based on the terms 
dictated by the licensing agreements. Regional windows allow content rights holders to generate 
revenue from a variety of geographic markets. Netflix is asked to police these borders, as 
consumers actively evade them to gain unauthorized access to shows and films not available in 
their area. At the same time, Netflix stands to profit from this circumvention, because those 
people who successfully circumvent the geoblock end up paying for the service. This analysis 
connects corporate strategies of content circulation to video streaming infrastructures, and 
unequal content access. However, there are similar stories across the four case studies, where 
elements of a streaming service upend distribution conventions, which can lead to costly 
conflicts, while also offering opportunities for generating revenue.  
Design strategies are also built into conceptions of access in this dissertation, in particular 
as they relate to encouraging certain activities or modes of use while foreclosing others. But 
design strategies can be intentional as well as reactive, and design often emerges by accident as 
much as it is purposely planned. Twitter has become infamous for its laissez faire attitude and 
management over access to its site, including identity verification and policing trolls. With its 
deal to livestream NFL games, Twitter incorporated live video from a broadcast network into an 
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open-access platform running on user-generated content. Twitter then became an insular 
ecosystem for television programming, where users could watch, comment on, and follow 
journalistic coverage of live sports in “real time.” This arrangement created design complications 
for syncing up the flow of the game with the tweeted commentary on the game. Moreover, the 
authorized broadcast would now intermingle with unauthorized, user-generated retransmissions 
that also existed on Twitter and Twitter-owned Periscope. The integration of these components 
creates a hybrid distribution circuit, mixing the formal with the informal, as well as the approved 
and unapproved. The other case studies also consider the design of a hybrid distribution circuit: 
Aereo built its service by attempting to retransmit programming without permission; Netflix 
subscribers circumvent geofences; Amazon and Google deploy technical workarounds for 
unblocking the interconnection between streaming platforms like YouTube and smart speaker 
devices like the Amazon Echo Show. 
This last example leads into concerns over interoperability, the final conception of access 
that this dissertation analyzes. By interoperability, I mean the connective tissue that enables 
communication amongst the software applications, consumer and infrastructural hardware, 
content delivery networks, and data storage platforms that together facilitate content circulation. 
The interconnection—and the fragmentation—of distribution circuits depends on contractual 
agreements amongst commercial (and some non-commercial) actors, especially among 
companies that are otherwise competitors. However, this conception of access highlights how 
malleable, flexible, and adaptable post-internet distribution circuits can be, especially when the 
circulation of conventional media forms (like television programming) becomes subsumed by 
broader systems of networked technologies like the Internet of Things. The conflict between 
Amazon and Google that serves as a catalyst for the final chapter underscores this point. On the 
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surface, their dispute is about Google removing YouTube from Amazon’s Echo Show smart 
speaker. But for both Google and Amazon, streaming video is only one part of a conglomerated, 
diversified set of business interests centered on technologies of the home. The conflict over 
YouTube thus becomes part of a much larger power struggle between two tech giants who are 
both working to build entire an entire ecosystem of interoperable technologies in the home, all 
funneled through a central device like the smart speaker.  
Conceiving of access in terms of interoperability broadens the scope of this dissertation 
project beyond conventional media industries. Existing work on media distribution tends to keep 
its analysis within the discrete parameters of such industries and media forms, including music, 
movies, television, video games, news and journalism, and so forth. For the most part, this 
dissertation also remains within the bounds of such conventions, by focusing so much on internet 
television. However, I lay the groundwork within these four case studies for expanding beyond 
such constraints, while also never losing sight of them. 
Dissertation Structure: Case Studies and Sources 
I use “circuit of distribution” to examine the issues in this dissertation. I draw the 
“circuit” from previous work in media and cultural studies, which has been used as a tactic of 
visualizing what is being studied, while also pointing to the way it is studied.2 My interest here is 
in the processes of distribution, how such processes operate, who or what kinds of institutions, 
companies, and regulatory bodies are instrumental to such operations, and the strategies at play 
in implementing such processes. The circuit becomes a useful heuristic for visualizing processes 
                                                 
2 Richard Johnson’s (1986) circuit model illustrated how the circulation of cultural products also simultaneously 
involves the circulation of subjective forms, which for him served as the ultimate object—or domain—of analysis. 
Hall et al (1997) modify this model with their circuit of culture approach, which examines the linkages amongst five 
“cultural processes” in production, consumption, identity, representation, and regulation. Julie D’Acci (2004) further 
refines the approach with a “circuit of media study” model that lays out the interplay among cultural artifacts, 
production, reception, and socio-historical context. 
12 
  
of distribution, as well as a grounding framework of analysis for understanding these processes 
in relation to each other. Its flexibility allows me to capture the complexity of contemporary 
distribution while also attending in part to the some of the historical antecedents at play in the 
case studies—like broadcasting and cable regulations for Aereo; traditions of content licensing 
practices and copyright policies for Netflix; evolving stances on informal distribution 
technologies from protective media organizations like the NFL and broadcast networks for 
Twitter; and the role that circulating conventional media programming plays within much larger 
distribution ecosystems for Google and Amazon.  
I extend the concept of the circuit to focus more explicitly on distribution. In doing so, I 
amend previous conceptions of the circuit, which tend to be largely circular. My own circuit 
would be illustrated more as a Venn diagram than as a circle, by exploding the more 
conventional “sites” in previous circuit models—like production or cultural artifacts—to see how 
the cites on the circuit come to be constituted through processes of distribution. In this 
dissertation, I use circuits of distribution to explore the expansive, fragmented, movement of 
media across platforms, technical formats, and geopolitical borders. I take the circuit to account 
in the broadest way possible the series of components that constitute the circulation of media—
and in each of the cases in this dissertation, of television programming—over the internet. These 
components include the paradigms of content circulation, including older legacy models like 
broadcast, cable, and satellite, alongside the more emergent paradigms like broadband, social 
media, software applications, and interconnected networks of devices like the Internet of Things. 
These paradigms are akin to logics of media (van Djick and Poell 2013). Media logics, broadly 
speaking, are defined as “the set of principles or common-sense rationality cultivated in and by 
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media institutions that penetrates every public domain and dominates its organizing structures” 
(3).  
I examine here some of the principles that govern the management of resources in 
economic terms, for example by analyzing how each company in the four case studies works to 
enact boundaries of artificial scarcity to exercise more control over the circulation of content, in 
the face of (and sometimes using) technologies of distribution that are built to cultivate 
abundance. At the same time, I analyze media logics that manifest in terms of organizational 
hierarchies and power structures, as with the notions of centralized versus decentralized 
mechanisms of control. My research details the establishment, maintenance, and evolution of 
contemporary content delivery circuits, which are comprised of a complicated network of 
telecommunications infrastructures that interact with social media and streaming platforms. This 
dissertation emphasizes that these circuits are entry points to underlying processes of digital 
distribution, whereby legacy mass media logics become intertwined with newer logics of social 
media and internet-based technologies. For instance, the centralized control over content 
circulation that characterized traditional mass media confronts the programmability of web-based 
applications, where consumer-user interactions on such platforms can reroute content in ways as 
significant as the decisions of producers, and that are anticipated by producers in advance. These 
paradigms consist of a host of infrastructures, technologies and processes of distribution. In 
addition, I focus on a series of companies and industries that regulate the circulation of media 
content.  
The way that I deploy the term “media” here, in terms of internet distribution, is largely 
rooted in older work on media convergence, which was a function of fetishizing digital media, 
whereby discrete media forms—music, news, film, television, books, and so forth—could be 
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reduced to their binary code in digital form, and then how multiple end points of distribution 
came together into a single consumer electronic device or a single medium. Alongside this older 
thinking about convergence by media theorists stood those attending to the rash of mergers 
between legacy media paradigms and telecommunications or internet technology companies. 
These mergers illustrated a concentration of ownership over different kinds of media content, as 
well as over different forms of media distribution. This form of thinking about convergence 
seemed to shift during the early 2000s, and especially with Henry Jenkins’ work on convergence 
culture from 2006. New media was no longer thought to subsume or displace older or legacy 
forms. Instead, for Jenkins convergence referred to “the flow of content across multiple media 
platforms, the cooperation between multiple media industries, and the migratory behavior of 
media audiences who will go almost anywhere in search of the kinds of entertainment 
experiences they want” (2006, 2). For Jenkins, convergence allowed for more grassroots and 
participatory forms of media to emerge, alongside and within networks of consumer 
empowerment. One of the main factors that distinguishes this dissertation from Jenkins’s model 
is that I am more interested in the systems of distribution beyond consumer empowerment.  
What I am doing here is a more descriptive project of a few specific processes of 
distribution, as instantiated through corporate entities. I am confining the scope of my conception 
of media—or more abstractly, of that which is distributed—largely to television programming 
over the internet. Doing so lays down a solid foundation from which to build off in future 
projects, by incorporating for instance different conceptions of the distributed like “information” 
or “data.” It does so through an acknowledgement that, for instance, the major cable and 
telecommunications companies that supply consumers with access to the internet in the first 
place—the bottlenecked “last mile” from which conventional media forms as well as more 
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abstract products like information and data flow—are in many ways the focal points of the 
distribution circuit. As such, grounding the analysis within the confines of conventional media is 
an essential first step to understanding the constitution and operations of such distribution circuit 
to begin with. 
This dissertation is exactly the inverse of Amanda Lotz's (2017) recent book Portals: A 
Treatise on Internet-Distributed Television. Whereas Lotz focuses more explicitly on how 
internet distribution changes the kinds of television that is made, and how such programming is 
organized for consumption, this dissertation uses internet television to ground case studies in the 
constitution and operation of media distribution circuits. I work across the spaces between that 
older model of media convergence—grounded in cable, “interactive television,” and discrete 
moving-image texts—and the more emergent model based in multiple devices (rather than the 
singled medium), mobile and social media, targeted and distributed media, data and metadata 
analytics, new ideas about and problems of "interoperability," and logics of information. The 
general trajectory of each chapter traces and explores the spaces between these models in distinct 
ways. In addition, the overall arc of the dissertation moves across these interstices, culminating 
in the final chapter on new configurations between industries and industrial functions. Unlike 
Lotz's emphasis on how the internet changes television as a cultural form, the focus of this 
dissertation necessitates a hybrid model and set of approaches that works between and amongst 
traditions connected to business case studies, legal studies, film studies, television studies, 
communication studies, developing interest areas of journalism, economics and public policy, 
cultural studies, internet studies, science and technology studies, and media studies. The circuits 
of distribution that this project takes as its objects hold together the nodes of distribution, the 
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means of distribution, and the media programming (that which is distributed) as these 
developments since over-the-top television continue to take shape.  
I draw from a wide range of secondary documents, including news stories, company blog 
posts, court cases, academic and popular press books, trade journals, and other sources that 
articulate some of the issues of cross-platform and international distribution that I raise here. I 
worked to identify patterns, themes, and connections across this array of disparate sources, and 
used these findings to identify and analyze assumptions, trends, and stakes that underlie the 
entrance of new geographic or technological markets by technology startups, entertainment 
streaming companies, social media companies, and multinational tech conglomerates. I ground 
this dissertation in critical media industries studies, and in particular the goals of the Connected 
Viewing initiative, a research collaboration started at the University of California, Santa Barbara 
between academic researchers and media industry practitioners. In particular, my research builds 
upon recent work that has shifted focus toward distribution, relative to media studies’ more 
common focus on production and consumption. Following from these efforts, I document and 
critically analyze the “broader ecosystem in which digital distribution in rendered possible” (Holt 
and Sanson 2014). I draw from work that focuses on the industrial background through which the 
control of circulation and access of media content occurs. I chose television as the primary mode 
for understanding all of these changes, in the first place, because it serves as such an important 
bridge between older but still present twentieth-century technological formations and more 
emergent formations from the twenty-first century. The point was not to make this dissertation 
about television on the internet, but rather to use the circulation of television over the internet to 
identify how contemporary, post-internet circuits of media distribution develop and intermingle. 
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In the first chapter, I use the Supreme Court case ABC v Aereo to trace the rise of 
retransmission fees within the context of the emergence of broadband distribution and internet-
based television. Aereo was a technology startup that captured broadcast television signals and 
retransmitted them over the internet. They charged users a subscription fee, but did not ask for 
permission from, or offer payment to, the broadcast networks. The networks then sued Aereo, 
and the case went all the way to the Supreme Court before Aereo was forced to shut down. In 
this chapter, distribution becomes a matter of threading discrete but overlapping technical 
infrastructures—broadcast, cable television, and broadband internet—through a web of business-
to-business financial contracts. These contracts are dictated by retransmission consent, a 
provision of the 1992 Cable Act that dictates rules about content circulation between networks 
and distributors. Retransmission consent is at the heart of the first chapter’s case study, the 
Supreme Court case ABC v. Aereo. Using retransmission consent as an analytical focus 
underscores the issue of carriage, which indicates which parties are responsible for carrying a 
televisual signal, what imperatives drive those responsibilities, and what kinds of contractual 
agreements stitch them together.  
Policymakers implemented retransmission consent in 1992 in large part to safeguard 
local broadcast stations against perceived competition from larger cable operators. The major 
broadcast networks have weaponized retransmission consent in the internet era to generate 
money through retransmission fees. These fees ballooned from $28 million in 2005 to $7.7 
billion at the end of 2016. Broadcast networks continue to exploit retransmission consent largely 
because federal policies do not account adequately for the proliferation of broadband-era means 
of distribution. By leveraging retransmission consent in a way that is at odds with the original 
mandate, broadcast networks have come to exert a great deal of power over the industry 
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standards that dictate rules about how television programming can circulate over the internet. 
ABC v. Aereo serves as a landmark moment in the history of internet-based streaming media, 
when internet television graduated from being a threat to legacy media companies to a mode of 
circulation that is officially sanctioned by broadcasters and cable networks. 
To support this claim, I first document Aereo’s company history and the underlying 
technological makeup of its streaming service, which demonstrates the connections between 
legacy media like broadcast television and Silicon Valley both in the makeup of Aereo’s 
executive board and its technical infrastructure. I then offer a history of the retransmission 
consent policy and the rise of retransmission fees, which I cobbled together from academic 
histories of cable, broadcasting, and media policy; news stories about programming blackouts 
from the past decade; and reports from congressional and regulatory bodies on media policy. 
This history allows me to illuminate the importance of broadcast-era regulatory policies for 
contemporary broadband distribution, and account for how broadcast networks have coopted 
federal regulations for financial gain. I then analyze the rulings of the lower Circuit Court as well 
as the Supreme Court by reading the arguments made by both the broadcast networks (the 
plaintiffs) and Aereo (the defendant), the written decisions from the Circuit Court judge and the 
Supreme Court justices, and news stories written about the case. By doing so, I show how legal 
decisions—and popular discourse around legal decisions—come to influence the structure of 
distribution circuits.  
My second chapter analyzes Netflix’s international expansion. This case study offers 
insight into how consumer viewing habits, technologies of information infrastructures, and 
content licensing practices intersect to shape the international circulation of media and structure 
access to it. I focus my analysis on geoblocking, a technology of access control that uses internet 
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protocol address databases to determine a user’s physical location via internet-connected devices. 
For people who stream media, geoblocking manifests itself most explicitly when access to 
certain content is blocked, and viewers are instead met with a message on their screen that says 
“this video is not available in your location.” It is common practice for a streaming service like 
Netflix to offer dissimilar content libraries in different countries and regions. Such an 
arrangement requires international distributors to negotiate for multiple content licenses of the 
same show, while also offering opportunities for service customization based on language or 
territory. On the other hand, Netflix users often circumvent geographic restrictions to gain access 
to content unavailable in their area. Content rights holders pressure Netflix to regulate such 
circumvention efforts, which they characterize as a form of piracy. However, these “pirates” are 
in fact paying Netflix subscribers, creating a dilemma that partly incentivizes Netflix to ignore its 
policing responsibilities. These new policies and practices are restructuring the international 
circulation of television programming. 
I analyze how Netflix operates internationally and how its actions reflect a strategy of 
global expansion, within the context of geographic market segmentation that geoblocking 
represents. To do this, I focus on three core areas of Netflix’s business: content, subscribers, and 
infrastructural technologies. First, the international distribution of streaming digital media brings 
with it a series of challenges for how Netflix deals with content both in terms of licensing third-
party television and films and for branding its Netflix Originals. Second, international streaming 
in fragmented markets reconfigures how Netflix conceives of its subscribers in terms of the 
recommendation system and viewership data, in ways that upset more traditional metrics of 
viewership “success.” Third, Netflix’s rapid and aggressive moves abroad has meant adjusting 
how it manages the various infrastructural technologies that serve as the backbone for the 
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streaming service. Netflix works to effectively manage both the massive flow of data traffic that 
its service generates and the circumvention of filtering technologies that map geographic borders 
onto digital spaces. 
 To build this analysis, I organize a collection of disparate sources, including Netflix’s 
financial reports and regulatory filings, their public correspondence and recordings, their 
marketing materials, news reports about them, and popular and academic business histories of 
the company. By reading these sources together, I analyze how Netflix has operated in light of 
the many complications involved in running an internationally expanding video streaming 
service. I contextualize these analytical insights by drawing from academic work on differential 
content access across geopolitical regions, international regulatory regimes, and the evolving 
business of licensing, production, and distribution of television programming.  
While geopolitical borders continue to complicate the distribution of television 
programming, live television represents a lucrative frontier for social media platforms the world 
over. The third chapter investigates the evolving relationship between conventional television 
and social media through an analysis of Twitter’s foray into livestreaming broadcast feeds. In 
particular, this chapter examines Twitter’s deal with the NFL to stream select regular season 
games through its platform during the 2016 season. The economics of live television continue to 
be driven by metrics that measure audience size, which helps determine advertising revenue. 
This incentive structure has led to experimental alliances between content owners and social 
media companies whose users represent massive potential audiences. In these partnerships, 
social media is evolving into a primary screen, where users can watch live “television” on the 
social media platform itself. This chapter offers insights into how Twitter attempts to reinvent 
itself as a hybrid video content gateway through which users can access live television. Part of 
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this transformation means bringing together a popular medium for user-generated content, where 
the barrier to entry for new users is so low that people do not even have to sign up for an account 
to use the service, with broadcast television, an industry that is notoriously consolidated and 
operates on a model that bottlenecks the flow of information down to a few select “voices.” 
The Twitter case highlights the evolution of the distribution circuit to include social 
media platforms. Initially useful for television distribution as a second screen—a place for 
content owners to publish supplemental content and for fans to interact with the show and with 
each other—Twitter morphed into its own version of a television screen for live content on an 
international scale. The Twitter case study expands the distribution circuitry to include platforms 
that initially operated adjacent to or wholly apart from conventional television, but which have 
come to experiment with its delivery over the internet. By integrating its livestreaming initiative 
into its platform for user-generated content, Twitter created an entire ecosystem of the television 
experience by facilitating the ability to watch, react to, and follow journalistic coverage of 
programming—and even generate unauthorized retransmissions—all in the same place. 
In this chapter, my primary sources are news articles about Twitter’s experiments with 
livestreaming. In particular, I focus on stories about Twitter’s acquisitions of, and partnerships 
with, technology startups in video streaming, artificial intelligence, and user-generated 
broadcasting, as well as major tech and media companies. By stitching these stories together, I 
can identify Twitter’s broader strategic aims in assembling a livestreaming infrastructure. I also 
draw from articles about Twitter’s executive board and department heads, which offer insight 
into the corporate crises and challenges that arose in recent years over Twitter’s role as a social 
media company, and the strategic responses that the company took that led to pursuing an active 
role in livestreaming television in the first place. These sources are further contextualized 
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through academic work that documents: broad paradigms of media and tech sectors like 
broadcasting, broadband, and social media; the development and deployment of second screen 
technologies by tech and legacy media companies; and characteristics of formal and informal 
screen distribution. By reading news articles in light of these academic sources, I am able to 
further narrate the overall arc of the dissertation by analyzing in this chapter Twitter’s shift from 
the second screen to a full ecosystem for television programming.  
The final chapter expands this circuitry even further, as I progress from a television 
ecosystem (in the case of Twitter) to investigate how streaming TV programming fits into a 
much larger distribution ecosystem that extends far beyond traditional media industries.  I use as 
a case study a conflict between Google and Amazon over the compatibility of cross-platform 
streaming media, in order to analyze the emergence of smart home devices—especially smart 
speakers like the Amazon Echo and the Google Home—as vehicles for media distribution. This 
chapter focuses on consumer electronic devices and the systems of networked technologies that 
undergird their increased interconnection in the still-nascent “smart home.” I analyze how 
Google and Amazon are attempting to turn the smart speaker into the main hub of this 
interconnection. Not only does the smart speaker serve as a control center for the circulation of 
media, it also represents a gateway to other smart home devices that might monitor and regulate 
the other household appliances, not to mention heating and lighting. As with the other chapters, 
here I draw largely from news reports and company blogs and websites that document the 
conflict between Google and Amazon, as well as the growth and development of their smart 
speakers. I read these sources in order to analyze the strategic moves taken by Google and 
Amazon as they enter a wide range of tech sectors, including voice-operated artificial 
intelligence software and smart speaker hardware, and position themselves as centers of power 
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working to become all-purpose distribution ecosystems. I end the dissertation with a brief 
afterword that zooms out from media industries, thus expanding the scope and the stakes of 
media distribution. 
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Internet Television Distribution and the Law: The Case of ABC v. Aereo 
 
Broadcast vs. Broadband 
 
On June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled in ABC v. Aereo that the television streaming 
service Aereo had violated copyright laws by retransmitting broadcast signals without 
authorization from or payment to content owners (Liptak and Steel 2014). This case was a 
pivotal moment for the internet-based distribution of live, linear television programming. Aereo 
represented a threat to retransmission fees, a revenue stream that for the past ten years has 
become increasingly important for broadcasters. By deciding against Aereo, the court enhanced 
broadcaster power to regulate the conditions under which live television can circulate via the 
internet. Live programming, and sports in particular, had become the most important advantage 
that broadcasters held over online streaming services in the battle for viewers. In addition, this 
decision entrenched linear television—setting a pre-determined programming schedule—as an 
industry standard for internet distribution controlled by broadcast and cable networks. In the 
wake of this important legal case, networks are now empowered to tether content to conduit, 
which constrains the possibilities for the development of internet television. The effects of such 
control can be seen in the slew of television streaming services that have emerged in the years 
since the court decision, including Playstation Vue, DirecTV’s Sling TV, YouTube TV, the 
network-owned Hulu with Live TV, and even recent experiments with live programming from 
social media companies like Facebook and Twitter. These services are largely replicating the 
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programming norms of traditional television by signing deals to stream pre-existing live network 
feeds.   
This chapter uses the Aereo case to analyze how broadcast networks leveraged existing 
copyright and telecommunications policies that dictate rules about the circulation of live, linear 
television programming, in order to enhance their power over internet distribution, at a time 
when that power was thought to be waning. ABC v. Aereo establishes a central tension for 
contemporary media distribution between broadcast-era policy and business models based on 
principles of scarcity, and broadband-era logics grounded in abundance. In particular, I focus on 
how broadcasters turned the issue of retransmission consent to their advantage. Retransmission 
consent is a clause of the 1992 Cable Act that set terms about the conditions under which cable 
providers can distribute broadcast network signals. As the Aereo case and its aftermath 
demonstrate, when broadcast signals are transmitted via broadband internet, their legal status and 
proprietary standing continue to be called into question by distributors, content rights owners, 
and regulatory bodies.  
Amidst debates about the responsibilities that companies who run internet-based 
platforms have (and should have) to people who use them, it is useful to highlight Aereo’s 
fundamental case, where the first key mode of twenty first century media distribution—
broadband—butted up against those of the twentieth century. Broadcast television has for 
decades served a role as a “public trustee” (at least, such a designation has served as a useful 
rhetorical device for media policy makers, journalists who cover the media, and for broadcasters 
themselves). In the Aereo case, which pitted broadcasters against an upstart internet company, 
the discursive position of the broadcaster’s traditional role as public trustee of the airwaves 
26 
  
becomes overshadowed by a different role: that of a guardian of financially lucrative, privately 
owned intellectual property.  
Several important factors play a role in this shift. First, several decades of deregulatory 
policies and a general political and cultural shift towards privatization—and away from public 
service liberalism—helped to engender the conditions for this shift. Another related factor is the 
continued convergence of broadband, broadcast, cable (and satellite), and mobile technologies. A 
third development is the ongoing digitization of content, which allows for increased 
“networkability” and compression (easy and efficient distribution through a network), density 
(how much information can be stored), and manipulability (the flexibility to shift content to 
multiple formats and platforms) (Burroughs 2015, Flew 2002). A fourth component involves the 
calculated cultivation, via internet streaming, of specific viewer behaviors and expectations for 
accessing, watching, interacting with, and paying for content, both from consumers (the “demand 
side”) and through media industry practices (the “supply side”). Finally, broadcasters can 
successfully exploit regulatory policy, effectively weaponizing certain aspects of the law for 
monetary gain. These factors came to a head in the Aereo case, forming a context in which 
streaming video helps to expose some of the gaps in the policy foundations of legacy media 
formations like broadcast and cable, in particular as those foundations are built into regulation on 
emerging distribution schematics.  
Retransmission consent represents a policy exemplar in this regard. Retransmission 
consent fees result from the retransmission consent clause of the 1992 Cable Act. For the past 
decade or so, broadcast television content has become an increasingly significant source of 
revenue for broadcasters via the collection of these fees, which cable and satellite distributors 
pay to broadcasters in exchange for the right to circulate broadcast channels to consumers 
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through cable and satellite packages. In 2005, cable and satellite distributors paid $28 million in 
retransmission consent fees to local stations. In June 2016, media research firm SNL Kagan 
expected retransmission fees to reach $7.7 billion by the end of the year, and projected $11.6 
billion would be collected by 2022 (Twomey 2016). These fees were in the foreground of the 
Aereo case, as the broadcasters fought to ensure they were paid, Aereo worked to keep from 
paying them, and the courts mused about what such fees signify in the context of technological 
change. Dozens of amicus briefs were filed on behalf of both sides by trade associations, major 
league sports, law associations, major media companies, national and international federations 
for copyright reform, and digital advocacy groups. In the meantime, outside the courtroom 
policymakers debated the merits and necessity of such legal provisions in the first place.  
Retransmission consent fees have been consistently overlooked within media studies, 
even media policy studies, and media journalism. When it is mentioned in the press, it is 
typically in the context of public blackouts of popular programming, stemming from disputes 
between a distributor and a network. Similarly, media scholarship tends to consider 
retransmission consent in terms of the various, and very public, television blackouts that result 
from disputes between networks like CBS and multichannel video programming distributors 
(MVPDs), a legal definition of television distributors that serves as an umbrella term for cable, 
satellite, telecom, and so forth. In this context, as Jennifer Holt, et al (2012) have described, the 
focus tends to be on the loss of access to favorite programming. Susan Crawford (2013) expands 
the scope of analysis somewhat by considering retransmission consent in terms of broader 
consumer rights. Amanda Lotz (2014) shifts the focus on retransmission consent from consumers 
to producers, to explain how networks attempt to generate new sources of revenue in light of 
new distribution technologies. Alexander Russo (2011) provides some welcome historical 
28 
  
context, by drawing parallels between television networks and affiliates with early relationships 
between radio networks and affiliates. Rob Frieden (2015) addresses retransmission as a 
regulatory matter, by discussing the extent to which the FCC can and should exercise its 
authority. Phillip Napoli (2011) also tackles retransmission as a matter of public policy, by 
dissecting whether or not it lives up to its original mandate: to protect the principle of localism. 
Here, I build off these varied and important approaches to retransmission consent, in order to 
examine how preexisting regulatory policies for “old media” like broadcasting are brought to 
bear on post-internet circuits of distribution.  
The rise in retransmission fees suggests a push by major content owners to co-opt, graft 
onto, and normalize a legacy business model for broadband television distribution in the face of 
what these companies see as profound change. The irony is that the policy tool that they are 
using to extract that preservation, retransmission consent, was meant to do quite the opposite: to 
preserve the local voices in the face of consolidated control over the major conduits for 
television. In addition, the ability to retransmit existing signals is precisely how cable television 
itself came to be in the first place. It is from that relatively straightforward action, of plugging 
into an existing distribution infrastructure, that cable distribution grew into its own dominant 
paradigm.  
This chapter argues that the evolution of live internet television is as much the result of 
broadcasters using broadcast-era federal policies like retransmission consent to their advantage 
as it is the product of new technologies, “disruptive” internet streaming companies, or evolving 
consumer demands. To do this, I discuss Aereo’s history and analyze the company’s attempts to 
unmoor the tightly controlled broadcast and cable television ecosystem in light of the rise of 
streaming services. Next, I turn to the ABC v. Aereo case, and use it to explore how broadcasters 
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have come to shift their traditional revenue models by leveraging both the retransmission consent 
clause of the 1992 Cable Act and existing copyright law. Finally, I conclude by speculating 
about how the implications of the Aereo decision will continue to shape broader trends in 
broadband distribution. 
Aereo’s History 
Chaitanya “Chet” Kanojia launched a company called Bamboom in 2011. Within a year, 
Bamboom had financial backing from a major media mogul, and its name changed to Aereo. 
Kanojia was a former chief executive of Navic Networks, which delivered interactive 
advertisements across cable networks via technology that was embedded in set-top cable boxes 
(Healey 2011). This technology enabled cable and broadcast networks to measure audience 
demographics in “real time,” and then provided the capacity for those networks to deliver 
demographic-targeted ads to match those measurements. His time at Navic Networks taught 
Kanojia that around half of pay-TV viewers were actually watching local broadcast channels at 
any given point in time. These channels could otherwise be watched for free—or at least without 
a monthly cable subscription—with a digital antenna.  
The idea behind Bamboom/Aereo came from what Kanojia saw as several important 
conditions about television, the internet, and media culture more generally. Cable companies had 
shown that people were interested in paying for television, even if in aggregate they largely 
watched channels they could otherwise get for free. Moreover, people prefer the flexibility of 
being able to watch when they want. In addition, for many people the television set was no 
longer the primary device through which they wanted to watch broadcast and cable 
programming. Also, the programmability of the internet offers the opportunity to translate the 
broadcast feeds into delivery formats that fit a given device. Finally, broadcast feeds travel over 
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the public airwaves, and can be accessed for free via any digital antenna. Kanojia reasoned that 
his company could harness the public airwaves to become a middleman between viewers and 
network feeds. Doing so would solve the problem of paying for content to distribute, which for 
distributors is an exorbitant cost. Rather than become an internet-based cable company, Aereo 
could get into the antenna rental business. This distinction, Kanojia thought, would allow the 
company to bypass the restrictions of the Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act, which gave 
networks and other content owners the exclusive right to publicly distribute their content.  
Media mogul Barry Diller bought into this business plan as well, and agreed to finance 
Aereo. On Valentine’s Day 2012, Diller introduced Aereo at a press conference in the Manhattan 
headquarters of IAC/InterActiveCorp, Diller’s media and internet company. For $12 a month 
(this would later drop to $8 during the lawsuits), subscribers received access to broadcast 
television streams through the internet that they could watch through multiple devices. In 
addition, Aereo offered a cloud-based DVR system so that subscribers could record shows they 
did not want to watch when they aired. At the time of its launch, Aereo positioned itself in a few 
unique ways. For the consumer, Aereo represented an alternative to expensive cable 
subscriptions and offered the flexibility to watch live television across multiple screens. For the 
traditional television networks and distributors, Aereo was the latest attempt to “disrupt” and 
“innovate” what Diller called the “closed cable-broadcast-satellite circle” (Stelter 2012). Finally, 
Aereo distinguished itself from other internet-based video streaming services by attempting to 
corner the market on circulating live, linear broadcast television over the internet. As points of 
contrast, YouTube grew largely through an integration of user-generated and network-owned 
content, and Netflix offers on-demand access to a library of films and television, thereby 
ignoring the model of linear programming distribution. 
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Diller is no stranger to legacy media in the United States, having worked in film and 
television for over 50 years. He has served as the Vice President of Development for ABC and 
launched what was seen as a new form of programming in “The Movie of the Week.” Later, he 
became Chairman and CEO of Paramount Pictures from 1974 to 1984, at a time when the 
company was one of the first and most successful at branching out into the emerging markets of 
video cassette sales and rentals (Salmans 1983). He then moved to the same position at Fox, Inc, 
where he helped build Fox into what was essentially the fourth major broadcast network 
alongside CBS, ABC, and NBC and spearheaded the push to make that network more “youth-
oriented” with programming like The Simpsons and Married, with Children. In the mid-1990s, 
Diller took over control of USA Network, Inc. from Seagram, a company owned by the 
Bronfman family, which made much of its wealth selling booze during Prohibition. In short, 
Diller is well-versed in acting as a kind of “pioneer,” in particular with respect to his own media 
image. The internet is riddled with archives of news articles going back to the 1970s about 
Diller’s business savvy, ruthlessness (or hardheadedness), and his various cutting-edge deals.  
Aereo’s service was cobbled together as an amalgam of broadcast and broadband-era 
technologies. Aereo operated using dime-sized antennas to pick up the broadcast signals from 
nearby stations and transmit them to its users. Each antenna was assigned to an individual user at 
the moment that user started to use the service. When they stopped watching, the antenna went 
back into circulation, and could be assigned to any other user. These signals were then 
transcoded from over-the-air television signals into a delivery format that various internet-
connected devices could turn into video streams. Aereo’s antennas were “narrowcast” rather than 
“broadcast” antennas, in that they only registered six megahertz spectrum blocks. Instead, they 
could be switched on and off by their users. Aereo users only activated their assigned antennas, 
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and thus the antennas only began to pick up the spectrum, once the users decided to watch 
something on the service (Roberts 2012). Aereo could afford to house a large amount of these 
antennas in a single place in each of the cities where the service operated. To store the antennas 
in New York City, its first launch site, Aereo rented the top floor of a government building on 
Vanderbilt Avenue in Brooklyn. The site was chosen because it had a direct and unencumbered 
line of sight to the Empire State Building, the city’s largest transmission tower. Aereo’s small 
antennas would each pick up the broadcast from the Empire State Building, and then transmit 
those signals to user devices throughout the five boroughs.  
Legal factors also played a role in the decision to use these micro antennas. Other 
companies had tried unsuccessfully to sustain businesses using similar models, including 
iCraveTV and ivi. These attempts were struck down in court for failing to comply with a part of 
the Copyright law that prohibited unauthorized “public performances” of television broadcasts. 
Both iCraveTV and ivi used a single large antenna to capture and transmit the telecasts. Like 
Aereo, they lacked the proper authorization (in the form of a compulsory license) and did not pay 
the content owners for the permission to transmit that content. The “performances” of these 
retransmitted telecasts by iCraveTV and ivi were considered public by the court because they 
used the single antenna to broadcast to their users. In other words, the legal distinction between 
what is public and private hinged on an adherence to a long-held logic of mass media that 
assumes centralized control over what people watch and when. The courts reasoned that the 
broadcasts of both iCraveTV and ivi were a classic “one-to-many” mode of communication (or, 
“performance”). Such broadcasts were considered public performances because there “many” 
viewers were watching the same thing at the same time, and because the broadcast feed they 
were watching comes from the same source: the single antenna. By contrast, Aereo devised a 
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system to decentralize that control, whereby a single antenna was assigned to a single user. In 
this way, Aereo reasoned, any use of its service was strictly a private rather than a public 
performance. Setting aside the legal distinctions between private and public performances, the 
larger point here is Aereo’s clear deference to broadcast-era policies about how television 
content is allowed to circulate, even as they sought ways to circumvent those policies in their 
attempt to successfully crack the code of live, linear television online.  
The major broadcast networks disagreed with Aereo’s logic, and on March 1, 2012 they 
filed a lawsuit against Aereo for copyright infringement. ABC v. Aereo was legally predicated on 
an accusation of copyright law infractions. However, broadcasters fought to protect the possible 
loss of retransmission fees. Distributors pay these fees to broadcasters in exchange for the right 
to circulate broadcast channels to consumers through cable, satellite, and now broadband 
streaming services. Before proceeding with an analysis of Aereo’s case progression from the 
lower courts to the Supreme Court, and a discussion of its implications for these subsequent 
developments in retransmission fees, it is necessary to explain the emergence of the fees 
themselves. The next section offers a primer on what these fees are, why they are rising, and how 
they relate to the stakes of the Aereo case.  
Retransmission Consent Fees: From 1992 Cable Act to the Present 
Section six of the 1992 Cable Act instituted retransmission consent, which offered 
broadcasters the option to negotiate monetary compensation—in the form of retransmission 
fees—for letting cable distributors transmit broadcaster signals. Since at least the late 1950s, 
when cable companies began to pick up local broadcast signals and transmit them to areas of the 
country that could otherwise not receive them, the legal status of both over-the-air broadcast 
signals and the programming on those signals has been in conflict. For some years, cable 
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operators were not obliged to compensate for the right to retransmit these signals. As a 
regulatory matter, this is because cable was viewed by policymakers in the 1940s and 1950s as a 
useful extension of broadcasting, rather than a threat that might undercut its existing revenue 
streams. Cable extended the reach of both the programming and the advertising of broadcasts. As 
a result, the FCC understood cable to be a “functional technology” that spread broadcast signals, 
rather than a new medium for regulation, which would have qualified it for status as either a 
common carrier or as a broadcaster in its own right (Lubinskey 1996). 
It was not until 1965 that the FCC determined that all forms of CATV (cable antenna 
television) could be regulated. In 1968 this decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., in which the court determined that the FCC’s had the authority 
to regulate cable under the Communications Act. The court restrained this authority “to that 
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of its responsibilities of television 
broadcasting” (Southwestern). Among such ancillary powers was the ability of the FCC to 
require cable systems to retransmit local broadcast signals. In a ruling that would become quite 
prescient (and somewhat ironic) for the Aereo case, the court dismissed the argument by cable 
companies that they were merely a receptive mode of distribution. To the contrary, the court 
recognized that cable played an active role in the reconstitution of television as a network of 
technologies (linked between the cable wires and the broadcast towers and airwaves) and as a 
cultural form, as cable companies had begun to attempt to originate their own content. A 
footnote in the court’s written decision made their thoughts plain: “It is clear that a CATV 
system is more than a passive recipient of television signals, indistinguishable from a rooftop 
antenna; CATV systems engage in commercial retransmission of the signals they receive” 
(Parsons 2008, pp. 220). Such sentiments are common in the history of U.S. media policy, where 
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regulators express unease about the consequences of vertically integrated corporations 
distributing their own content. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, much of that regulation emerged not from federal 
but from county and municipal authorities that granted (often exclusive) local cable franchises 
and enforced the cable rate rules, which were implemented because cable was thought to be a 
natural monopoly. The first major national cable television policy by the federal government 
came about in 1984 with the enactment of the Cable Communications Policy Act. This Act 
deregulated cable rates in areas with “effective competition,” a rather vague term that was 
defined as “any franchise area where three or more unduplicated broadcasting signals were 
available within a cable operator’s service area” (Parsons 2008). Nearly all cable systems 
qualified under this definition for rate deregulation. Cable prices subsequently rose throughout 
the rest of the decade, until Congress responded with the 1992 Cable Act.  
In the early 1990s, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
wrote a report on the state of the broadcasting system, detailing their reason for establishing the 
retransmission provisions: they intended to “establish a marketplace for the disposition of the 
rights to retransmit broadcast signals,” but did not intend “to dictate the outcome of the ensuing 
marketplace negotiations” (Parsons 2008). Many of the provisions in the 1992 Cable Act—
including retransmission consent—were born out of this report. Cable companies had begun to 
generate a lot of revenue, in part by carrying broadcast signals alongside content from cable 
networks. They were becoming the primary providers of television service in many local markets 
and were competing with local free broadcast services for advertising dollars. In addition, cable 
companies operated through subscription services, as opposed to the model of free over-the-air 
broadcasting. The point of the retransmission consent clause was to ensure “that our system of 
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free broadcasting remains vibrant, and not be replaced by a system which requires consumers to 
pay for television service” (Vogt 2013). To compensate for a perceived power imbalance that 
seemed to favor large-scale nationalized programming over local broadcast programming, 
Congress imposed “must-carry” provisions in the 1992 Cable Act. These provisions took one of 
two forms. Either cable companies were required to carry all local broadcast stations within a 
given market without payment, or a broadcast station could waive that right and negotiate 
compensation from cable systems. For several years after the implementation of retransmission 
consent, most broadcasters either opted for must-carry or negotiated with the cable company for 
some form of non-monetary compensation: advertising time, cross-promotions, and carriage of 
affiliated channels. A 2005 FCC-commissioned report to Congress argued that “cash still has not 
emerged as a principal form of consideration for retransmission consent. Today, virtually all 
retransmission consent agreements involve a cable operator providing in-kind consideration to 
the broadcaster” (FCC Retransmission Consent 7).   
Since 2005, broadcasters have become much more aggressive in incorporating 
retransmission consent fees into their revenue stream. They did so in response to what they saw 
as threats posed by internet distribution. The growth and maturity of internet distribution was 
supposed to spell the “death of TV.” A proliferation of competitive models for television 
distribution emerged to supposedly upend the stranglehold that the networks held over how 
television programming could be packaged, sold, and consumed. In addition, advertising dollars 
were increasingly spent on the internet, where advertisers could theoretically target and track 
consumers more efficiently and effectively. The era of broadcasting and mass media appeared to 
be at an end; we had supposedly entered a new age of decentralized and democratized control 
over access to the media. Instead, the networks found an alternative and incredibly lucrative 
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revenue source to not only keep them afloat, but to strengthen their position. More importantly, 
networks found in retransmission consent (and in retransmission fees) an effective policy vehicle 
for normalizing more traditional distribution practices onto broadband-era television distribution.  
Broadcasters have exercised their considerable authority to take control over the publicly-
owned airwaves. In particular, they have leveraged their power of the airwaves to enhance their 
ability to dictate terms over the rules about how broadcast content—and broadcaster feeds—can 
circulate on the internet. This has happened in large part through their manipulation of the 
retransmission consent clause of the Cable Act to generate the massive increases in 
retransmission fees. To reiterate, these fees totaled $28 million in 2005, but by the end of 2016, 
broadcasters had raised $7.7 billion. In the network era, relationships among stakeholders in 
television distribution were relatively straightforward because of the limited supply of channels 
and the restrictions in linear programming and scheduling. The proliferation of content 
distribution outlets on the Internet reduces the scarcity that cable companies leveraged against 
broadcasters. As such, the rise of retransmission fees is partly the result of a reversal of power 
relations between broadcast networks and distributors (Multichannel Video Programming 
Distributors, or MVPDs, to use the legal term). Cable networks are currently paid by distributors 
for their content, and broadcast networks have for the past decade fought to establish a similar 
relationship with distributors. Their networks, broadcasters (correctly) argue, have larger 
audiences than any of the cable networks. If an MVPD decides to balk on the fees that networks 
charge, they risk a channel blackout and angry customers, who in most markets have the option 
to switch to a different form of distribution (or cut the cord altogether). Therefore, broadcast 
networks have begun to leverage a considerable amount of influence over the rights to circulate 
their content over the internet.  
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Temporary Broadband Victories: Aereo in the Lower Courts 
Filed on March 1, 2012, ABC v. Aereo alleged that Aereo’s service infringed the 
broadcasters’ copyrights through unauthorized public performances. On July 11, 2012, Second 
Circuit Court Judge Alison Nathan denied the broadcasters’ request for a preliminary injunction, 
which would have blocked Aereo from allowing subscribers to use its service. It was a temporary 
victory for Aereo. In her ruling, Judge Nathan used the 2008 decision in Cartoon Network v. 
CSC Holdings, known as the Cablevision case, as an important precedent. This case hinged on 
Cablevision replacing physical DVRs—the set-top boxes that Cablevision subscribers kept in 
their homes—with virtual DVRs housed on the company’s servers. Using a remote DVR shifts 
the location of recordings from a set-top box in their living room of each subscriber’s home to 
“the cloud.” For broadcasters, the figure of the cloud seemed threatening because Cablevision 
was consolidating subscriber recordings in what appeared to be a centralized repository. From 
this central repository, broadcasters argued, Cablevision would control the conditions under 
which broadcaster content was retransmitted to consumers. This control would violate the 
broadcasters’ rights of public performance. Nathan argued that in the matter of Aereo, the 
Second Circuit was beholden to the reasoning laid out in the Cablevision case: “Because each 
RS-DVR [remote storage-DVR] playback transmission is made to a single subscriber using a 
single unique copy produced by that subscriber, we conclude that such transmissions are not 
performances ‘to the public,’ and therefore do not infringe any exclusive right of public 
performance” (pp. 43). According to Judge Nathan’s reading of the Cablevision case, Aereo’s 
service was analogous to the RS-DVR. Aereo’s subscribers were each assigned an individual 
antenna that produced a “single unique copy” of a transmission, so the resulting service was not 
seen as infringing on the right of public performance despite the fact that the transmissions were 
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stored in the cloud. The legal question here centered around whether Aereo itself actively (or 
directly) infringed the copyright when its subscriber hits “record” on its service, or whether the 
individual consumer was personally responsible for calling forth those recordings. 
Judge Nathan’s reasoning here is instructive for understanding how decisions about the 
legality of media distribution are made. The principles at stake in the rules of content circulation 
come from a desire on the part of the broadcasters to commodify the means of transmission by 
controlling the circulation of the broadcast feed and the nature of the storage of that feed’s 
content. Even as Aereo emerged from the Second Circuit victorious, the terms of the debate were 
couched in language that privileged the rights of major content owners to control distribution 
over the rights of upstart companies looking to transform and innovate broadcast television. 
Broadcast television has for decades served a role as a “public trustee,” or at least such a 
designation has served as a useful rhetorical device for media policy makers, journalists who 
cover the media, and for broadcasters themselves. In the Aereo case, the discursive position of 
the broadcaster’s traditional role as public trustee of the airwaves becomes overshadowed by a 
different role: that of a guardian of financially lucrative, privately owned intellectual property.  
The figure of the cloud in the Aereo case, as in the Cablevision decision, plays an 
important role that helps to unpack one of the most important stakes here: the commodification 
of the means of transmission itself. Traditional industry knowledge holds that media are typically 
defined as “dual-product” markets: the audience market and the content market.  This is an 
oversimplified characterization, one that ignores the value of distribution itself.  Instead media 
markets should be thought of as tri-product markets: audiences, content, and modes of 
transmission. The retransmission consent provisions acknowledge the value of the broadcast 
signal, as distinct from the value of the content on that signal. The commodification of the means 
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of transmission does not simply mean the signal. Included here also are the modes of data 
storage (for Aereo, the cloud-based DVR service) as well as the nature of the nodes in the 
transmission chain. In a Forbes column written during the window of the first round of the Aereo 
case, Professor Peter Decherney (2014) argues that one of the major implications of the 
Cablevision case is that the cloud would be included in the legal definition of the home, 
ostensibly for the first time. This is because the court ruled that content stored via the cloud by a 
DVR service was part of a private rather than a public performance.  
While this may be true, the consumer-viewer continues to shift in interesting ways as 
pure broadcast and cable services give way to hybridized broadband-based services. It used to be 
that the consumer node was “the home.” This node was geographically static. Signals were 
beamed to a home antenna or satellite dish, or the home was wired with cables. Aereo and other 
broadband-based services opened up the node to a more “mobile” target: from the home to the 
subscriber. Although geographic restrictions for service access still very much apply, the way 
those restrictions are managed through the law and by the corporate entities who offer such 
access is in conflict, as both the law and the companies reconcile a desire to sometimes apportion 
scarcity and other times manage abundance. Part of how this happens is through arguments over 
the tools of transmission.  
This ruling also offers insight into how the courts consider differences in distribution 
technologies when multiple means of accessing the same content exist. The broadcast feeds that 
Aereo distributed were already available for free to anyone with access to an antenna. Aereo’s 
legal argument hinged on its assertion that it is an equipment rental company: that the monthly 
fees paid by its subscribers are not paying for the content, but rather for the antenna used to 
access that content (as well as the use of the web-based interface and the cloud-based DVR 
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service). Barry Diller used Radio Shack as an analogy for Aereo’s service, arguing that by the 
broadcasters’ logic, any company that sold antennas should have to pay retransmission consent 
fees because the antennas facilitate the distribution of the broadcast feeds to viewers. Rather than 
selling antennas, Aereo was selling an antenna rental service, and was as such acting as an 
intermediary exempt from copyright infringement liability. This raises the issue of the 
gatekeeper role for distributors. Under the court’s ruling that the recording is private, it is in fact 
the consumer who would seem to become the gatekeeper to content access, in the sense that the 
consumer makes the decision about when access is granted. Moreover, Aereo (and Cablevision 
before it) would be considered a neutral conduit. Such logic detaches distribution technologies 
from the contents they carry. This defense has been a common refrain in debates about the 
circulation of content over the internet, including debates on net neutrality and with the recent 
controversies over “fake news” and social media. It isolates the technical problems over the 
control of the flow of information on the internet from the social or cultural problems. For the 
people who work on these platforms to begin to make editorial decisions about the kind of 
content therein would be to assume an uncomfortable level of “bias.” Philip Napoli and Robyn 
Caplan (2016) call this phenomenon the technocratization of communications policy discourse. 
In the Aereo case, this discourse framing becomes even more complicated because the first key 
mode of twenty first century media distribution—broadband—butts up against what is perhaps 
the preeminent mode of twentieth-century distribution in broadcast.  
One of the major articulations that kept arising in the Aereo case is that between the 
private-public debate, the individual consumer-viewer-subscriber, and the various distribution 
technologies at play. For Aereo, providing a rental service whereby each subscriber was assigned 
her own antenna meant facilitating a private performance, which would preclude them from 
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copyright restrictions. There is an irony in this argument and in its inverse (which the 
broadcasters represent). In the Aereo case, shifting from a broadcast-based distribution model to 
an internet-based model of distribution means shifting from television as a publicly-owned 
infrastructure to a privately-owned infrastructure. Retransmission consent is one policy whose 
original mandate—to preserve and ensure that the broadcasters who have been entrusted with the 
use of public airwaves—has essentially been inverted. So Aereo is using a public good argument 
to justify their privatization of television: it is simply facilitating access to what are free (and 
public) broadcasts. On the other hand, the broadcasters themselves argued to preserve their right 
to control the public performances of their privately owned intellectual property even as they 
built their businesses on the back of a public distribution system in the airwaves.  
There is also a clear upsetting here in the precise meaning of the term “private” as 
broadband and broadcast paradigms intersect. At stake for instance in the designation of a cloud-
based DVR service as a privately protected action are a couple of issues. Because the court relies 
upon precedence to rationalize its rulings, it often analogizes different generations of what seem 
to be similar technologies without fully taking stock of some important ways in which they are 
different. For instance, cloud-based DVR service are compared to set-top box-based DVR 
services, as well as earlier forms of recording technologies like the VCR. The point of 
comparison here is in the primary function of the technology: the ability to time shift and to 
make a copy of a piece of content for private consumption. One of the key components of a 
broadband-based logic of distribution is an “always on” or “always connected” component. With 
the cloud-based DVR, then, there is an extra level of monitoring since consumer-viewer 
activities—or impressions—can be more granularly catalogued and indexed. In addition, because 
this activity is stored in the cloud, it essentially extends private activities into a gray area, where 
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the protections of privacy have been subsumed by the contractual terms of service that 
subscribers agreed to in signing up to use Aereo (or something similar).  
There is also a sense in which this always on characteristic becomes implicitly articulated 
to the notion of “public” in public performance, in particular as the broadcasters are leveraging it 
to defend against unauthorized retransmission of their copyrighted work. The threat here is larger 
than Aereo, but rather comes from the ease with which such retransmission can occur through 
the various forms of broadband-internet distribution. Any number of Aereo-like startups have 
attempted to pick up broadcasts and distribute them over the internet. Some of them try to grow 
into legitimate businesses, while others operate through smaller peer-to-peer networks, but are 
typically quite easily accessible with a simple Google search: “Watch such-and-such online.” 
More recently, social media services have begun to offer broadcast capabilities to individual 
users with the introduction of applications like the Twitter-owned Periscope and Facebook Live. 
And while these mostly supersede the Aereo case, they are precisely the kind of threat that 
broadcasters fought against: the normalization of private broadcasts being transmitted into a 
realm deemed public on the way to private consumption. In other words, not only were the 
broadcasters fighting to defend their right to control the “performances” of their work to a public 
audience, they were also attempting to prevent such technologies from being able to operate in 
public, hidden in plain sight.  
Aereo and the Supreme Court 
By the time Aereo emerged, the broadcasters had for a few years been aggressively 
targeting retransmission fees as a source of revenue. Judge Nathan’s ruling in favor of Aereo in 
the Circuit Court signified a potential threat to that revenue because legalizing Aereo would open 
opportunities for distribution services to develop through business models built on retransmitting 
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over-the-air broadcast feeds without paying to do so. Perhaps more importantly, the ruling 
represented a hazard to broadcaster desire to dictate terms about the future of television 
distribution on the internet, by dislodging a major part of their ability to control how their 
content circulates. Seeking an appeal, broadcasters escalated the case to the Supreme Court. On 
October 11, 2013, council for the broadcasters filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, in which it 
asked the Supreme Court to rule on “whether a company ‘publicly performs’ a copyrighted 
television program when it retransmits a broadcast of that program to thousands of paid 
subscribers over the Internet” (ABC v. Aereo p. 3). In a six to three decision delivered on June 
25, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the broadcasters, thereby reversing the lower court 
ruling and rendering Aereo guilty of violating the Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act. 
As in the lower courts, the Supreme Court ruling hinged in large part on an analysis of 
the relationship between the content and the conduit. The conduits in this case are the various 
forms of material infrastructures that make up the distinct-but-interrelated distribution 
paradigms: the airwaves of broadcast, the cables and satellites, and broadband’s “pipes” and 
cloud data storage centers. Federal policy has often operated on an assumption that these 
conduits have some effect on the content that runs through them. Sometimes, this concern 
manifests in polices that regulate “horizontal” ownership structures, as in instances that restrict 
the number of media outlets—television stations, newspapers, radio stations—that a single media 
company can own and operate in a given market. Other times, these policies can regulate vertical 
integration, where telecommunications companies that largely control distribution (the conduits) 
merge with content companies, in an effort to achieve some level of “synergy” and exert control 
over specific media markets.  
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The potency of the retransmission consent clause—the ability to extract a large amount of 
revenue through by exploiting retransmission consent—is predicated on the persistence of the 
relationship between the “content” and the “conduit.” The rights to the content are controlled 
under the compulsory licenses as dictated in section 111 of the Copyright Law. On any given 
television signal one finds multiple shows, the copyright to each of which could is most likely 
owned by multiple parties (although it is worth noting that in 2013 nine companies owned 90 
percent of professionally produced video content in the United States (Lotz 2014).  Instead of 
having to negotiate with each copyright owner on a given stream, distributors (cable and satellite 
companies) can simply file for a compulsory license and pay a standard fee for the right to 
transmit the content on that signal. Those compulsory license fees are then distributed to the 
various associated parties to the copyright.    
The broadcasters played into this assumption, arguing that the mode of transmission is 
part and parcel of the content. People do not simply turn on any old channel; they turn on 
specific channels with specific programs. In its petition to the Supreme Court, for instance, the 
broadcasters tried to paint a picture of the lunacy of the Circuit Court’s ruling in favor of Aereo: 
“When tens of thousands of Aereo subscribers all simultaneously watch the same broadcast of 
the Super Bowl using Aereo, Aereo is not publicly performing the Super Bowl.  It is merely 
making tens of thousands of simultaneous ‘private’ performances to its subscribers” (Liptak and 
Carter 2014). The content is everything, but the underlying assumption here is that the content 
matters in the context of its distribution. The Super Bowl example is of course used as an 
extreme case, but one in which the connection between content and conduit is articulated through 
the collectivity of the event as consistently the show people (Americans) most watch “together.”  
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In the Supreme Court ruling, the connection between the content and conduit manifested 
in the difference between the majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, and the dissent opinion 
written by Justice Scalia. In its write-up of the case, the Harvard Law Review described this 
difference as a debate between “formalism” and “functionalism.” Justice Breyer, the 
functionalist, based his decision on an analysis of what Aereo’s service actually does, rather than 
how it works. He emphasized Aereo’s commercial effects, the user’s experience of the service, 
and whether or not broadcasters considered Aereo to be somehow fundamentally distinct from a 
cable provider. By contrast, Justice Scalia paid more attention to the technical aspects of Aereo’s 
system (Harvard Law Review 371). Whereas Breyer and the majority of the court’s justices 
embraced the analogy of Aereo as an internet-based cable company, given Aereo’s subscription-
based business model, Justice Scalia focused more on the differences between how a cable 
company worked and how an internet-based antenna rental service with a cloud-based digital 
video recorder worked. The majority decided this way despite the fact that cable television and 
broadcast television are themselves considered to be distinct kinds of entities under the law. Such 
distinctions matter because they shape the policy grounds under which media infrastructures are 
regulated. By siding with the broadcasters, the Supreme Court took a major step in foreclosing 
certain possibilities for the development of internet television distribution at a time when that 
development was quickly evolving.  
Another related example stems from the retransmission consent clause. In large part, 
instituting the retransmission consent policy was motivated by a core principle for 
communications policy in the United States: localism. The FCC looked to preserve the ability of 
local communities to access “the news and information that addressed their specific needs, 
interests, and concerns in the face of technological and competitive changes in the television 
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marketplace (Napoli 2011).  Retransmission consent is a policy that was born out of concerns 
over the overlapping power of two distinct distribution paradigms in cable and broadcast.  In 
other words, how to keep “broadcast” while at the same time making room for cable.  The fear—
however unfounded that it may have been—was that cable would usurp broadcast, and the losers 
would be those local affiliates, the local voices. The conduit becomes an expression of market 
power, bringing with it the “voices” of the national networks to overshadow those of the 
“community.”  
But what does a localism principle look like with the emergence of internet-based 
television distribution? In the shift from a broadcast model to a broadband video streaming 
model, one way of understanding this is to look at how space is configured. In many of the early 
conflicts that arose between cable operators and broadcasters, these conflicts would arise as 
broadcasters would try to restrict cable operators from transmitting “distant signals,” which are 
signals that are otherwise unavailable through over-the-air broadcasts in a given area. The 
problem with distant signals, from the point of view of broadcasters, is that they were adding 
value to cable services by providing more programming in addition to the over-the-air signals 
that the cable services were able to retransmit. A consumer could conceivably choose between a 
free over-the-air service that only offers a few channels and a paid service that offers those 
channels plus other “distant signals”; the fear for broadcasters is that more people would choose 
cable.   
By contrast, many emerging internet-based television services have completely elided 
local programming and live broadcast feeds, unless viewers live in one of the largest cities in the 
country (Lotz 2016). We can see this conflict play out during the numerous (and growing) 
retransmission negotiations that often end up in a blackout. In 2010, for example, Time Warner 
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was in a prolonged and ugly negotiation with Sinclair Broadcast Group, which owned affiliate 
stations for ABC, Fox, and CBS. There were threats to consumers that Time Warner would have 
to blackout those stations because it refused to pay the retransmission fees that Sinclair 
demanded. Turns out that Fox had negotiated a separate deal with Time Warner in the midst of 
the Sinclair negotiations, which would allow Time Warner to purchase Fox’s national network 
programming in the event that it lost access to the station feeds. What this essentially means is 
that the nationally televised shows would remain on the air for people in those “problem areas,” 
but the locally-produced or licensed programming—like the local news—would be inaccessible. 
Such an agreement also severely diminishes the negotiating power for the stations (and the 
broadcast group), while also creating a scenario where there is a two-front war: the fight over the 
mode of transmission (the feed) and the fight over access to the programming itself, which in the 
separate negotiation for Fox’s national content essentially unbundled the shows from the 
broadcast. As in the example of the public performance right, the content blackouts also work to 
maintain the necessity of the content-conduit articulation.  
The rise of these fees, therefore, coincides directly with “always on” connectivity and 
industry initiatives like TV Everywhere, where theoretically one can watch what one wants, 
when one wants, and on whatever devices one wants.  As such, retransmission fees are an effect 
of the expansion of networking, which Victoria Johnson describes as a “framework for the 
reorganization of space and time from the region and local expression to seemingly ‘placeless,’ 
modern, national modes of production and consumption” (Johnson 2009, pp. 34). Retransmission 
fees, therefore, are an important driver of changing distribution models, by being integrated into 
a networking logic that defies the original mandate. Such policies represent a legacy of a media 
culture that protects the “origins” of distribution: the “primary transmission” in the Aereo case, 
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for instance, is considered the most valued and most strongly protected by the broadcasters. As 
such, the greatest distributive leverage comes from the origination point, rather than from, for 
instance, the destination (or indeed from anywhere else along the transmission path).  
Origination conceived in this way is a function of a centralized media system, a “mass” media 
that transmits from one (or, from few) central location outwards to many destination points. The 
Aereo Supreme Court decision highlights the continued power of legacy broadcast entities. 
Broadcast networks fueled and capitalized on overwrought rhetoric about the “death of 
traditional television.” The irony is that the policy tool that they are using to extract that 
preservation, retransmission consent, was meant to do quite the opposite: to preserve the local 
voices in the face of consolidated control over the major conduits for television.  
From Aereo to YouTube TV: The “Broadcastification” of Internet Television 
The Aereo case has implications that go beyond specific statutes in either the Copyright 
Act or the Cable Act. ABC v. Aereo speaks to the contradictions in play between existing 
broadcast-era economic and policy logics and those of broadband internet. Just look for instance, 
at one part of Netflix’s “long-term view,” which serves as the overall company vision that it 
gives to its investors: 
Sometimes, large ISPs want to use their market power to extract interconnect fees from 
us and others. We fight for free interconnection, where neither side charges the other, as 
we think Netflix and consumers are best served by strong network neutrality. We have 
made good progress in these battles, and they are usually country and ISP specific. We 
don't intend to try to collect a percentage of broadband revenue from ISPs, despite the 
facts that we are a substantial portion of what consumers do with their Internet 
connection, and that this payment would parallel the payments to basic cable networks. 
Strong net neutrality, where payments are neutral between ISPs and content providers, is 
better for supporting amazing innovation for consumer benefit. 
 
In some very important ways, the fundamental ideas behind net neutrality are very much 
related to the policy and policy goals of retransmission consent. Both function by constructing 
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certain assumptions about their media infrastructures: namely, that the infrastructure in place that 
allows content to circulate is itself a market that is governed largely through legal contracts 
amongst companies that control that circulation. Moreover, these contracts involve financial 
transactions that are meant to shoulder the burden of both content production and infrastructure 
maintenance: the interconnection fee or the retransmission consent fee. In addition, both operate 
under the assumption that the transaction revolves around a discrete commodity form: for net 
neutrality this is the data traffic, whereas for retransmission consent it is the transmission itself. 
With their retransmission fees, the broadcasters and cable companies are buying and selling the 
right to use the channels that facilitate circulation: in terms of broadcasting, these are the signals, 
whereas for television on the Internet, these are the “streams.” Net neutrality policy has laid 
some important groundwork for the emergence of these network-, satellite-, and cable-sanctioned 
streaming services to emerge, because it appeared to require that all internet service providers 
treat content the same, and that they would not favor their own content or services over others.  
Where they diverge speaks to the underlying assumptions that each policy represents. 
Retransmission consent assumes a scarce infrastructure, whereas net neutrality assumes an 
infrastructure of abundance. In its contemporary context, the retransmission of traditional 
television positions a scarce infrastructure—broadcasting spectrum—being infiltrated by an 
infrastructure of abundance in cable. This is complicated further when it comes to net neutrality, 
which is really a set of principles that work to manage abundance itself. Aereo’s loss meant it 
had to shut down its service. It is now relegated to the scrap heap of history, one in a long line of 
“disruptive” upstart technologically-driven companies unable to break into the relatively closed 
off ecosystem of what in theory is—or, what advocates argue should be—a fairly democratic 
medium. So, why does it matter? For one thing, it marks a signpost in the evolution of media 
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distribution, which brings together legacy power structures and technological infrastructures and 
more emergent ones. During the long legal process, and as Aereo kept winning battles in the 
lower courts, it became a symbol of the ways in which so-called “legacy” media forms and 
systems change and hybridize. Many battles around this case were fought within the media, 
which drew lines in the sand between content and distribution, Silicon Valley and Hollywood, 
“old media” and “new media,” and so forth. It points to the many and various tensions at play in 
the continued interconnection of distinct modes of distribution. For instance, on October 28, 
2014—just four months after the Supreme Court delivered its decision in the Aereo case—FCC 
Chairman Tom Wheeler published a blogpost on the Commission’s website, announcing “the 
first step to open access to cable programs as well as local television” to internet video services 
(Wheeler 2014). For Wheeler, that first step meant to start a rulemaking proceeding that 
reopened the term MVPD to interpretation, and in particular to ensure that a new definition is 
“technology-neutral.” Passing such a ruling would mean that video distribution services would 
have equal opportunity for access to programming owned by both cable and broadcast operators. 
It is a testament to how slowly federal regulation works that this ruling has still not been decided 
upon. 
As the Aereo case made clear, there are also new stakeholders that have emerged, in 
addition to the reshuffling of traditional stakeholder priorities. A focus on retransmission consent 
and the Aereo case offers a way to consider how those new technologies become intertwined 
with existing media paradigms. Aereo claimed to represent “a logical development at the 
intersection of three legal technologies: DVRs, cloud computing, and TV antennas” (Handel 
2014). Broadband and legacy television enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship since around 
2010, when streaming television started to become normalized, because the licensing fees that 
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broadband distributors would pay to broadcasters for their content represented a new form of 
revenue for traditional networks. These fees paid for secondary windows that for networks 
supplemented their original broadcasts and worked to ensure a longer shelf life for that content. 
For their part, these new services—like Netflix, Hulu, and so forth—worked to acclimate 
viewers to new ways of accessing and watching television, as well as the linearity of traditional 
television.  
Aereo was a precursor for how over-the-top distribution, or broadband distribution, 
would come to first be fought by—and then accepted by—legacy networks.  It was the moment 
between the time that the networks accepted broadband distribution as an external relationship, 
rather than a component internal to—and indeed, central to—their own business models. In other 
words, it marks the turning point for networks between licensing content to other broadband 
distributors and creating their own broadband distribution services. According to Amanda Lotz 
(2015), the biggest thing to happen in 2015 is that legacy media networks (like HBO, CBS, and 
so forth) started launching their own broadband-distributed services. Doing so marks a shift in 
priorities for networks, as they move from generating revenue primarily through a business-to-
business model—in which they transact with advertisers or with distributors—to one in which 
they start to more directly transact with consumers.  
Companies continue to experiment with different forms of unbundling content, either 
through offering stand-alone streaming services for single channels like HBONow and CBS All 
Access, or migrating content away from traditional television distributors to companies like 
Amazon. Since the court decision, several kinds of Virtual MVPDs have emerged, including 
digital pay-TV services like DirecTV Now and Sling TV. Although there is some variation in 
how they are defined, a Virtual Multichannel Video Programming Distributor offers access to 
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both the library-based streaming service (Netflix) and internet-based “live” linear programming, 
but does not own any of the network infrastructure behind the service. These are just the latest 
iteration of services that are looking to unify all manner of content access that until now has been 
kept in distinct “classes,” not only legally but also as they are experienced by viewers. In 
February 2015, TiVo won an auction for many of Aereo’s assets, including its trademark and 
customer lists.  
Aereo tried to do an end-run around the established access points for linear television, 
and when that failed they regrouped and pleaded for online linear television distribution to be 
regulated as a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD).  If it could not beat the 
cable companies, Aereo would try to become one, at least in terms of copyright law. One major 
shift in the rise of internet-based streaming services is the increase in the subscription model as a 
means of access. Building up a paywall is an attempt to shift the nature of the commodity form, 
from purchasing discrete shows on physical formats like DVDs to purchasing access to a library. 
Moreover, whereas the DVD purchase is a one-off, the subscription is built to continue in 
perpetuity.  
Another reason that this case matters is that it disrupts a trend in much scholarship on 
television—and media more broadly—that assumes a linear teleology in the medium’s 
development as a cultural form, set of industrial practices, and group of technologies.  From a 
“macro-level” perspective, then, we understand television as broadly moving from broadcast to 
cable and satellite, and now to broadband internet. When I say “broadcast” or “cable,” I mean 
not only the mode of distribution but also the industrial formations and business models, as well 
as the type of content produced and the “ways of seeing” that content (Spigel 2004).  What 
Aereo shows is a rather stark example of the ways in which these distinct paradigms of 
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television—broadcast, cable, broadband—come into contact and conflict with one another.  An 
analysis of Aereo and the rise of retransmission fees offers a clear opportunity for dissecting the 
“multiplicity of norms [that] coexist” and give form to what we understand to be television, as 
Amanda Lotz (2016) has argued. It is important to note how these norms come into conflict with 
the emergent logics of broadband. This means considering economic logics, like transitioning to 
a point where content distribution is overtaken by the trade of data (across international markets). 
It also means attending to the underlying power dynamics of legacy entities, who remain very 
much in control despite their perceived unmooring. 
For traditional broadcasters, broadband distribution has come to serve a number of 
distinct roles. Streaming services like Netflix initially became acceptable secondary markets for 
broadcast content, offerering a welcome supplemental revenue stream for networks. In addition, 
many networks used the internet to distribute complementary content as a way to maintain their 
presence beyond the show’s initial telecast. For years, networks have cultivated a robust social 
media presence related to specific shows, and operate official YouTube pages and Facebook, 
Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram accounts (among others).  
Of course, for networks broadband distribution can be as much a threat as a useful tool. 
YouTube in particular became a bastion for pirated content. When Hulu launched in 2008 as a 
joint venture between Fox and NBC Universal (Disney’s ABC would join the following year), it 
was pitched as the networks’ answer to unauthorized broadband distribution: a streaming service 
that offered full seasons of network programming, for free. The launch of HBO Go and ESPN’s 
WatchESPN mobile app in 2010 served as test cases for cable networks to circulate content on 
their own platforms. Networks largely held such services behind cable paywalls, in an effort to 
ensure that internet television was beholden to more traditional power dynamics. In 2015, an 
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influx of over-the-top, direct-to-consumer network streaming services entered the market, like 
HBO Now, Disney Life, and CBS All Access. These subscription services offered people access 
to network content without the need for a cable subscription, although people did of course need 
access to the internet.  
The proliferation of distribution technologies, including broadband internet distribution, 
has not only affected the sources of revenue but also changed the conventions of television 
distribution itself in interesting and complex ways. Various kinds of nonlinear television services 
have emerged in the past few years to create a hybridized television ecosystem. Nonlinear 
television is a function in large part of the affordances of internet-based television distribution. 
Such formations create distinct relationships amongst the companies involved in the circulation 
of content in ways that are sometimes analogous to, but often diverge from, the more traditional 
broadcast and cable relationships. When it comes to streaming conventional television over the 
Internet, so-called content owners are moving from being strictly wholesalers who make deals 
with distributors (cable companies and so forth) to more direct-to-consumer sales. This gives the 
illusion of disintermediation, which is exemplified in such popular industry parlance as “over-
the-top” (OTT) services, like HBONow and CBS All Access. 
For Elihu Katz (2003), disintermediation is a concept whereby “communicators are 
continually trying to reach over the heads of intermediaries in order to establish direct relations 
with some target audience” (pp. 53). It is often used in the context of the internet, to illustrate the 
consequences of aggregation services like Google for traditional forms of content organization. 
In this sense, it is similar to the ideas of unbundling cable channel packages, in the context of 
television. As internet-based streaming services continue to emerge, disintermediation is a useful 
rhetorical device that leverages viewer expectations and desires about media access and bakes 
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them into a marketing slogan, offering people “what they want, when they want it, on whatever 
device they choose.”  
This discourse of the sovereign consumer assumes a specific kind of marketplace, in 
which distinct paradigms of distribution (broadcast, cable, broadband internet, mobile) are pitted 
against each other such that one paradigm liberates consumers from another, even as the 
interdependencies of such paradigms are implicitly foregrounded. This liberty supposedly arrives 
in the form of a lack of various kinds of intermediary interference in the consumer experience. 
An overview of the distinct ways in which cable has been historically constructed, particularly in 
policy discourse, is instructive here. In the 1960s, cable television became a stand-in for the 
seemingly limitless potential of technology to effect social change, as a crucial “communications 
utility, spanning the country and providing news, specialized entertainment, electronic banking, 
electronic mail, health care services, outlets for community expression, and a local and national 
forum for political debate” (Parsons 2008, pp. 7). The 1971 Sloan Commission declared that the 
cable paradigm would create a “television of abundance,” to contrast with—and indeed bypass—
the bottlenecked oligopoly of broadcast television, which operated within the rationale of 
scarcity because the broadcast spectrum was constructed as a finite resource. Moreover, federal 
regulatory bodies took steps to provide an environment that would cultivate cable’s growth in the 
face of resistance from legacy broadcasters, mostly through deregulation. By the time the 1992 
Cable Act was passed, however, the “Blue Skies” rhetoric that trumpeted cable’s promise had 
shifted; the retransmission consent clause served to protect broadcast television from cable, 
rather than the other way around. If in the 1960s and 1970s cable had been constructed to offer 
more opportunities for “direct” (disintermediated) communication that bypassed broadcast’s 
stranglehold over the airwaves, then the retransmission consent clause rearticulated broadcast 
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itself as a more direct means of communication by emphasizing the importance of protecting the 
local voices of a given “community” (or of a given market). In the logics of both broadcast and 
cable, these forms of disintermediation assume a level of centralized control over the 
communications infrastructures, because within these distribution paradigms the flow of content 
runs mostly one way: toward the consumer-viewer.  
Conclusion 
And so, Aereo was forced to shut down. The company ended up operating for just over 
two years, and for almost the entirety of its run Aereo was dealing with the lawsuit. Aereo’s 
service concluded with a relatively small number of subscribers: just over 108,000 total 
subscribers in 14 American cities. Amidst debates about the responsibilities that companies who 
run internet-based platforms have (and should have) to those who use them, it is useful to take 
note of Aereo’s case. Broadcasters, the “public trustees” of the airwaves, leveraged existing 
federal policies that regulate the media to more effectively control how television is allowed to 
circulate over the internet. Of course, the Supreme Court is an interpretive body that insists on 
contextualizing its rulings by emphasizing Congress’s important role in altering existing policy, 
if necessary. Such changes may or may not be forthcoming, although in the three years since the 
Supreme Court’s ruling there has been little fundamental change to federal regulations about the 
distribution of television over the internet. Instead, it appears that broadcaster power has only 
become even more entrenched, when it seemed as though broadcaster power was a distant 
twentieth-century memory. Retransmission fees have only gone up in the three years since this 
ruling. Retransmission consent is one policy whose original mandate—to preserve and ensure 
that the broadcasters who have been entrusted with the use of public airwaves—has essentially 
been inverted. In the context of the internet, the rise in retransmission fees suggests a push by 
58 
  
major content owners to normalize a legacy business model for broadband television 
distribution. The irony is that the policy tool that they are using to extract that preservation, 
retransmission consent, was meant to do quite the opposite: to preserve the local voices in the 
face of consolidated control over the major conduits for television. It is no accident that the 
growth and maturation of streaming video coincides with massive increases in retransmission 
fees. These fees represent a repurposing of federal media policy by major television networks 
(and “content” networks more broadly) to control not only what programming is authorized to 
stream over the internet, but also to preserve the preexisting scheduling norms of linear 
programming, even as broadband distribution becomes a more fundamental and popular means 
of accessing and circulating content. As such, the content-conduit connection persists as an 
historical construction perpetrated by a consortium of related, often conflicting interests 
involving digital media and technology industries, regulatory agencies, and citizen-consumers.  
The implications of the Aereo decision are most evident in, for instance, the rollout of 
YouTube TV, YouTube’s streaming service where subscribers pay a monthly fee to watch live 
television of the local broadcast stations of ABC, NBC, and FOX alongside an expanding array 
of cable channels, including ESPN, FX, USA, and Bravo. YouTube’s parent company Alphabet, 
Inc. continues to sign content licensing deals with rights holders like Disney in order to expand 
its channel offerings. Despite the vast, global user base of YouTube, YouTube TV is only 
available within the United States, and even then only in certain local markets (Pino 2017). In 
addition, the capacities of YouTube’s broadband distribution have also been “broadcastified,” as 
YouTube is forced to play by the local, regional, and national geographic restrictions imposed on 
more traditional television providers. Moreover, YouTube TV viewers are watching the same 
live programming schedules that cable subscribers watch. YouTube does not yet have any power 
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to dictate what content it actually distributes. This is not to suggest that broadcasters have 
complete control over the state of live linear programming. YouTube has a separate service built 
into its core site for non-network live programming. However, the demarcations between more 
traditional television on the internet and the more web-native live programming remain stark. 
The Aereo case contextualizes the development of streaming video distribution by exposing 
some of the gaps in the policy foundations of legacy media formations like broadcast and cable, 
in particular as those foundations are built into regulation on emerging distribution schematics.   
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Figure 1-1 
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Global Internet Television Distribution: Geoblocking and the International Expansion 
of Netflix, 2010-2016 
 
 
A Global Network in a Fragmented World: How Netflix Navigates Differential Access to 
Content 
In January 2016 at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas, Netflix announced a 
near-simultaneous rollout of their streaming service in over 130 countries. The announcement 
meant Netflix would be available almost everywhere in the world, except for China, North 
Korea, Syria, or Crimea. At the same time, the availability of content on Netflix in any given 
area in the world varied widely, and continues to do so. As part of his announcement at CES, 
Netflix CEO Reed Hastings claimed that the company was working to unify content availability 
around the world by changing licensing practices so that they no longer are so exclusive to 
regions. The ultimate goal for Netflix is to offer its service everywhere on Earth, and to equalize 
content access. Yet the loftiness of this goal should not overshadow the reality of Netflix’s 
current configuration: Netflix is not a singular entity but rather a series of disparate versions of 
streaming services and content libraries, connected by a complex and multifaceted constellation 
of infrastructures. Since launching its streaming service in 2007 in the United States, Netflix has 
faced the complexities of providing (and policing) on-demand access to a content library while 
also navigating the mandates of content rights holders. These complexities became exacerbated 
in 2010 when Netflix launched in Canada, thus beginning its aggressive international expansion 
that culminated in the 2016 CES announcement.  
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This chapter investigates Netflix as a key player in shaping the global circulation of 
internet television. My analysis uses geoblocking as a starting point to examine how Netflix has 
navigated the complexities of differential access to content as it expands internationally. I 
explain how Netflix approached the challenges for expanding its international subscription 
streaming service in light of differential access to content. To do so, I focus on Netflix’s 
strategies for managing the coevolution of consumer viewing habits, technologies of information 
infrastructures, and content licensing practices. It is worth tracing and analyzing the many paths 
that Netflix has taken since launching its domestic streaming service to expand abroad, in order 
to understand how media companies establish and maintain control over access to digital 
products and content like television programming. Ultimately, my analysis of Netflix’s 
international expansion helps to build a picture of the broader context within which media 
distribution operates, by connecting corporate strategies of content circulation to the affordances 
of video streaming infrastructures, to practices of curation and artificial intelligence, and to the 
issue of unequal access. 
Building and operating a subscription-based video streaming service at an international 
scale, as opposed to a service confined within a single country, presented a unique set of 
challenges. For one, Netflix confronted some fundamental assumptions about international 
geographies of digital video cultures. It has been forced to enact and police boundaries, keeping 
some people out while also attempting to make sure that those who are allowed in—their 
subscribers—do not leave. At the same time, the company has claimed to work to flatten those 
boundaries by equalizing content access, such that all versions of the service are more or less 
equal. Netflix exercises a singular influence over the digital distribution of internet television 
programming through the deceptively straightforward practices of geoblocking, a technology of 
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access control that uses internet protocol address databases to determine a user’s physical 
location via internet-connected devices. On the one hand, Netflix uses geoblocking to lock 
content into distinct geographic markets, thereby enforcing the licensing terms of availability set 
forth by content rights holders. While it takes these responsibilities seriously, Netflix also is in 
the process of fighting for global content licenses. Thus, as it has grown internationally Netflix 
has had to adhere to the practices of regional content licensing that a reliance on third party 
content requires. In this sense, geoblocking acts as a burden to Netflix. At the same time, the 
fragmented conditions that geoblocking engenders is helpful for Netflix to customize its service 
for international users based on language, territory, or other markers of market segmentation. In 
that regard, geoblocking serves as a useful tool for Netflix to optimize its personalization and 
curation practices, which are part of the bedrock of its streaming service strategy.  
Critical attention to geoblocking is relatively limited, despite the central role it plays in 
constructing the cultural geography of internet-based media streaming. Existing work on 
geoblocking tends to focus on the practices of circumvention, detailing how and why people 
cross geoblocked boundaries in an effort to reframe industry-driven narratives about 
circumvention as a form of piracy (e.g. Lobato and Meese 2016, Elkins 2015, Wagman and 
Urquhart 2014, Deibert et al. 2010, Roberts et al. 2010, Christophers 2009, Goldsmith and Wu 
2006). The subjects of this work tend to be individual consumers, positioned against monolithic 
entities like Hollywood, which try to propagate differential media markets in the name of profit, 
or governments that target circumvention and its tools. In many parts of the world the 
circumvention of geoblocking technologies has become not merely an activity of privileged, 
tech-savvy elites, but has gone mainstream. Such studies usefully elucidate how preexisting 
power structures inform the political economy of geoblocking. In this chapter, I expand on this 
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work by turning attention to the construction of Netflix’s international streaming service since 
2010 and analyzing how geoblocking is at once a hindrance and an asset for Netflix’s 
international expansion. I describe how geoblocking frames Netflix’s approach to three core 
aspects of its international business: content, subscribers, and infrastructural technologies. This 
approach highlights how differential access to content, and its particular instantiation in 
geoblocking, simultaneously serve distinct and seemingly contradictory strategic purposes, as a 
phenomenon external to and endemic to streaming services that operate internationally. 
Geoblocking becomes externalized as an obstacle to be overcome, representing older formations 
of media industries that seem stuck in an era predating the ubiquity of networked technologies.  
The international distribution of streaming digital media brings with it a series of 
challenges for how Netflix deals with content both in terms of licensing third-party television 
and films and for branding its Netflix Originals. For the most part, digital content rights for video 
are still regional. A show or film is not universally available on Netflix; rather, the rights to 
include it in Netflix’s library are largely negotiated country by country. Differential access to the 
films and television series on Netflix forces the company to create multiple versions of itself: the 
content library for Netflix Canada is distinct from Netflix Brazil or Netflix Japan, and so on. At 
the same time, content licensing has become an increasing expense given the proliferation of 
distribution platforms and the turn by many major content owners to self-circulate their video 
with services like HBONOW and CBS All access. Netflix has chosen to mitigate that cost 
growth by shifting into original programming. Netflix continues to move up the supply chain 
from solely licensing third party content to international co-productions. It then brands these 
productions as Netflix Originals for its international audiences. In doing so, it is attempting to 
cultivate a specific subscriber attachment born out of a sense of artificial exclusivity, 
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differentiating itself from other streaming services and narrowing the gap amongst the many 
Netflix catalogs around the world. I contextualize the rise of the “Netflix Originals” brand as a 
response to regional content licensing practices by content rights holders. While the Netflix 
Originals brand has come to stand for a certain kind of content, Netflix also articulates it to a 
“global” level of access and availability. As such, I show how Netflix uses the Netflix Originals 
brand to fortify its position not in spite of differential content access, but rather because of it.  
I also consider how Netflix understands both current and potential subscribers in terms of 
geoblocking. International streaming in fragmented markets reconfigures how Netflix conceives 
of its subscribers in terms of the recommendation system and viewership data. Netflix wants to 
erase the geographic borders from its streaming service by pushing for global licensing rights; 
however, its recommendation system attempts to exercise other forms of control over content 
flows by demarcating borders around specific “taste cultures,” in order to fully personalize its 
service for each user. In an international context, this personalized curation means that Netflix 
tries to act like an intercultural ambassador. Netflix envisions subscribers in terms of a series of 
preferences, rather than as a series of demographics. These preferences circulate not only at the 
level of content, as Netflix constructs connections amongst its catalog titles, but they must also 
attend to local languages (through subtitling and dubbing content) as well as the different modes 
of payment that might be normalized in each area (for instance, the use of PayPal as opposed to a 
credit card). As such, geoblocking seems to morph into a different form of market segmentation, 
where subscriber data that is generated at the level of the nation—in the form of subscriber 
numbers by country and region—is reabsorbed and redistributed into curation practices and 
personalized services.  
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Finally, I highlight Netflix’s attention to the technological infrastructures that they use to 
help regulate geoblocking. Netflix works to effectively manage the massive flow of data traffic 
that its service generates, while also attending to the circumvention by users of filtering 
technologies that map geographic borders onto digital spaces. In particular, I analyze the shifts in 
Netflix’s stance on subscribers using virtual private networks (VPNs), which mask a computer’s 
IP address so that users appear to be in one country or region when they are actually in another. 
Netflix attempts to negotiate “Netflix tourism,” where people access regional versions of 
Netflix’s content libraries other than their own, or where people signed up from places that did 
not have Netflix access at all, before its service was widespread internationally. Such practices 
presented Netflix with a conundrum. Although Netflix tourists violated terms of service, they 
became paying customers. Netflix continues to operate at a crossroads, as a company whose 
streaming service is a compromise between content rights holders and regulators who continue to 
argue for stricter IP enforcement, and various constituencies that push for equal access to 
content. In this sense, Netflix must negotiate the calls from content owners, other distributors, its 
own subscribers, and regulators to exercise power as one of many internet gatekeepers, or even 
internet police. How Netflix has deployed its resources—its PR and marketing employees, its 
international offices, its company blogs, its engineering teams, and so on—to confront 
geoblocking and its circumvention offers important insights into Netflix’s strategies for 
international expansion beyond content curation practices or subscriber data.  
In order to investigate the interrelations for Netflix amongst content, subscriber, 
infrastructures, I draw from a variety of official sources to inform my analysis. Among these are 
Netflix’s letters to investors, public conference calls, webcasts, annual reports, and associated 
reports filed with the SEC, along with posts on the company’s official blogs, YouTube Pages, 
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and Facebook and Twitter, and marketing materials from Netflix’s international rollout. In 
addition, I also use trade magazines and industry publications, popular and academic business 
histories of Netflix and the streaming video industry at large, and correspondence on online 
forums that are both about and involve Netflix and its employees. Finally, I analyze some 
material from the Sony email hack, which has provided some interesting insights into 
international distribution deals amongst Sony, its affiliated companies, and Netflix. Compiling 
these disparate sources and reading them in light of one another offers important insights into 
how Netflix has navigated the complexities of building and maintaining an international 
subscription-based streaming service since 2010. An analysis of these sources reveals some of 
Netflix’s fundamental assumptions about what kinds of content to distribute and where, how to 
market to and service subscribers in local and international contexts, and how to deploy 
infrastructural technologies that best negotiate among distinct sets of interests from content rights 
holders, subscribers, and Netflix’s own sets of management and executive teams.  
I marshal these sources in order to describe and analyze content, subscribers, and 
infrastructural technologies as three core components to Netflix’s international business. In the 
next section, I summarize the phases of Netflix’s international expansion and examine how 
geoblocking implicates each of the three core components in the issues of differential access that 
geoblocking represents. Finally, I devote one section each to content, subscribers, and 
infrastructure, before a concluding section in which I elucidate Netflix’s strategies for 
responding to geoblocking circumvention.  
Geoblocking and Netflix’s International Expansion 
Netflix is the largest subscriber-based video streaming service in the world, both by total 
number of subscribers and by revenue. At the end of the third quarter 2017, Netflix had nearly 
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110 million subscribers worldwide. According to Statista, over 57 million of these subs are in the 
United States, which is by far the most. The United Kingdom is second with 10 million subs; 
Canada has seven million, Brazil has six million, Mexico has five million, and Australia, France, 
and Germany each have three million. Regionally, Europe has just over 24 million, Latin 
America has over 12 million, and Asia Pacific has just under 5 million. As of the end of the third 
quarter 2017, U.S. streaming revenues have outpaced international revenues every quarter since 
the company started reporting separate revenue streams after the first quarter 2011. The gap has 
narrowed considerably, however, as Netflix reported at the end of third quarter 2017 $1.55 
billion in U.S. revenue, and $1.32 billion in international revenue, with the latter continuing the 
grow as Netflix integrates further into international markets. 
Netflix’s streaming service expanded internationally in late September 2010, when it 
launched in Canada. Since that time, the international expansion has moved in several distinct 
phases. The first phase focused on the western hemisphere. In July 2011, Netflix announced that 
it had launched in 43 countries, including Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and South 
America. Between March 2012 and October 2015, Netflix slowly rolled out in Europe, beginning 
its second phase with the United Kingdom and Ireland in early 2012, then moving to the Nordic 
countries later that year. In 2013, Netflix premiered in the Netherlands. Netflix slowly moved to 
the central and southern parts of the continent, launching in France, Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg in the span of one week in 2014. Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain followed in 2015. The announcement at the 2016 Consumer Electronics Show that it 
would launch in 130 countries has so far been the final stage of Netflix’s international rollout. As 
of October 2017, Netflix has been unable to officially launch in China, Crimea, North Korea, or 
Syria.  
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The geographic expansion has also coincided with a few distinct phases in Netflix’s role 
in the global supply chain for the distribution of movies and television programming. The first 
step in the leadup to international expansion in Canada was Netflix’s transition from DVD rental 
service to streaming service. Netflix had three and a half years between the introduction of its 
streaming service in the United States and its launch in Canada to complete this transition. An 
analysis of Netflix’s 10-K forms (see Figure 1)—the annual business report that it files with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange commission—shows Netflix clearly signaling its shifts in the core 
company strategy from DVD rental to streaming. Netflix progresses from the full-scale focus at 
the end of 2007 (heading into 2008) on the DVD business, while “Internet-based delivery of 
content” remains entirely ancillary, to the end of 2010 where the DVD business is not mentioned 
at all as part of the core strategy. Instead, Netflix lays out in the 2010 10-K its vision for 2011 
that foregrounds streaming and international expansion: “Our core strategy is to grow our 
streaming subscription business within the United States and globally.” The shifts between the 
2008 and 2009 10-K are subtle but important, as Netflix switches the order in which “DVD by 
mail” and “streaming” appear, thereby signaling the transition in 2009 toward streaming as a 
primary business priority.  
Figure 2-1 Netflix Core Strategies as listed in Form 10-K, 2007-2010 
2007 Our core strategy is to grow a large DVD subscription business and 
to expand into Internet-based delivery of content as that market develops. 
We believe that the DVD format, along with its high definition successor 
formats, including Blu-ray will continue to be the main vehicle for watching 
content in the home for the foreseeable future and that by growing a large DVD 
subscription business, we will be well positioned (sic) to transition our 
subscribers and our business to Internet-based delivery of content. 
2008 Our core strategy is to grow a large subscription business consisting 
of DVD by mail and streaming content. We offer over 100,000 titles on 
DVD. In comparison, the 12,000 content choice available for streaming are 
relatively limited. We expect to substantially broaden the content choices as 
more content becomes available to us. Until such time, by bundling DVD and 
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streaming as part of the Netflix subscription, we are able to offer subscribers a 
uniquely comprehensive selection of movies for one low monthly price. We 
believe this creates a competitive advantage as compared to a streaming only 
subscription service. . . . Despite the growing popularity of Internet delivered 
content, we expect that the standard definition DVD, along with its high 
definition successor, Blu-ray . . . will continue to be the primary means by 
which most Netflix subscribers view content for the foreseeable future. 
However, at some point in the future, we expect that Internet delivery of content 
to the home will surpass DVD.  
2009 Our core strategy is to grow a large subscription business consisting 
of streaming and DVD-by-mail content. By combining streaming and DVD 
as part of the Netflix subscription, we are able to offer subscribers a uniquely 
comprehensive selection of movies for one low monthly price. We believe this 
creates a competitive advantage as compared to a streaming only subscription 
service. Despite the growing popularity of Internet delivered content, we expect 
that the standard definition DVD, along with its high definition successor, Blu-
ray . . . will continue to be the primary means by which most Netflix 
subscribers view content for the foreseeable future. However, at some point in 
the future, we expect that Internet delivery of content to the home will surpass 
DVD as the primary means by which most Netflix subscribers view content. 
2010 Our core strategy is to grow our streaming subscription business 
within the United States and globally. We are continuously improving the 
customer experience, with a focus on expanding our streaming content, 
enhancing our user interfaces and extending our streaming service to even more 
Internet-connected devices, while staying within the parameters of our 
operating margin targets. 
 
In 2013, Netflix decided to expand on this core strategy by orienting itself around a 
“Long-Term View,” which it published on its Investor Relations website. This Long-Term View 
argues that Internet TV—which Netflix classifies as “on-demand, personalized, and available on 
any screen”—is replacing linear TV as the dominant form of video entertainment around the 
world. More importantly, it articulated a clearer attention to international growth. This strategy 
envisions the United States as the company’s core focus, where most of Netflix’s revenue comes 
from, as well as much of its most valuable content. But the global focus in the Long-Term View 
paints Netflix as a force that transcends geopolitical boundaries while also positioning itself 
against the limitations of older media conglomerates:   
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 . . . we also believe in the growing ubiquity of the internet and rapid technological 
progress, and that great, high-quality storytelling has universal appeal that transcends 
borders. That’s why we are increasingly licensing content on a global basis, so Netflix 
members everywhere in the world can enjoy the same movies and TV series, free of 
legacy business models and outdated restrictions. (Netflix’s View)  
 
This image of a borderless, frictionless, egalitarian, global, and ubiquitous streaming 
service that revolutionizes previously entrenched models of content access serves as a useful 
signpost for understanding Netflix’s ambitions. The company’s leadership clearly knows what it 
wants Netflix to become. In terms of its size and scale, Netflix is largely succeeding so far in 
achieving its goal of becoming a “global network.” At the same time, a number of obstacles 
emerged that constrained Netflix’s expansion. Netflix’s international influence is contingent on a 
number of important technological and regulatory factors, as well as a growing number of 
partnerships with local internet service providers, mobile service providers, cable and satellite 
companies, and consumer electronics manufacturers that produce video game consoles, smart 
TVs, tablets, and other devices on which the Netflix app is allowed to live.   
A few underlying concerns are generally recognizable across the many places around the 
world that Netflix has targeted since 2010, setting aside for the moment some of the specific 
differences in local contexts. For one, Netflix needed to contend with existing competitors for 
“entertainment video”—a phrase Netflix uses in its investor relations documents—in a given 
location. Such competitors often included other subscription video-on-demand services that were 
exclusive to a certain country or region; major international internet television and movie content 
providers like iTunes, Amazon, Hulu, and YouTube; and cable, satellite, and 
telecommunications providers (collectively known in the United States as multichannel video 
programming distributors, or MVPDs) that had video-on-demand and “TV Everywhere” 
initiatives. To complicate matters further, Netflix would also have to maintain relationships with 
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local internet service providers (ISPs) that delivered its service to subscribers while also owning 
competing video services. Such relationships proved to be tricky from the outset of Netflix’s 
international expansion. Two days after Netflix announced its launch in Canada in July 2010, 
Canadian ISP Rogers Media implemented a data cap for its internet service customers (Acland 
and Wagman 2017). Three other major Canadian ISPs followed suit. These caps were meant to 
force consumers into making choices about how to use their allotted data, and to cultivate an 
attitude that data was finite and costly. Quite often, Netflix faced issues with the availability of 
broadband internet in the first place, with India and Mexico being notable large market 
examples. In addition, the proliferation of internet-connected devices—from video game 
consoles, to tablets and mobile phones, to smart televisions, to set-top boxes and digital media 
players like Roku or Google Chromecast—meant that Netflix would need to package its service 
as an application that could live on a wide range of operating systems across the world.  
Netflix also grappled with existing regulatory regimes at local, national, and international 
levels. Sometimes, regulatory conditions were extremely favorable for Netflix. As it expanded 
into Canada, United Kingdom and Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand especially, 
Netflix was often positioned as a “mainstream media service” in competition with preexisting 
legacy media services like broadcast and cable TV in those markets (Lobato 2017). However, 
Netflix benefitted from its status as a broadband-distributed SVOD service in that it was often 
not regulated in the same way as broadcast or cable, which were subject to local quotas on 
content or taxes. In Canada, for instance, broadcasters and cable companies are required by law 
to meet certain quotas for “producing, airing, and promoting Canadian content” (Acland and 
Wagman 2017). Streaming services like Netflix are not subject to such mandates. Neither are 
Canadian-based streaming services, but such services are required to collect sales tax and pay 
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income tax, whereas Netflix is not. Likewise, Netflix and other internet video services were 
exempt from the 2011 Brazilian Pay TV Law, which was passed to regulate foreign-owned 
television networks (Donoghue 2017). The law used tax incentives to support the production of 
content in Brazil, and implemented a content quota for how much Brazilian programming should 
be broadcast daily. India also has a set of guidelines for non-news channels that dictates rules 
about what is and is not acceptable content, but Netflix is not yet subject to them. The rules were 
not written with streaming services in mind, and there has been no firm ruling by any Indian 
regulatory body as of late 2017. At other times, Netflix had to deal with restrictive regulatory 
regimes. In May 2017, the European Parliament set content quotas for OTT video services at 30 
percent, as part of an overhaul of its broadcasting policies through the European Commission’s 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (Orlowski 2017). Some European countries had 
previously instituted their own national quotas, including France’s mandate that 60 percent of the 
library be French productions. In Indonesia, Netflix was forced to confront a film censorship 
board, which charged that Netflix was carrying content that was too violent or sexual. The state-
owned telecommunications company PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia TBK even blocked Netflix’s 
service until the company agreed to adhere to regulations (Pak and Danubrata 2016).  
Each of these issues points to just how widely dispersed Netflix’s international streaming 
service and company resources are. Netflix’s attempts to build a global media network is in 
reality a series of interlocking agreements, conflicts, and acquiescence with the demands of a 
wide variety of stakeholders in a fragmented international media geography. At their core, these 
issues boil down to grappling with control over access: to content, to information, to material 
resources. It is in this context that an understanding of Netflix’s relationship to geoblocking 
becomes important. Geoblocking uses internet protocol address databases to determine a user’s 
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physical location via whatever device they use to access the internet, thereby mapping 
geographic borders onto digital spaces. It is a technology of access control, which has become a 
vital tool for the management of international data traffic, as well as for the maintenance of 
separate national media markets (Lobato 2015). As Cameran Ashraf and Luis Felipe Alvarez 
Leòn (2015) note, there are different forms of regulation, including technical regulations, which 
focus on the tools used to control the flow of information on the Internet, and activity 
regulations, which focus on what is controlled. Geoblocking is an instance of technical 
regulation, one that maps geopolitical borders onto digital spaces. The three core components to 
Netflix’s international business—content, subscribers, and infrastructural technologies—all are 
implicated in the issues of differential access that geoblocking represents. 
A viewer’s location matters because digital content rights for video are still largely 
regional. Up until relatively recently, a show or film was not universally available on Netflix. 
Geoblocking has emerged as an important issue of content access in part because of the 
increased value that content rights holders and distributors place on multi-territory licensing 
deals. Such deals have become more profitable in recent years, with the proliferation of 
international distribution technologies, as well as the more global focus for streaming companies 
like Netflix. Traditionally, multi-territory deals were seen as secondary windows for television 
distribution, after national broadcasters had sufficiently benefitted from exclusive rights to the 
first release of programming (Steemers 2016). By contrast, as it expanded internationally Netflix 
began to focus more on multi-territory licensing deals as primary windows of distribution. 
Netflix wants to fulfill the company dream of becoming a truly “global” network, by offering 
much of the same content across territories at the same time.  
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Although it gets much of its content library through licensing deals, Netflix does not 
simply side with content owners on the issue of geoblocking and the segmentation of digital 
international media markets. In fact, as will be shown, Netflix has stood to benefit quite a bit 
from the circumvention of geoblocking. Those who circumvent the geoblock do not simply have 
free access to content. They are getting around the digital walls in order to pay for Netflix. The 
act of the monetary transaction is an important distinction in this case. Typically, such 
transactions are considered outside the “primary” marketplace, where exchange occurs in a 
legally sanctioned and controlled space. Exchanges beyond these constraints typically operate in 
a black market, underground way and tend to involve a completely separate set of actors, 
intermediaries, companies, and so forth. While there is some academic work that focuses on the 
secondary markets for digital content, it tends to be about informal or unauthorized distribution, 
where the financial transactions that take place do not involve “Big Media”: for instance, selling 
illegitimate DVD copies of DVDs on the street.3 And while there are plenty of cases where 
businesses attempt to formalize these secondary markets in an effort to legally normalize them, 
such studies to date that consider secondary markets focus more on the precarity of their legal 
status.  
By contrast, geoblocking circumvention to access Netflix seems to exist in a gray space, a 
combination of authorized and unauthorized activities: getting around the geoblock in order to 
pay for the service, rather than to download or stream content for free. Netflix has already 
established itself as a business with considerable clout in negotiations with content owners and 
with national and international regulatory bodies. Discussions about geoblocking that involve 
Netflix do not focus on whether or not Netflix should be allowed to operate in a legal sense; 
                                                 
3 See among others Currah 2004, Larkin 2008, Lobato 2012, Lovink and Niederer (eds) 2008, Harris 2007 
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instead, the questions focus more on how to manage or police circumvention, under the 
assumption that Netflix will continue to exist. As such, it offers a unique way to understand the 
complex interconnectedness of international digital media circulation.  
An analysis of geoblocking and its circumvention reveals how Netflix operates at a 
critical nexus point where consumer interests, corporate interests, and regulatory interests all 
intersect in complicated ways. Netflix negotiates amongst content owners who continue to argue 
for stricter enforcement of intellectual property rights, users who push for various forms of “open 
access” to content, and national and international regulatory bodies that enforce legal compliance 
while at the same time working to ensure economic growth and protect a variety of interests, 
including personal privacy and security rights. Its overall strategic vision is to become a 
“universal” service, with worldwide coverage. It wants to not only cross geographic borders but 
to smooth them over, or even erase them entirely. Part of the push to become a global network is 
to offer the same high-demand content for everyone. For Netflix, an undifferentiated global 
market with a full catalogue of premium programming would simplify licensing practices, ease 
the burden of policing geoblocking borders, and offer a useful marketing campaign for attracting 
new subscribers (and keep existing ones).  
Geoblocking reflects the will of state actors as well as market actors. For market actors—
in particular, the content owners who license to Netflix and others—breaking up territories 
allows for more opportunities to generate revenue through distribution deals. In this sense, the 
circumvention of geoblocking is seen as a form of piracy that, under the definition of the term 
extolled by the content owners, takes money out of their pockets. Typically, piracy concerns are 
bolstered by statistical estimates of lost revenue, which form “a framework of objectivity for 
trade disputes and the groundwork for their articulation” (Miller et al. 215). These official 
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statistics, which are generally acknowledged by major state and market power brokers as 
legitimate markers for managing the flow of cultural content, have tended to approximate as 
closely as possible a one-to-one ratio between a thing stolen (a DVD, CD, a single digital copy) 
and that same thing otherwise purchased legally. But quantifying what is actually stolen in the 
case of circumventing geoblocks to access Netflix is less clear. People are crossing the borders to 
access content, but are still paying Netflix to use its service. I turn now to how Netflix strategizes 
about and conceives of issues related to content: licensing terms, differential availability, and 
how to cultivate the Netflix Original brand.    
Global Content in Local Contexts: Cultivating the Netflix Originals Brand 
The international distribution of streaming digital media brings with it a series of 
challenges for how Netflix deals with content both in terms of licensing third-party television 
and films and for branding its Netflix Originals. This expansion began in 2010, at a time when 
content licenses were granted largely at the level of the nation or a predefined region. Such 
licensing practices still largely exist. Moreover, these licensing practices assume that distribution 
itself is controlled regionally by local service operators, whether they are telecommunications, 
cable or satellite television, or mobile communications companies. Differential access to the 
films and television series on Netflix forces the company to create multiple versions of itself. In 
this section, I contextualize the rise of the Netflix Originals brand as a response to regional 
content licensing practices by content rights holders. While the Netflix Originals brand has come 
to stand for a certain kind of content, Netflix also articulates it to a “global” level of access and 
availability. As such, I show how Netflix uses the Netflix Originals brand to fortify its position 
not in spite of differential content access, but rather because of it.  
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The Netflix Originals brand constitutes programming across a wide swath of genres that 
is in some way exclusive to the service. It encompasses programming licensed from third parties, 
original productions like Stranger Things, and co-productions like Orange is the New Black—
which is produced through a partnership between Lionsgate Television and show creator Jenji 
Kohan’s production company Tilted Productions—and then more recently by moving into out-
and-out ownership. As Karen Petruska usefully points out, there are three distinct forms of 
content that tend to appear on streaming sites: syndicated content, exclusive content, and original 
content (Petruska 2015). While syndicated content can be found across multiple services, 
channels, and networks (from CBS’s linear broadcast to Netflix to Amazon Video), exclusive 
content is licensed only for a single service. Moreover, original content is a means of branding 
that content with the signature of the distributor. The stamp of “original” is meant to suggest that 
the distributor has not only licensed but has also had a hand in the creation of that content. 
Among the “Netflix Originals” are Sense 8, a globe-trotting science fiction series from Lana and 
Lilly Wachowski, who made The Matrix series; The Get Down, a musical drama from Australian 
director Baz Luhrman, set in the South Bronx in the late 1970s; Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt, a 
comedy from Tina Fey and Robert Carlock, both from 30 Rock; and Bojack Horseman, an 
animated series. The company has invested in content across the board: dramatized and comedic 
series (in English, French, Spanish, Japanese, Portuguese, Korean, Norwegian and others), kids 
shows, stand-up comedy, anime, docu-series, a weekly talk show starring Chelsea Handler, and 
feature films. Netflix released over 600 hours of original content, and another 1000 hours of 
content in 2017.  
From the beginning, Netflix Originals has been international in its focus and scale. The 
first example of a show or film to be released as a Netflix Originals was in late 2012 with 
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Lilyhammer, a Norwegian show with an American lead actor in Steven Van Zandt. The show 
was originally commissioned in 2009 by the Norwegian production company Rubicon TV for 
the Norwegian public service broadcaster NRK, which at the time was owned by the 
Scandinavian company Metronome Film & Television. Metronome was purchased by the Dutch 
company Shine Endemol in 2009, which was itself bought in 2011—one year prior to the release 
of Lilyhammer—by News Corp. While the first season was being filmed, Van Zandt reportedly 
pitched the show to Netflix, which agreed to co-invest in the production in exchange for 
exclusive streaming rights in the United States.  
This interest in international content predates Netflix’s streaming service. It has long held 
international markets squarely in its purview, even back to its initial launch in 1998. Netflix’s 
interest in international content stemmed at first from a desire to add films to its content library 
for DVD rentals while minimizing content acquisition costs and differentiating itself from more 
established brick-and-mortar stores like Blockbuster. Such stores thrived on offering new 
releases of major studio films, which required inventory at massive scale to keep up with 
demand. As a newly launched company in 1998, Netflix opted to target older, more obscure 
“niche” films, which were less expensive to purchase and required smaller inventories. Netflix’s 
first movie acquisitions chief Mitch Lowe realized that many of their initial customers were 
Indian students in the local California area or technologists working in or around Silicon Valley, 
and were early adopters to internet-based services like Netflix (Keating 2013). The company 
started sending surveys to its customers and found Hindi films to be in high demand, as they 
were difficult to find outside of their home countries, or at local Indian markets. Netflix then 
began to expand its library to include Japanese anime, Chinese martial arts films, and other 
international genres that became of interest to its diverse customer base. Netflix has from the 
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beginning been a company focused on international content and customers, despite its 
developmental origins in the United States, where it operated exclusively for the first twelve 
years of its existence.   
At the time of its deal to co-invest in Lilyhammer, Netflix had only just begun its 
international expansion, operating in the U.S. and Canada. Netflix moved into original 
programming with a now famous hands-off approach, limiting their editorial involvement and 
focusing instead on funding. As it moved through its three seasons of production, Lilyhammer’s 
budget basically doubled each year, from 3.7 million Euro in year one to 7 million Euro in 
season two to 13.5 million Euro in the final season (Sundet 2016). Netflix’s focus on production 
investment of original programming was in part a reaction to the rising costs of licensing deals 
for streaming rights to third party-owned content. Content licensing has become an increasing 
expense given the proliferation of distribution platforms and the turn by many major content 
owners to self-circulate their video with services like HBONOW and CBS All access. Such deals 
tend to be either strict content-licensing or subscriber-revenue sharing. Netflix has chosen to 
mitigate that cost growth by shifting into original programming. In 2012, Netflix spent $1.83 
billion on programming. By the end of 2016, Netflix spent around $6 billion, and that number 
grew even more in 2017. Somewhere between 10% and 20% of that money is earmarked for 
original content, and that percentage is also expected to increase in the future. The growth in 
these figures has caused Netflix to rethink how it builds out its library. In terms of the sheer 
number of different shows and movies on its service, the U.S. version of Netflix has shrunk by 
around 33 percent between March 2014 and March 2016 (Epstein 2016). Instead of simply 
aggregating as much available content as possible, then, Netflix has had to become much more 
selective in its additions to the library. It also means a more targeted focus on producing and 
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licensing Netflix Original content, pushing harder for global content rights licenses, and working 
with local content producers around the world to create products with “global potential.” Netflix 
continues to move up the supply chain from solely licensing third party content to international 
co-productions. It then brands these productions as Netflix Originals for its international 
audiences. In doing so, it is attempting to cultivate a specific subscriber attachment by 
differentiating itself from other streaming services while at the same time narrowing the gap 
amongst the many Netflix catalogs around the world. 
As the service has expanded internationally, the moves from licensing content from other 
companies, to licensing content that is branded as Netflix exclusive, to finally owing the show or 
film in its entirety is born out of the desire “to control an increasing number of international 
territories and windows within those territories” said Netflix head of Original Content Cindy 
Holland back in June 2014. In other words, the company wants to push for global content rights 
that it pays for, but it also wants to take advantage of the existing segmented geographies of 
digital content rights by selling content of its own. This move also serves as a hedge against the 
difficulties of negotiating for exclusive global rights. With the proliferation of distribution 
platforms, there is some concern that the major content owners will start to hold back their 
content from Netflix, or indeed will begin to launch their own streaming services, as CBS and 
HBO, among other traditional networks, have done. As it expands internationally, Netflix is 
caught in an interesting paradox: it wants to at once smooth over or even erase geographic 
borders when it comes to licensing practices, while at the same time it wants to validate and even 
cultivate the hyperlocal cultural contexts around the world, in accounting for differential tastes 
through both its recommendation system and in its original content production and licensing 
patterns. 
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Creating a recognizable brand identity for a streaming video company follows in the 
wake of developments that go back to the rise of the cable industry, first with the introduction of 
niche channels that catered to more specific kinds of audiences (as opposed to the mass media 
programming of the major broadcast networks), and then in the transformation of those niche 
channels themselves into brands (McDonald 2016, Curtin and Shattuc 2009). In the context of 
cable and satellite television, the brand became a way to assert the value of a specific channel (or 
set of channels) in the face of proliferating distribution services and programming options. As 
Kevin McDonald has argued, the niche-oriented channels “demonstrated their value to cable 
operators not through ratings but by formulating a brand that appealed to particular audience 
segments,” like the Nickelodeon orange splat logo or the “It’s Not TV. It’s HBO” slogan 
(McDonald 2016).  
But what is the “Netflix Original” brand? In building out its content libraries, Netflix 
works to establish the Netflix Original brand both in terms of how it looks to subscribers and in 
terms of how to appeal to content creators and owners. In the United States, Netflix bills itself as 
an alternative, independent service: it is not a slave to traditional success metrics like ratings or 
box office receipts, it offers production and licensing terms that allow for more creative 
expression from content producers, it provides access to content that is otherwise more difficult 
to find, and it delivers that access “over-the-top,” which has become accepted industry parlance 
for content services that are unshackled from the traditions of cable television, namely program 
scheduling for live television, including the temporal scarcity of valuing certain segments of the 
day over others, with only three to four hours of “primetime” available to fill, advertising breaks, 
as well as elements related to customer service. In the face of dealing with subscription television 
services, which the American Customer Satisfaction Index rates as the most disliked industry in 
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the United States, Netflix positions itself as a relatively painless experience: signing up and 
cancelling are designed to be easy and painless, as opposed to the endless frustrations associated 
with the customer service call centers of Comcast or Time Warner Cable.  
More specifically, however, the company traffics in what M.J. Clarke (2013) has called a 
beneficial addictive good in transmedia television. More colloquially, this could be understood as 
binge watching, where “consumption capital” is accrued based on how much one watches. This 
capital becomes more valuable with subsequent viewings as you move through the show. Netflix 
began to ramp up this kind of brand identity as it acquired serialized dramas that had originally 
aired on AMC, FX, BBC and other networks. These licenses were strategically timed such that 
they interrupted the conventional syndication windows, at least in the United States: subscribers 
could “catch up” on shows via Netflix before they became re-runs on broadcast or cable 
channels. This arrangement proved to be symbiotic, as many of these shows appeared on Netflix 
between seasons, but before the show itself had concluded. This led to increased ratings in 
subsequent seasons of the show, as people caught up on Netflix then tuned in to watch the show 
as it aired. It is against the backdrop of binge watching licensed content, a form of viewer 
behavior that in its most appealing (to Netflix) form serves as the manifestation of a deep 
emotional investment in the show, that Netflix continues to cultivate the Netflix Originals brand.  
The company has spent ample resources cultivating a sense that Netflix was an appealing 
alternative to the traditional film studios and television networks, one that offered financial 
flexibility and artistic freedom. In this respect, it is no accident that its first major original 
programming deal, House of Cards, featured high-profile Hollywood A-listers like Kevin 
Spacey, Robin Wright, and David Fincher. Not only were these names enough to attract viewers, 
but Spacey and others involved in the show spent a lot of time doing publicity work for both 
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House of Cards and Netflix in interviews and public speeches, emphasizing how the company 
greenlit a two season, twenty six episode run and pledged $100 million for the project without 
forcing the producers into the usual pitfalls of television production, like creating a pilot episode 
and worrying about whether the show will get picked up or renewed.  
Netflix’s original programming strategy is born in large part out of its internet-based 
distribution model, which allows it to circulate its shows simultaneously around the world. 
Broadcast, cable and satellite have been defined by the capacity to widely transmit one 
centralized message, and to do so one signal at a time (Lotz 2017). These are technological 
paradigms of mass media. By contrast, broadband internet distribution is a much more efficient 
mode of distribution, where the technologies that can compress, transmit, cache, decode and 
translate data lay the framework for broader distribution at a larger scale. These differences then 
lead to distinctions in business models for the distribution of television programming. Traditional 
broadcast and cable television is largely advertiser-funded, rather than funded through 
subscriptions. Even subscription-only networks like HBO were up until recently inaccessible via 
authorized channels except as add-ons for traditional cable packages, which still generated 
revenue through advertising. Advertiser-funded television requires a mass audience to succeed. 
By contrast, Netflix’s subscription-only model is ad-free. The shows in its library do not need 
mass audiences because Netflix is not operating on the same metrics of success. Moreover, many 
subscriber-based services, or portals, have begun to operate as lone content networks that are 
untethered from the perceived restrictions of the economics of content bundling. They embrace 
specific kinds of programming, aimed at niche audiences, rather than generalized programming 
aimed at mass audiences. Amanda Lotz (2017) argues that Netflix uses a “conglomerated niche” 
strategy, by developing a variety of series for a variety of different niches, which it is able to do 
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given its capacity to serve each of those distinct niches at the same time. This capacity, while not 
unique to Netflix, nevertheless lays the groundwork for its ability to expand internationally.   
I would refine that strategy categorization slightly. Given its international scale and 
aspirations, Netflix operates in between mass-audience programming and niche programming. 
Netflix’s international focus is a two-pronged approach. First, the company looks for content that 
fits their understanding of global or universal appeal. Original programming like Marco Polo and 
Sense 8, which star international actors and move within the show across international locations, 
are efforts at a mass media-like appeal on a global scale. Netflix identifies storyline themes, 
genres, actor charm or relatability, or even character subjects that it flags as having what it 
considers to be an attractiveness across the world. For instance, Ted Sarandos was asked at the 
2016 UBS Annual Global Media and Communications Conference about how the Netflix show 
The Crown was performing. He responded that the show’s reception had been “really great and 
exactly how we’d hoped, which is that Queen Elizabeth is probably the most famous human 
being on the planet right now, living human being known around the world and people who 
know the history of her or don’t and just know the history of the monarchies around the world 
are really fascinated by this family and this story” (Seeking Alpha 2016). In this case, Sarandos 
indicates that one important criteria for considering whether a show could be globally marketed 
as a Netflix Original is the celebrity factor of the subject. Sometimes, this celebrity is related to a 
character or set of characters within a show. Other times, the celebrity is linked directly to the 
actor, rather than the character, as in the case of Adam Sandler’s four film deal.  
Underlying this appeal to an imagined universal audience is Netflix’s attempts to 
articulate a type of content—a show or film that might appeal to “everyone”—to global access to 
that content. Moreover, this content is further branded as exclusive to Netflix subscribers, even 
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as the vision of the show itself is built around inclusiveness of idealized “universals.” It is a 
response to what Lucas Hilderbrand (2009) has called “access entitlement,” the idea that content 
access should be equalized around the world. Not only should everyone be authorized to 
subscribe to Netflix regardless of where they live, but everyone should have access to the same 
content library. Indeed, it is through such shows as The Crown that Netflix asserts itself as an 
international purveyor of first run content. Not only can people watch the show all at once, and 
around the world, but they will be seeing the show during its premiere, as opposed to waiting for 
a predetermined period afterwards. International content windowing strategies traditionally have 
kept certain people from accessing the shows and films they want to watch. Netflix initially 
emerged as an important secondary market for television programming, by constructing and then 
filling gaps between those windows as an international streaming service that was known mostly 
for allowing people to catch up on ongoing shows. In this sense, the Netflix Originals brand 
serves as a signal that Netflix has entered the market for first-run distribution and exhibition. 
Such a move works to invert the power relations between Netflix, content rights holders, and 
other distributors.  
In addition, Netflix has begun to tap into the international box office success of comic 
book-based tentpole franchises with its 2013 deal with Marvel TV for exclusive rights to shows 
based on four characters that exist within the ever-broadening Marvel Universe: Jessica Jones, 
Daredevil, Luke Cage, and Iron Fist. On March 17, 2016 Netflix debuted season two of 
Daredevil. The show was available, in the same moment, in 190 countries. Wired’s Brian Barrett 
hailed this moment as important for Netflix’s corporate strategy to position itself “to be the first 
truly global content network” (Barrett 2016). Daredevil marked a watershed moment for 
Netflix’s international expansion, as the first major Netflix Original release following Netflix’s 
87 
  
aggressive international expansion just two months prior. In other words, Daredevil was the 
Netflix Original “viewable” to first reach the widest possible set of subscribers. Perhaps more 
importantly, the scale of Netflix’s reach mirrors its interest in the possibilities of tapping into the 
Marvel universe as a popular source of intellectual property, with endless opportunities for 
spinoffs, new series, reboots, and so forth.  
This interest in mining Marvel extends to the structure of the shows themselves, as 
Netflix looks to build shows that work as standalone productions as well as bridges to the 
broader character universe. This bridging works not only in terms of storylines, but also formally 
as well, in the relationship between the Marvel content that exists as television programming and 
the films. Unlike the Marvel films, which tend to involve epic fight scenes that result in the 
destruction of entire cities, and sometimes are elevated to a cosmic or interstellar scale to reflect 
their fit for the “big screen,” the television series tend to revolve more around smaller scale 
intimacies that have become characteristic of the small screen. Not only that, but the Marvel 
television shows are driven more by character than by plot, as the conventions of long-form, 
serialized multi-season storytelling offers more real estate for narrative exploration.  
In addition to marketing franchises that have “global appeal” (broadly defined) like 
Marco Polo, The Crown, Narcos, and shows from the Marvel universe, Netflix also cultivates its 
Originals brand based on productions that are made with specific types of niche audiences in 
mind. From the beginning of its international expansion, this aspect of its expansion has been 
received with mixed feelings. Across the world, Netflix naysayers pointed to tropes of cultural 
imperialism and Americanization, fearing that Netflix would negatively impact the local 
production, distribution, and exhibition industries and sectors. On the other hand, the aggression 
with which Netflix has expanded into original programming from around the world—whether 
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through licensing third-party content or co-producing from the ground up—has been a deliberate 
attempt to signal Netflix’s interest in incubating local creativity. For third-party content licensed 
as a Netflix Original, the promise to creators is wider distribution of content that may have 
initially been restricted to small-scale releases through festivals or local broadcasting. 
Netflix’s place in the contemporary media distribution ecosystem cannot fully be 
understood outside of the shifting contexts for how access to content works. In terms of 
international content, streaming services often offer a bridge that fills in gaps of differential 
access to certain kinds of content that are otherwise only available for limited amounts of time, 
and in limited geographies. For instance, Seung Bak, the founder of a streaming service called 
DramaFever, said he started the site in 2008 because he wanted to practice his Korean language 
skills by watching Korean dramas but found that such content was difficult to locate. He could 
either rent pirated DVDs from Korean supermarkets in Manhattan (where he lived), or he could 
pay for a premium cable service that offered a limited content library: “a couple of Korean TV 
networks that only aired a few current episodes with no access to previous shows” (Yu 2013). A 
former financial industry executive, Bak went to the South Korean TV network MBC and spent 
six months in negotiations with the company for his new startup to legally license MBC’s 
content under a revenue-sharing agreement. A large number of other streaming services have 
popped up in the past several years with similar aims: to increase access to certain types of 
content that otherwise has limited distribution.  
Netflix buys films and television programming from many such distributors, usually in 
bulk orders. This is one of the primary ways Netflix fills its libraries in new markets. Ordering 
lesser known viewables from distributors like DramaFever offers Netflix a quick way of 
obtaining content that appeals not only to niche interests, but also to subscribers in new markets 
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for whom such content is itself local and well-known. In the process, Netflix offloads some of 
the work involved in choosing content in the first place, relying on the labor and expertise of 
distributors like DramaFever to aggregate content based on its knowledge of a given niche taste. 
Sometimes, such aggregation purchases became mildly controversial in international markets. 
Shortly after launching in Finland in 2012, Netflix was found to be distributing a version of the 
Canadian-American sci-fi series Andromeda that had been translated by a popular fansub 
community called “DivX Finland,” rather than using official or authorized subtitles (Van der Sar 
2012). Netflix apologized for the error to a local Finnish newspaper and removed that version of 
the show. While Netflix may not have knowingly used unauthorized versions of shows in this 
case, they have often used unauthorized distribution platforms like BitTorrent as research 
sources when deciding on what content to buy, and what films and shows are popular in a given 
area. During its launch in the Netherlands in 2013, Vice President of Content Acquisition Kelly 
Merryman told the local tech blog Tweakers that “with the purchase of series, we look at what 
does well on piracy sites” (Schellevis 2013).   
Sometimes, Netflix combines these two foci into a single show. In 2016, it began 
simultaneous international co-production of Ultimate Beastmaster, an athletic competition show 
with competitors from six different countries: the United States, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, 
Germany, and Japan. Netflix filmed six different versions of the show, from the point of view of 
hosts from each of the countries speaking in their native tongue. The only discernable difference 
across the versions of the show is which two hosts guide viewers through the competition. The 
show doubles not only as a competition amongst elite athletes but also a competition of 
nationalities, as the hosts adamantly cheer for the athletes from their respective countries. Netflix 
then decided to selectively distribute each version. The below table shows data on the show’s 
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availability from Netflixable, a website that catalogs where given viewables are available across 
39 countries (a relatively small subset of the over 190 countries Netflix currently operates in). 
The English language version from the United States is clearly the flagship, as it is the only 
version available everywhere, including the places where the other five versions are available. 
The only other overlap is in the United States, where the Ultimate Beastmaster Mexico version is 
available.   
Figure 2-2: Availability of Ultimate Beastmaster 
Season 1 
Ultimate Beastmaster 
Version 
Countries where the show is available 
UB USA 
Argentina Hong Kong Philippines 
Australia India Portugal 
Austria Ireland Russia 
Bangladesh Israel Singapore 
Belgium Italy South Africa 
Brazil Japan South Korea 
Canada Luxembourg Sweden 
Costa Rica Mexico Switzerland 
Denmark Netherlands Taiwan 
Egypt New Zealand Thailand 
Finland Norway United Kingdom 
France Pakistan United States 
Germany Panama   
UB Brasil 
Brazil 
Portugal 
 
UB Mexico 
Argentina 
Costa Rica 
Mexico 
Panama 
Spain 
United States 
 
UB Japan 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
 
UB South Korea South Korea 
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UB Germany 
Austria 
Belgium 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
 
 
The show was renewed for a second season, with a different set of countries in addition 
to the United States for its versions: Spain, France, Italy, India, and interestingly China. The data 
above is obviously incomplete, as it omits the vast majority of countries in which Netflix 
operates. However, the table does shed some light on some of the underlying assumptions about 
the distribution of original programming across Netflix’s “global” content library. For Netflix, 
language clearly transcends national borders when it comes to content, and yet language is still 
used to construct regional market segmentation. This distribution choice seems to be strangely at 
odds with the very production of the show itself. In every version, all six sets of judges are 
visible at certain points to the audience. All judges are shown at the beginning of each episode to 
be lined up in what look like cubicles, with each set of hosts simultaneously performing their 
hosting responsibilities by serving as master of ceremonies to their respective version while also 
acknowledging periodically the existence of their fellow hosts. Yet while each set of hosts is on 
equal footing within the show itself, it is clear from the distribution of the versions that the U.S. 
version serves as the service’s master copy, given its availability in all 39 countries. Netflix thus 
seems to be driven at least in part by assigning its own original content to regional libraries based 
on a broad understanding of language dissemination. The motivation behind this decision is not 
entirely clear. Why not release all versions everywhere?  
It is clear that sometimes Netflix deliberately withholds its original programming despite 
owing global distribution rights. However, it is only recently that Netflix has held such power 
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over content in its libraries. Its international expansion has proceeded largely piecemeal, and 
Netflix has had to adapt some hybridized strategies for negotiating content licenses. For instance, 
Netflix obtained the streaming rights to certain ongoing shows before they launched their service 
in many countries. In March 2016, Netflix released the fourth season of House of Cards, but that 
season was not made available to people in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Hong Kong, 
Turkey, and much of Africa. Moreover, in a few countries, no seasons of the show are available 
at all. Such situations result from legacy licensing agreements in place between Netflix and 
Media Rights Capital, the production company that owns the show, and Sony Pictures 
Television, which handles worldwide distribution through a sales partnership (Van der Sar 
2016). The first season of House of Cards launched on February 1, 2013, with Netflix famously 
releasing all 13 episodes of the first season at the same time. At the time, Netflix was available in 
the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Latin America, and Scandinavia. Within two 
months, Sony Pictures Television had sold the distribution rights to the show to companies in 
dozens of countries. In Germany for instance, the exclusive local rights to House of Cards were 
first licensed to Sky Deutschland, a media company that runs a Satellite Pay-TV platform.4 The 
show was available both on Sky’s linear programming schedule and its on-demand service. In 
both Spain and France, CanalPlus obtained exclusive rights to the first two seasons. So, by the 
time Netflix launched in these two countries, it was forced to contend with the fact that it could 
not offer one of its flagship original shows, and moreover that local competitors could.  
Such examples happened as the result either of a lack of power in licensing negotiations 
or because Netflix did not foresee or care about the problems of separating its streaming service 
from its original programming. However, they can also be seen as fortuitous. In fact, it is 
                                                 
4 Sky Deutschland operates only in Germany, but is in fact owned by 21st Century Fox. 
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important to note that Netflix’s content is sometimes strategically detached from the service 
itself. Whereas Netflix’s initial international growth strategy involved growing its subscriber 
base through robust marketing campaigns once they enter a given market, it also uses the 
strength of the programming itself as a standalone asset. In other words, Netflix-branded content 
that exists beyond the streaming service has been and continues to be a useful means of 
international expansion. This has proven particularly true in China, by far the largest market in 
the world where Netflix’s streaming service does not yet operate. For years Netflix has attempted 
to penetrate the Chinese market with its service, and due in large part to national regulations for 
economic protectionism those efforts have not worked. Netflix then turned to a different 
approach in early 2014, reaching a licensing deal with Chinese streaming service Sohu for the 
rights to House of Cards. The show quickly became the most-watched show on Sohu (Wan 
2014). In April 2017, it announced another content licensing agreement with the Chinese 
streaming service iQiyi, which is a subsidiary of the massive Chinese search company Baidu 
(Brzeski 2017).  
This section has detailed many of the critical components to Netflix’s international 
expansion strategies as they relate to original programming. But for whom is this programming 
made? How does Netflix conceive of its subscribers, and how are such assumptions built into the 
service itself? Moreover, how does the fragmentation of international markets through 
geoblocking play into Netflix’s strategies for courting new subscribers and keeping existing 
ones? To address these questions, the next section examines how Netflix’s recommendation 
system operates in the context of international subscriber bases.  
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Reimagining the Netflix Subscriber in International Contexts 
In this section, I consider how international streaming in fragmented markets 
reconfigures Netflix’s conception of its subscribers, in terms of the recommendation system and 
viewership data. Constructions of who those subscribers are, why they matter, and what they 
want out of a streaming service is fundamental to Netflix’s international expansion. These 
constructions are built into certain parts of the streaming service itself. In particular, the 
recommendation system becomes the engine through which Netflix feeds its assumptions about 
subscribers back to the subscribers themselves. Although the various proprietary internal 
algorithmic machinations of its recommendation system are “black-boxed” to a great degree, the 
recommendation system has always been a core marketing tool for Netflix’s service. As Sarah 
Arnold has argued, the way that Netflix positions its recommendation system as a useful 
instrument for improving its subscriber’s viewing experience “represents a shift in audience 
measurement and interpretation from the notion of the depersonalized mass to the personalized, 
the individuated, and the autonomous” (49). Netflix wants to erase the geographic borders from 
its streaming service by pushing for global licensing rights; however, its recommendation system 
attempts to exercise other forms of control over content flows by demarcating borders around 
specific “taste cultures,” in order to fully personalize its service for each user. In an international 
context, this personalized curation means that Netflix tries to act like an intercultural 
ambassador. Netflix envisions subscribers in terms of a series of preferences. These preferences 
circulate at the level of content, as Netflix constructs connections amongst its catalog titles. 
Netflix must also attend to local languages (through subtitling and dubbing content) as well as 
the different modes of payment that might be normalized in each area (for instance, the use of 
PayPal as opposed to a credit card). As such, geoblocking seems to morph into a different form 
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of market segmentation, where subscriber data that is generated at the level of the nation—in the 
form of subscriber numbers by country and region—is reabsorbed and redistributed into curation 
practices and personalized services.  
Much of the impetus for Netflix to expand abroad so aggressively and in such a short 
period is to try to accelerate the build out of its subscriber base, as monthly subscription 
payments are its primary source of revenue. Netflix’s letter to shareholders at the end of the 2016 
third quarter reveals the extent to which Netflix has begun to rely on international growth. While 
the domestic subs have grown modestly in the past year, up to 46.5 million from about 42.1 
million at the end of the 2015 third quarter, internationally subscription growth has been much 
more pronounced. As of September 30, 2015, Netflix reported 23.95 million paid memberships. 
A year later, that number was up to 36.8 million (Letter to Shareholders). In July 2017, Netflix 
reported that for the first time, international subscribers had overtaken subscribers in the United 
States during the second quarter 2017. Figure 2.1 from Statista illustrates the comparative rise in 
subscribers from the U.S. versus the rest of the world. 
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Figure 2-3: International Netflix Subscriptions Surpass U.S.
 
Netflix executives identified international expansion as their primary means of growing a 
sustainable and profitable business, in part because subscriber growth in the United States could 
not keep up with the rising costs of content licensing and production. However, the projections 
for when subscriber growth will begin to seriously mitigate the cost of content continue to be 
pushed into the future, given the accelerated pace of content spending. If anything, servicing 
subscribers has only become more expensive since Netflix started its international expansion. 
The average programming costs per streaming customer worldwide have increased from $16 in 
the third quarter of 2012 to $21.50 in the third quarter of 2017. Given the scale and scope of its 
“global” ambitions, Netflix is clearly betting big on its ability to sign up new subscribers and 
keep existing ones.  
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Digital media platforms from Netflix to Facebook to Google largely close off their 
recommendation systems from public scrutiny, obscuring the processes that connect users of 
these platforms with the content on that platform.5 Yet although Netflix tightly guards much of 
the specifics of its viewership data and how it operates its recommendation system, there is some 
useful public information available from its official tech blog and other public pronouncements, 
including publications in scholarly journals by its employees. Such information can be revealing, 
identifying certain assumptions that those working in the company are making about the 
relationship between people, content, and culture. Specifically, analyzing these public documents 
can generate insight into how viewer data gets filtered through the Netflix recommendation 
system, and how that in turn organizes the content library across geographic regions.  
One of the benefits of the company’s foray into streaming video—as opposed to digital 
downloads, for instance—is the constant connection that Netflix can maintain with its 
subscribers. Shifting from renting DVDs to streaming video meant the company could extract a 
lot more information about the subscriber’s interactions with the content. The DVD business was 
(and still is) fueled by the one to five-star viewer ratings, because that rating system was the 
primary indicator that the viewer had actually watched what they had rented. In addition, the 
major object of the Netflix website for the DVD business was to help people fill their queues 
with titles that they would only see in the future, as it took several days to exchange a DVD 
(Amatriain and Basilico 2012). By contrast, subscribers on the streaming service are looking to 
watch something at that moment. This is one major reason why the “queue” itself was renamed 
as “My List.” With the queue, the subscriber must “wait in line” for the DVD to arrive at some 
point in the future; that list is also lined up such that it moves one at a time, in order, based on 
                                                 
5 See for instance Gillespie 2007 and 2011, Vaidhyanathan 2011, Hallinan and Striphas, 2016 
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what a subscriber wanted to watch next. By contrast, “My List” reconfigures the element of 
waiting and the element of the hierarchical ranking. Waiting is now a factor of viewer choice 
rather than a necessity born out of the DVD-by-mail distribution system.  
In the case of DVD-by-mail service, the problem of waiting was for Netflix 
geographically contained to the United States. It manifested as a matter of efficiency in logistical 
planning: where to open up distribution centers, how inventory was managed, and how best to 
work with the U.S. Postal Service to most effectively deliver the most DVDs in the fastest way 
possible to the greatest number of subscribers, among other factors. By contrast, waiting in the 
context of international streaming exposes the inequity of digital video geographies. For those 
actually interested in the service, waiting became a function of either not having access at all to 
Netflix, or complaining that one’s locally available content library did not contain certain desired 
shows or films. Moreover, the internet facilitated international information flows such that 
people from around the world started tracking what was on Netflix in given areas around the 
world and when certain content would arrive or disappear. Existing and potential international 
subscribers were thus quite aware of their own lack of access, and at the same time could clearly 
see what others had access to.  
In December 2015, Carlos Gomez-Uribe, Vice President of Product Innovation at Netflix, 
and Neil Hunt, its Chief Product Officer published an article that digs into the data science of the 
Netflix recommender system (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt 2015). This article reveals how the 
company understands what a recommendation system is in the context of streaming video on 
subscription services, how the company thinks of their subscribers in terms of choices and 
preferences, and finally some of the ways that Netflix demarcates digital markets. The 
recommendation system for streaming, as Gomez-Uribe and Hunt write in 2015, “consists of a 
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variety of algorithms that collectively define the Netflix experience, most of which come 
together on the Netflix homepage” (13:2). With slight differences based on the type of device 
one uses to access the service, the Netflix home page is designed to look like a grid, or a matrix: 
a viewer is greeted with a series of rows of images, and each image represents a distinct title in 
the catalog.   
In Figures 2-4 through 2-8 below, the variations across devices to the Netflix homepage 
can be seen. All photos or screenshots were taken within 10 minutes of each other on Wednesday 
November 16, 2016, across the five different devices that can access Netflix in my house: the 
Netflix app on a Playstation 3 connected via an HDMI cable to an HD TV, the Netflix app on a 
Smart TV, the Netflix website on a HP laptop, the Netflix mobile app on a Samsung Galaxy S5 
phone, and Netflix app on an iPad. The distinctions are subtle in some cases, as with the different 
row names and titles between Figures 2-4 and 2-5. There is some overlap in others: four of the 
five figures showcase “Popular on Netflix.” The main banner title, however, is different in four 
of the five cases, although each showcases a different Netflix Original.  
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Figure 2-4: Playstation 3 
 
Figure 2-5: Smart TV 
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Figure 2-6: Netflix website via HP laptop 
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Figure 2-7: Samsung Galaxy S5 phone 
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Figure 2-8: iPad 
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Each title in a given row is related to all other titles in that same row, by a particular 
“theme”: this theme could be a genre (“Romantic Movies”), popularity (the “Trending Now” 
designation), when the title became available (“Recently Added”), if you had previously begun 
to watch (“Continue Watching”), or a row of “Top Picks” titles that Netflix suggests for a 
specific member profile. These genres and other categorizations are constructed specifically for 
Netflix. In 2007, the company hired the first set of “taggers”: people who are employed to watch 
and tag specific titles in as many ways as possible that reflect with some degree of accuracy the 
many and varied characteristics of each title (Siemens 2015). In January 2014, Alexis Madrigal 
of The Atlantic reported that Netflix had 76,897 unique ways to describe its content titles 
(Madrigal 2014). Per Gomez-Uribe and Hunt, each homepage has around 40 distinct rows, and 
within each row there can be up to 75 titles. The recommendation system accounts for around 
80% of the hours streamed at Netflix, while the remaining 20% comes from Netflix’s search 
functions.  
Titles are generated within each row by a distinct algorithm, based on the category of the 
row designation. For instance, titles in each genre row (“Romantic Movies”) are dictated by 
Netflix’s personalized video ranker (PVR) algorithm, which organizes the catalog for each 
member’s profile. As of November 2016, there can be up to five distinct profiles on a single 
account. The personalization of the PVR comes from a “blend personalized signals with a pretty 
healthy dose of (unpersonalized) popularity” (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt 13:3). In other words, the 
PVR algorithm works by combining data based on a single subscriber’s viewing preferences 
with a larger aggregated dataset that is culled from across the entire Netflix member base, but 
that is specific to the genre or other similar filtering category.  
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The Top N video ranker finds a few personalized recommendations, which are organized 
in the “Top Picks for (user name)” row. Unlike the PVR, the Top N titles are generated from the 
entire catalog, rather than from a distinct subset of the catalog (like a genre). As with the PVR, 
these titles are driven in part on “unpersonalized” popularity data, which is used to rank the 
possible titles that the algorithm recommends. In addition, the titles themselves are selected in 
part based on personalization criteria, like data on what that viewer has previously watched. The 
algorithm draws from different periods of a viewer’s history, ranging from what that person has 
watched in just the past day to what they have watched across the previous year.  
The video-video similarity algorithm, or “sims,” works similarly to the Top N, except it 
bases its recommendations on a single title rather than sampling from across a subscriber’s 
previous viewing history. The sims algorithm generates a ranked list of similar videos for every 
title in the catalog; in this sense, the recommendations are drawn from so-called unpersonalized 
data, because the ranked titles are based on attributes between titles that are alike and are 
determined independent of a viewer’s preferences. These titles end up in the “Because You 
Watched” (BYW) rows. Although the recommended titles within a given BYW are not 
themselves personalized, the actual BYW rows that end up on a subscriber’s profile are 
personalized based on viewer history. In other words, although the BYW recommendation list 
for The West Wing is basically the same regardless of whether it appears on my profile or my 
neighbor’s profile, my neighbor’s viewing history may cause the algorithm to suggest a BYW 
list for Arrested Development instead.  
How then does the recommendations system account for the differences across countries 
between content libraries? Gomez-Uribe and Hunt explain that the recommendation system 
operates regionally, rather than using a single recommendation system (yet) or using a specific 
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system for each individual country. Each region is made up of countries that have similar 
catalogs and that also have a large enough base of subscribers to generate the necessary amount 
of data for the algorithms to work within the prescribed margin of error. In development is a 
single system that operates “globally,” and shares data across countries irrespective of region. At 
the same time, however, the recommendation system can respond negatively as a result of 
differential content availability: two titles that would otherwise be categorized as similar types of 
content may instead be classified as dissimilar because the titles do not live in the same content 
library. In this sense, Netflix tries to account for the limitations of regional content libraries by 
steering subscribers away from content. It is an effort to minimize the recognition of a library’s 
absence, while simultaneously highlighting the library’s “strengths.” Such algorithmic 
permutations betray an assumption on Netflix’s part that viewables on its service are inextricably 
tied to the fragmentation of international markets. Moreover, this connection is exacerbated in a 
“on-demand culture” (Tryon 2013), when instant access is demanded.  
In addition, there are other algorithms that account for cultural data that exists outside the 
bounds of personal viewer preferences or aggregated information on popularity. Although 
Gomez-Uribe and Hunt do not say so explicitly, these algorithms are an attempt to account for 
factors that contribute to the context of a subscriber’s life. For instance, the trending ranker 
offers title recommendations based on an understanding of major events that are happening at a 
given time. This ranker identifies two different types of trends: repeat events and one-off, short-
term events. Repeat events include annual holidays: titles about or involving Christmas tend to 
spike every December, for instance. One-off, short-term events include natural disasters: the 
example that the authors use is the arrival of a hurricane, which is “covered by many media 
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outlets, driving increased short-term interest in documentaries and movies about hurricanes and 
other natural disasters” (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt 13:4).  
This example is born out of an interesting assumption on the part of the authors, which is 
that the awareness of a particular kind of event correlates to an increased interest in learning 
about or even “experiencing” in a mediated way similar types of events. Although this is 
admittedly only one example, it does raise important questions about whether the Netflix 
engineering teams, which seem to be so advanced in their ability to fine-tune the various 
components of their recommendation system, are in fact assuming a rather simplistic model of 
“effects-based” communication with the media. It is unclear the extent to which they can account 
for the complicated ways that people interact with media at the level of the text and media 
becomes meaningful in various contexts: cultural, political, economic, domestic, and so forth. 
Attending to the assumptions underlying how such algorithms work to organize access to media 
content (and “knowledge” more generally) is profoundly important, as they can shape not only 
corporate policies on recommendation systems but also public policy as well.  
It is important to point out that Gomez-Uribe and Hunt identify the trending ranker as a 
useful tool for identifying temporal trends: in using their examples for both repeat events and 
one-off events, what is important for this algorithm according to the authors is when they 
happen. What is assumed to matter less is where they happened. A closer look at some of the 
company’s recent public pronouncements offers some insight into how Netflix integrates 
physical geography into its recommendation system. For instance, in March 2016, Todd Yellin, 
Netflix’s VP of product innovation, told Wired that “There’s a mountain of data that we have at 
our disposal.  That mountain is composed of two things. Garbage is 99 percent of that mountain. 
Gold is one percent. . . . Geography, age, and gender?  We put that in the garbage heap.  Where 
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you live is not that important” (Barrett 2016). A Netflix Tech Blog post from February 17, 2016 
from two Netflix engineers who work on algorithms and machine learning refines this statement 
somewhat:  
 . . . we sought to combine the regional models into a single global model that also 
improves the recommendations we make, especially in countries where we may not yet 
have many members. Of course, even though we are combining the data, we still need to 
reflect local differences in taste. This leads to the question: is local taste or personal 
taste more dominant? Based on the data we’ve seen so far, both aspects are important, 
but it is clear that taste patterns do travel globally. Intuitively, this makes sense: if a 
member likes Sci-Fi movies, someone on the other side of the world who also likes Sci-Fi 
would be a better source for recommendations than their next-door neighbor who likes 
food documentaries. Being able to discover worldwide communities of interest means 
that we can further improve our recommendations, especially for niche interests, as they 
will be based on more data. Then with a global algorithm we can identify new or 
different taste patterns that emerge over time (Raimond and Basilico 2016). 
 
Both quotations contest the assumption that geography plays some strong determining 
factor in the development of people’s “taste” for content. Geography is also a well-established 
and traditional demographic category of consumer marketing, along with age, class (or socio-
economic status), ethnicity, gender, race, and sexuality. Yellin refutes the idea that, as a unit of 
measurement or as a factor in a dataset, geography can offer useful insight into subscriber 
preferences. In fact, a slightly deeper analysis into this sort manufacturing of algorithmic culture 
suggests that Yellin and the Netflix teams would simply prefer to tell a story that minimizes the 
connection between geography and taste: between where someone lives and what someone wants 
to watch. This story shifts the common assumption about how to account for “quality” in a 
cultural hierarchy. The “best” recommendation system is not one that recommends a series of 
canonical titles that somehow represent the greatest film and television programming, nor is it 
one that recommends the most popular titles, but rather one that can modulate seemingly 
disparate titles that may otherwise appear out of place (Hallinan and Striphas 2016, Pariser 
2012). This is the essence of Netflix’s curation practices. 
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Such practices underscore Netflix’s efforts to interface with subscribers by eliding 
geopolitical borders and regional differences in the availability of content. Netflix has worked to 
equalize subscriber experience with the service, even as the available choices are not always 
equal. Sometimes these efforts have been clumsy and mishandled, as Netflix has moved into 
different countries. In 2010, prior to its launch in Canada, Reed Hastings gave an interview 
where he coyly hinted at the first country Netflix would expand to: “The big market for 
Hollywood content (after the U.S.) is Europe. . . . Third is Asia. Fourth is the rest of the world. . . 
. Canda is and was an option. It’s sort of international-lite” (Keating 2010). This backhanded 
slight only served to further underscore concerns about the Americanization of a still nascent 
streaming economy (Acland and Wagman 2017). Complaints would often loudly and publicly 
arise when Netflix initially launched in a new country, especially where English was not a 
primary language. Following its launch in Brazil in 2011, then VP of Global Corporate 
Communications Jonathan Friedland addressed rising concerns about the lack of subtitled or 
dubbed content in an interview with Gizmodo Brazil. The company was conducting focus groups 
to gather feedback on whether people preferred subtitles or dubbing. He made clear that one 
obstacle the company needed to avoid was basing decisions on a “vocal minority,” as opposed to 
sticking with majority-rule feedback (Heim 2011).  
As much as Netflix wanted to elicit feedback from its subscribers, it also felt that it had a 
pedagogical role to play in markets where streaming video was still in its earliest stages. In 2012, 
Netflix Director of Corporate Communications Joris Evers noted some of the “unique 
challenges” that Netflix faced while expanding into parts of Latin America: “Click and watch 
video subscription services are new to Brazil and as a result, it takes time to educate people about 
how easy Netflix is to use, how safe it is, and what a great value we offer for a very fair price” 
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(Stewart 2012). There is a strong element of conversion or even evangelizing to such comments. 
Evers articulates a sense of responsibility for Netflix to not only introduce the conveniences of 
internet-based video streaming, but also to work to adjust normative practices of cultural 
consumption by extoling the virtues of their subscription service. The implications are that 
Netflix would be improving the lives of the people in these new markets, as well as taming 
preexisting cultures of unauthorized digital content circulation through p2p downloading. Netflix 
took a similar approach in the Netherlands when it launched in 2013. After acknowledging 
Netflix’s practices of monitoring BitTorrent in an interview, Reed Hastings told a local journalist 
that “Netflix is so much easier than torrenting. You don’t have to deal with files, you don’t have 
to download them and move them around. You just have to click and watch” (Van der Sar 2013). 
Moreover, the company line in interviews has been to claim that the existence of Netflix is in 
fact decreasing traffic on file-sharing sites. In 2012, Chief Content Officer Ted Sarandos was 
asked by the UK consumer electronics website Stuff about how Netflix combats piracy. He 
responded by saying that  
One of the things is we get ISPs to publicize their connection speeds—and when we 
launch in a territory the Bittorrent traffic drops as the Netflix traffic grows. So I think 
people do want a great experience and they want access—people are mostly honest. The 
best way to combat piracy isn’t legislatively or criminally but by giving good options. 
One of the side effects of growth of content is an expectation to have access to it 
(Edwards 2013).  
  
Speaking to international subscribers through local journalists and bloggers has been a 
staple tactic for Netflix as it has expanded its service. There is a recognition in such statements 
that their subscribers are often early adopters of technology many of whom already have access 
to the content that Netflix is entering a market to provide. Especially early on it its expansion, 
when streaming video (as opposed to digital downloading) was relatively nascent in its adoption, 
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Netflix adopted what seems to be an “inform and reform” approach: to inform potential 
subscribers in new areas about the conveniences and superiority of streaming over downloading, 
while also reinforcing the fact that their service was completely legal in an effort to reform 
cultural practices. In this final section, I shift focus from subscribers to streaming infrastructures, 
in order to dissect how Netflix dealt with issues of unauthorized access and the circumvention of 
geoblocking as it expanded internationally.  
Conclusion: Responses to Geoblocking and to Circumvention  
 Netflix has expanded to nearly 200 countries in less than seven years. While this rate 
seems extraordinarily rapid, many streaming video consumers were not interested in waiting for 
Netflix to launch in their countries. Moreover, many people were not interested in remaining 
restricted to their assigned version of Netflix, given the differences in content libraries. To get 
around these restrictions, people use virtual private networks (VPNs), which mask a computer’s 
IP address so that users appear to be in one country or region when they are actually in another. 
They are then able to access the version of Netflix from the country it appears they are in. Netflix 
attempts to negotiate “Netflix tourism,” where people access regional versions of Netflix’s 
content libraries other than their own, or where people signed up from places that did not have 
Netflix access at all, before its service was widespread internationally. Such practices presented 
Netflix with a conundrum. Although Netflix tourists violated terms of service, they became 
paying customers. Netflix thus operates at a crossroads, as a company whose streaming service is 
a compromise between content rights holders and regulators who continue to argue for stricter IP 
enforcement, and various constituencies that push for equal access to content. In this sense, 
Netflix must negotiate the calls from content owners, other distributors, its own subscribers, and 
regulators to exercise power as one of many internet gatekeepers, or even internet police. Netflix 
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works to manage the massive flow of data traffic that its service generates, while also attending 
to the circumvention by users of filtering technologies that map geographic borders onto digital 
spaces. 
Netflix’s streaming infrastructure is distributed across the world. In January 2016, Netflix 
announced that it had finally completed a seven-year process of migrating large parts of its 
streaming service to Amazon Web Services (AWS) (Brodkin 2016). A major portion of this 
move involved billing and payments, the migration and general operation of which require 
sensitivity to the security of people’s personal and financial information. According to Yury 
Izrailevsky, Netflix VP of cloud and platform engineering, “All the search, personalization, all 
the business logic, all the data processing that enables the streaming experience, the 100 
different applications and services that make up the streaming application, they live in AWS” 
(Brodkin 2016). Amazon’s cloud network is housed in thirty-five total “Availability Zones,” 
spread across thirteen regions around the world (Amazon AWS Global Infrastructure). These 
Availability Zones consist of one or more data centers, “each with redundant power, networking 
and connectivity, housed in separate facilities,” according to Amazon’s AWS site. As of October 
2016, Netflix operates out of the regions in Oregon, Northern Virginia, and Dublin (Brodkin 
2016). At this point, then, Netflix’s streaming service no longer works through its own data 
center space (its DVD business still does, however). Instead, its operations are the function of a 
series of collaborations with, in many cases (as with Amazon) some of its major competitors for 
consumer of video services. Part of the management of Netflix’s service requires distributed data 
sites, which offer the flexibility of responding to logjams or bottlenecks in data delivery.   
As has been made public on several occasions over the past few years, Netflix uses up an 
incredible amount of the Internet’s capacity, in particular during “peak” hours, in the evenings. 
113 
  
In May 2015, that figure was cited at 37 percent of downstream Internet traffic; streaming media 
in total reportedly accounted for over three-quarters of all traffic (Protalinski 2015). To help 
alleviate this stress, Netflix shifted to its own content delivery network (CDN) called Open 
Connect. The point of the CDN is to have the content delivered locally, rather than to have it 
travel from one central node (Netflix’s headquarters, for example) across thousands of miles 
through the Internet’s backbone. Basically, Open Connect deals with the processes that happen 
once you hit “play.” Open Connect consists of thousands of large hard drives that contain copies 
of Netflix’s library. These hard drives—which are boxes that look like a desktop computer—live 
all across the country and the world, inside the data centers that are operated by local Internet 
service providers, either within the ISP’s networks or at Internet exchange points, where traffic 
moves across networks. Depending on the geographic location, some of these boxes hold the 
entire content library—including multiple copies of the more popular movies and shows—while 
others hold more stripped-down versions, depending on the geographic rights licenses. When 
Netflix opened its doors to the 130 new markets in March 2016, it required only four different 
Open Connect Locations to handle the content demand: these were located in Dubai, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Johannesburg (Barrett 2016).  
At the broadest possible scale, Amazon Web Services and Open Connect together 
encompass the infrastructures that Netflix uses to maintain its streaming service and deliver 
content to the variety of consumer electronic devices used by subscribers around the world. This 
all too brief overview serves to underscore the material reality of international streaming 
services. Rhetoric about on-demand, all-access streaming services, where content is available 
any time, anywhere, on any device, should not paper over the fact that this content travels from 
somewhere. It does not materialize out of thin air. Moreover, the path it takes is determined in 
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large part by technological architectures and regulatory constraints. In this sense, then, Netflix 
does not simply deliver content to subscribers across international borders, it also to some degree 
polices those borders and in the process, manifests them in the first place.  
Streaming video over the internet has evolved in the context of regional restrictions on 
access to popular films and television programming. In the process, a whole cottage industry has 
developed to help circumvent geoblocks. In some places, geoblocking evasion has become a 
mainstream cultural staple, at least for those early adopters of internet technologies. Ramon 
Lobato detailed how in 2012 geoblocking circumvention very nearly became a regulatory 
mandate in Australia. The Australian government announced a Parliamentary Inquiry into how 
the country could combat what it saw as unfair trade practices with other countries (in particular 
the U.S.). Australians were fed up with years of spending more for cultural goods. The Inquiry’s 
final report recommended “amending the 1968 Copyright Act to allow lawful circumvention of 
geoblocking, and educating consumers about how to use VPNs effectively” (Lobato 2015). 
While such recommendations did not end up passing into law, the gesture itself was taken to be 
an endorsement by the government for circumventing geoblocking. Netflix proved to be an 
incredibly popular service in Australia, with unconfirmed estimates of up to 200,000 subscribers 
in mid-2014.6 Yet Netflix did not actually launch in Australia until 2015. Australians used VPNs 
to circumvent the geoblock that prevented them from accessing Netflix’s service in the country. 
They would then sign up as subscribers as though they were in a country that already had access, 
like the United States.  
                                                 
6 See Pocketbook 2014, Taylor 2015, Bulbeck 2014. 
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For years, Netflix essentially looked the other way on such circumvention measures, 
aside from including a clause about it in its terms of service. The company’s terms of service say 
the following, with respect to user geography:  
You may view a movie or TV show through the Netflix service primarily within the 
country in which you have established your account and only in geographic locations 
where we offer our service and have licensed such movies or TV shows. The content that 
may be available to watch will vary by geographic location. Netflix will use technologies 
to verify your geographic location. 
 
The 2014 Sony email hack offered some interesting insight into the specific reasons for 
Netflix’s position on VPNs and other circumvention measures. As reported by ArsTechnica, one 
email sent in November 2013 from Sony Pictures Television’s president of international 
distribution argues that  
Netflix are heavily resistant to enforcing stricter financial geofiltering controls, as they 
claim this would present a too high bar to entry from legitimate subscribers. For example, 
they want people to be able to use various methods of payment (e.g. PayPal) where it is 
harder to determine where the subscriber is based. They recognize that this may cause 
illegal subscribers but they (of course) would rather err that way than create barriers to 
legitimate subscribers to sign up.  
 
However, in late 2014 claims began to surface that Netflix had begun to crackdown on 
VPN use in a more systemic way. Many subscribers who used VPNs—and several VPNs 
themselves—reported that Netflix was no longer working correctly. During the Consumer 
Electronics Show in early January 2015, Neil Hunt, the chief product officer for Netflix, disputed 
those claims by saying that the company had not changed their policy on VPNs, and that “people 
who are using a VPN to access our service from outside of the area will find that it still works 
exactly as it has always done.” This response is quite coy, because the rhetoric about the extent 
to which Netflix can “crack down” on VPN use is somewhat overblown. They may be able to 
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target a particular VPN, but it is also the case that VPNs can adjust. So what Hunt seems to be 
saying here is that VPNs will work as they always have, despite Netflix’s efforts.  
More recently, Netflix seems to have changed its tune when it comes to VPNs, by more 
explicitly denouncing their use. For example, in January 2016, Netflix Vice President of Content 
Delivery Architecture David Fullagar published a post on the Netflix blog, stating that the 
company would continue to honor regional licensing agreements:  
Some members use proxies or “unblockers” to access titles available outside their 
territory. To address this, we employ the same or similar measures other firms do. This 
technology continues to evolve and we are evolving with it. That means in coming 
weeks, those using proxies and unblockers will only be able to access the service in the 
country where they currently are.  
 
Among the measures that Fullagar alludes to is a blacklisting of IP addresses that Netflix 
finds are linked to particular VPNs.  
While many consumers (and consumer advocacy groups) and content owners agree that 
some regulation over the flow of streaming video content via Netflix is acceptable, and even 
necessary, there is no clear consensus on what form that regulation should take. This is in large 
part because any regulations that are implemented have implications that extend beyond the 
context of the business of video streaming, and the consumer experience of it. For instance, 
advocates of Virtual Private Networks argue that efforts by Netflix to block its service on VPNs 
sets a dangerous precedent, because doing so works to articulate the use of VPNs with unlawful 
or unsanctioned consumer activity. VPN proponents argue that there are more fundamental and 
important reasons to use such services that go beyond breaking through borders on the Internet: 
VPNs offer their users security and privacy. In other words, when Netflix takes steps to block 
access to its service by VPN users, the company is basically accepting as true the argument that 
the main reason people use VPNs is to circumvent geoblocking regulation. In fact, there is some 
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evidence to suggest that Netflix has more actively accepted that argument, at least in terms of its 
technical team. Elsewhere in his blog post, Fullagar’s claims that “If all of our content were 
globally available, there wouldn’t be a reason for members to use proxies or ‘unblockers’ to fool 
our systems into thinking they’re in a different country than they’re actually in.”  
For proponents of VPNs, such arguments seem tone deaf for a company that wants to 
position itself as a forward-thinking brand that embraced—and indeed championed—what it saw 
in streaming as a cutting-edge consumption model. In fact, framing the response in this way, and 
for the response to come from one of the company’s chief engineers, seems to mark an 
interesting transition for Netflix in how it thinks of itself in certain contexts, from disruptive 
Silicon Valley tech company to more traditional media company that is interested in the 
protection of intellectual property. There is little doubt that the head of content delivery 
architecture understands why people use VPNs beyond simply circumventing geoblocking; 
however, he chose either explicitly or implicitly to frame VPNs in terms of their ability to break 
the rules, and ignores their other more upstanding uses. Some have argued that there are different 
technical responses that Netflix can take to address circumvention. In May 2016, the digital 
rights group OpenMedia petitioned Netflix to stop targeting VPNs. The petition was signed by 
around 45,000 people, and offers alternatives to enforcing geographic restrictions, including 
linking content libraries to credit card addresses. Moreover, the letter articulates VPN use in 
relation to privacy concerns and net neutrality debates, because VPNs offer a way to ensure that 
browsing is not throttled by internet service providers. As Netflix has also been a vocal advocate 
for the principles of net neutrality, the point of this letter seems clear: to try to position users and 
Netflix as on the same side, and to suggest that the real problem is the way that licensing deals 
are negotiated. If action needs to be taken, it should be directed at something other than VPNs. 
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Indeed, it is sometimes the case that VPN users are trying to access Netflix in ways that are 
perfectly within the bounds of the company’s user agreement. For instance, one report cites a 
transcript between a Netflix subscriber and Netflix customer service, after the subscriber 
contacted Netflix to inquire about why they could not access a certain film. When told that the 
subscriber used a tunnel broker, which is a technology like a VPN, Netflix conceded that that 
was indeed the cause for the disruption in service. The interesting wrinkle here is that the 
subscriber was based in the United States, and was simply trying to access the U.S.-based Netflix 
library.  
In this chapter, I have used Netflix’s international expansion as a case study to explore 
some of the underlying technological, legal, and economic concerns associated with a 
fragmented global mediascape. In the next chapter, I turn to Twitter’s foray into streaming live 
television programming to uncover some of the ways that social media integrates with legacy 
media like broadcasting, as well as artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies.  
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Internet Television Goes Social: Twitter Livestreams the NFL 
Marrying Social Media and Television 
In March 2016, several tech companies—including Twitter, Amazon and Facebook—
were in the midst of a bidding war for the rights to live-stream Thursday night regular season 
games of the National Football League for the 2016-17 season. Twitter emerged the winner and 
agreed to pay around $10 million to stream the network broadcasts from either CBS or NBC of 
10 games. It was one among many live-streaming deals that Twitter struck over the course of 
2016, including with the other three of the “big four” professional sports leagues—the National 
Basketball Association, Major League Baseball, the National Hockey League, the Pac-12 
Networks for college sports, and CBS News, which agreed to allow Twitter to livestream its 
feeds of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions (Isaac 2016).  
The deal with the NFL serves as an example of how a technology company and social 
media platform like Twitter attempts to reinvent itself as a hybrid video broadcaster, in order to 
broaden its appeal as a more “mainstream” destination for both internet users and advertisers. 
This transformation involves integrating a popular service for user-generated content, where the 
barrier to entry for new users is so low that people do not even have to sign up for an account to 
use the service, with broadcast television, an industry that bottlenecks the flow of information 
down to a few select outlets. Moreover, Twitter’s deal with the NFL signaled higher aspirations 
to become the primary mechanism of control for the distribution of live television content over 
the internet, by building out a streaming infrastructure that can deliver video beyond Twitter 
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itself, operating across multiple platforms and outlets while also aggregating user data for 
advertisers. Thus, Twitter’s livestreaming deal with the NFL serves as a pivotal case study for 
thinking about how networked distribution systems are created and sustained, especially as 
television programming continues to migrate online and onto mobile platforms (Braun 2015). 
Live television serves as a trojan horse for social networks, as they incorporate broadcast feeds in 
order to experiment with automated advertising technologies, artificial intelligence and machine 
learning. As social media companies continue to partner with legacy media institutions to form 
ever more complex interconnected technological formations, this chapter uses Twitter’s foray 
into livestreaming to explore social media’s evolving roles in reconfiguring access to popular 
culture over the internet.  
A primary goal of this chapter is to trace the transmission path that television takes 
through a hybridized distribution system that connects broadcast networks with social media 
networks, through web applications, and onto the various electronic exhibition devices that 
people now use to watch. Focusing on the sets of relationships that make up the distribution path 
exposes the types of intermediaries for the circulation of television that have emerged in recent 
years, and which work to control the route that content takes and the nature of our access to it. 
Such intermediaries are often hidden from public view and are easily overlooked, even in 
scholarly analyses of online distribution. They include startup artificial intelligence companies 
and machine learning technologies, streaming infrastructures owned by major conglomerates like 
Disney, and emerging initiatives from within Twitter itself.   
In order to properly assess the implications of this deal for the future of media 
distribution, this chapter identifies, defines and analyzes the characteristics that make Twitter a 
viable portal for live television, and the strategies that Twitter has used in order to begin 
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distributing live television in the first place. As such, this chapter builds on the work of the 
previous two chapters by re-contextualizing live television in light of the shifting means of 
distributing television programming and video content more broadly. I expand chapter two’s 
scope of analysis by incorporating live television to deepen understanding of not only how 
streaming video works, but also how it is defined as a technological and cultural practice. I use 
Twitter’s entry into livestreaming television to analyze how social media logics upend and 
reconfigure traditional broadcasting logics. By addressing social media’s role in television 
distribution, I further develop the insights from chapter one, which used Aereo to articulate how 
broadband influences broadcasting conventions, and vice versa.  
In the following section I contextualize Twitter’s role in the broader media ecosystem, as 
a social media platform with international reach, but with a business model that suggests a lack 
of future sustainability for the company. It is within this context that Twitter’s decision to 
livestream broadcast television makes sense. Then, in the next section, I detail Twitter’s deal 
with the NFL. I unpack this deal and scrutinize it, in order to piece together the circulation path 
that connects social media to broadcast television. I then transition in the next sections from 
contextualizing and explication to analysis. I start with an analysis of Twitter’s role as a 
gatekeeper for broadcasting content. Following this analysis, I document Twitter’s development 
of a hybrid technical infrastructure for livestreaming, with one section each on: Twitter’s 
infrastructure for authorized, formal broadcasts (like the livestreams from the NFL); Twitter’s 
acquisition of Periscope, a platform for user-generated, informal broadcasts; and finally, 
Twitter’s “front-end” infrastructure, which deals with distribution issues at the level of the 
interface with the user. Finally, I conclude with a brief assessment of the marriage between 
broadcasting and social media and its implications for the constitution of distribution circuits. On 
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the whole, this chapter illustrates the technical, institutional, and organizational architecture of 
Twitter’s television distribution system: the layers of technologies and how they interconnect, 
the many business partnerships in play, and the way that Twitter restructured its own internal 
structure to reorient itself around livestreaming television.  
Reimagining Twitter from Second Screen to Livestream 
Twitter is supposed to operate as a tool that facilitates decentralized communication. It is 
free to join and erects minimal barriers to entry aside from internet access. One need not even 
create a Twitter profile to use the service. The platform itself is also open to “user 
experimentation and reappropriation,” whereby users can modify some of Twitter’s tools to their 
own ends (Tufekci 2017). But as a publicly traded company that does not generate revenue 
through subscription payments (like Netflix does or Aereo did), Twitter relies on internet 
advertising to make money. While Google (and YouTube) and Facebook are the most dominant 
platforms for advertising on the internet, Twitter still maintains a robust, multibillion-dollar 
annual revenue stream from ad sales. In the fourth quarter of 2015, Twitter reported $556 million 
from ads shown on its platform, with another $85 million coming from off-Twitter ad sales that 
it generates through its MoPub mobile ad exchange and TellApart, an automated ad-buying 
startup that Twitter acquired earlier in the year (Peterson 2016). Since August 2014 when it 
introduced “Promoted Video,” Twitter has incorporated video ads into its business more and 
more. As of the fourth quarter of 2016, video became the largest portion of Twitter’s ad revenue 
(Swant 2017).  
This growth in video ads on Twitter is part of a series of broader trends across multiple 
media industries. As the use of mobile devices increases worldwide, advertisers and online 
publishers have for the past few years continued to experiment with different ad formats to 
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account for the changes to consumption patterns and the smaller screen sizes. More emphasis has 
been placed on advertising in “storytelling formats” with elements of interactivity that are 
supposed to draw audiences in, rather than the static formats of traditional internet advertising 
like banners (Edmonds 2016). Video is considered a useful format on social media sites, as they 
can be formatted to fit across a variety of screen sizes and can also blend into a user’s timeline or 
feed. In addition, traditional video is a gateway to more experimental forms of advertising—and 
sponsored content—that offer more immersive experiences, including virtual and augmented 
reality. Entering the market for live television streaming allows Twitter to further enter the 
market for video advertising, as the cultural expectations for ad breaks during broadcasts—
especially for live sports—is already built into the viewer experience (in particular in the United 
States).  
Increasingly, Twitter company executives are making decisions that recentralize control 
in an effort to stabilize the platform’s reputation, to generate a stronger user base, and ultimately 
to maintain a growing revenue stream through ad sales, data licensing, and content partnerships. 
Twitter can be an organizational tool for gathering people together or disseminating messages in 
a targeted way, a means of gathering data about user activity and information flows, a way to 
facilitate how people navigate space online by linking “content” (news articles, websites, and so 
on) that takes people off Twitter’s platform, and now as a television. It can be used for one-to-
one communication as well as one-to-many and many-to-many. It is an unmitigated success in its 
ability to ingratiate itself into the culture by offering numerous ways of rewriting, for better or 
worse, many of the norms of popular language with its #hashtags and its 140-character limit. It 
has become an integral tool of communication for “the mainstream media.” Reporters regularly 
use Twitter to report breaking news, and tweets are often integrated into national and local 
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broadcasts, and are published on innumerable popular websites as sources of information. At the 
same time, President Trump claims Twitter is his most effective way of speaking directly to “the 
people,” so that he can actively bypass the mainstream media (CNN 2017). Of course, for 
someone with the gravitas of the President of the United States, these two affordances of Twitter 
tend to converge. Not only is the President tweeting to his followers, but the media will 
inevitably cover such tweets, thereby offering another wide audience.  
This platform flexibility has sparked what Twitter executives seem to consider an 
existential crisis for the company, stemming from a lack of clarity about what Twitter actually is. 
On an earnings call in August 2015, CEO (and Twitter co-founder) Jack Dorsey gave voice to 
this anxiety by stating that “an answer to ‘why Twitter’ must be articulated clearly (Peterson 
2015). He announced an upcoming marketing campaign aimed both at potential users and at 
investors that would work to address that question. The company’s Chief Marketing Officer, 
Leslie Berland (who had been hired from American Express in January 2016), admitted at the 
2017 Consumer Electronics Show that there has been ongoing confusion about Twitter’s 
“purpose” since it first launched in 2006: “So, we were a platform, a product, a service, a water 
cooler, a time square, a microphone, and we are every single one of those things” (Kapko 2017). 
At the same time, this crisis has its own strategic value for Twitter, which seems to publicly 
complain about how to articulate its purpose every few years. In 2010, Twitter co-founder Evan 
Williams steadfastly argued that the initial confusion the company felt about its purpose – “is it a 
social network? a Facebook feature? – were put to rest: “I think it’s pretty clear now that Twitter 
is a real-time information network” (McGirt 2010).  
Although it operates as a social network, Twitter’s executives have for years cultivated its 
relationship to more traditional mass media, especially television. While individual users 
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continued to take advantage of—or be mystified by—Twitter’s open design, the company 
insisted on hitching its wagon to television’s star, first as a second screen that facilitated 
discussion about TV programming, and then more recently as a source of programming itself. 
Twitter jumped into the excitement in the mid-aughts over “interactive television,” the latest 
craze to try to tap into potentials for “democratizing” television by turning it into a two-way 
medium. Twitter started to strike up partnerships with broadcast and cable networks to help them 
integrate viewer tweets into broadcasts. Twitter offered the immediacy of event access that by 
this point had become rote for traditional television, and at a granular level that broadcasts did 
not reach. Tech literate early adopters could turn to Twitter for updates on local events, 
following along with tweets from people “on the ground,” that broadcasters would often ignore, 
before broadcasts were on television. In 2013, Twitter’s then-CEO articulated this vision of 
Twitter’s symbiosis with television to Forbes, in an article titled “How Twitter Will Save TV 
(and TV Will Save Twitter)”: 
As we’ve grown, it’s become more and more clear to us that the characteristics that make 
up Twitter—public, real-time and conversational—make it a perfect complement to 
television. TV has always been social and conversation-driven. It's just that in the past, 
the reach of that conversation was limited by the number of people in a room or who you 
could talk to on the phone or the next day at the watercooler. Broadcasters have come to 
understand that Twitter is a force multiplier for the media they've created (Bercovici 
2013).  
  
Part of the initial effort to rebrand the company was to try to shift the public perception of 
how people can use Twitter. Some of these changes have been subtle, but were implemented to 
recalibrate expectations and perceived social anxieties about the impetus for users to constantly 
be sharing their thoughts via tweets. For instance, in 2016 Berland had the company moved from 
the social networking category of app stores to the news category. Doing so is an effort to 
foreground Twitter as a tool for gathering information, while shifting to the background its use as 
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a tool for generating information, which it had originally been intended for as a microblogging 
service. The move from social networking to news also brings with it an implicit shift in 
Twitter’s role as an information processing platform, specifically in terms of the company’s 
capacity to serve as an editor, curator, and culture filtration system. The turn to live television is 
a natural extension of Twitter’s rebranding as a news app in the sense that, like with news, 
people tune into live broadcasts to find out “what’s going on.”  
Twitter made its mark with the television industry as the second screen: the device that 
people are using while watching television (the first screen), which facilitates trackable user 
communication (Nee and Dozier 2017; Gil de Zúñiga, Garcia-Perdomo, and McGregor 2015; 
Cameron and Geidner 2014; Rossi and Selva 2014). The second screen offers a feedback loop 
where people can express their thoughts on a particular show, which is enticing for marketers 
and advertisers. It also operates as a platform for supplementary content (behind-the-scenes 
looks at actors or the production process, for instance). Early iterations of the second screen 
tended to involve polls for reality shows, where viewers text or call in to vote. This idea has a 
few distinct but related valences. For one, the second screen is of secondary importance to the 
first, or primary, screen: the television. Twitter has positioned itself relative to the major 
industrial players in the television industry as the platform for audience output: it is the outlet for 
people to communicate about the inputs from the television. The second screen also inverts the 
idea that broadband and broadcast paradigms are at odds with each other, and can actually be in 
lockstep. Twitter’s relationship with the television industry becomes symbiotic, as it is a tool that 
links together the centralized control of mass media with the user-generated control of social 
media. Underlying the assumption of mass media is the commodification of audiences: 
shepherding groups of people “together” in order to sell access to them. The dominant means of 
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doing this for broadcast television has typically been in terms of the scale of the audience: the 
larger the better. With the emergence of cable television in the 1980s and 1990s and the 
proliferation of channels specializing in specific kinds of programming, the “niche” audience 
became important for advertisers. Whereas the large audience was thought to be valuable in size 
alone, the niche audience was small in number, but more “passionate” about the programming. 
Social media offers both hyper-niche and mass scales of audiences through its surges in user 
traffic. In addition, the second screen tethers the user to a programmer schedule, by creating a 
common space where viewers of the same show or live event can go to express themselves. Not 
only do users gather on Twitter, they often do so at appointed times.  
For years, much of Twitter’s business model has been built on exploiting this 
construction. When they unveiled in May 2013 their “Twitter Amplify” program, they framed it 
as a set of multi-screen partnerships, where the second screen—Twitter—performs as the 
marketplace where broadcasters, advertisers, and consumers all can meet and interact:  
We think these types of two-screen sponsorships are a win-win-win. Users receive 
spectacular, timely content that rounds out their TV experience or reminds them to tune 
in. Powered by Promoted Tweets, broadcasters reach new audiences and open up new 
business lines. Brand advertisers get, for the first time, an integrated cross-platform tool 
for reaching the social conversation wherever it happens (Roberts 2013). 
 
One major component of the second screen is its interactivity, which has created more direct 
lines of communication among users, content owners, advertisers, and so forth. For broadcasters, 
the second screen has been an effective tool for extracting more detailed information about its 
audience, and in ways that move beyond simply considering the viewer-show relationship. This 
is because the second screen, the mobile device, is always connected as “part of the ubiquitous 
computing continuum” (Snickars and Vonderau 2012, pp. 9). Part of the way that this continuum 
is constructed is through “passive” measurement of user activity, through for example audio 
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watermarking and audio fingerprinting, which can operate in the background to capture user 
activity without intruding on user experiences (Lee and Andrejevic, 2014).  
The social network as second screen provides an added benefit for both users and for 
advertisers and broadcasters, because a user’s social network tends to operate as a way to 
collaboratively filter what is otherwise information overload. Twitter, Facebook and other third-
party apps which are designed specifically to act as second screen silos have all begun in the past 
few years to build this filtration system into the very design of the service by incorporating a 
“trending” feature. Unlike the recommendation algorithms that operate beneath the surface on 
these services, the trending features are incorporated as part of the user interface in a way that is 
specific to the content or event itself, rather than to the relationship between the user and the 
user’s social network. In other words, what shows up in Twitter’s “Trending Now” are key 
words, topics, or events that have reached a certain audience size, and that a sufficient number of 
users are tweeting about. What is foregrounded here is not that “Trending Now” is personalized 
for you, but rather that it is generally of interest to a “mass” of users. For broadcasters and for 
social media companies, the second screen always assumed that the user was watching the 
primary screen, the television. The second screen was therefore one means of ensuring that an 
audience did in fact exist: that there were people watching the content and at the same time. Of 
course, this is often the case; however, there was still an unknowable distance between the 
second screen and the primary screen. By integrating the primary screen into its platform, 
however, Twitter can theoretically erase that distance. In the next section, I describe and analyze 
Twitter’s first major attempt to become the primary screen: the 2016 deal to livestream regular 
season games from the National Football League.  
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The Twitter Deal with the NFL 
Sports and other live events like awards shows are seen as steadfast revenue sources for 
broadcast television networks and the legacy television ecosystem. In the past several years, the 
price of live sports rights contracts between leagues and networks has increased immensely. 
Cable and broadcast networks charge distributors to carry their content on a per subscriber basis. 
ESPN charges by far the most of any network: as of August 2016 the monthly fee was $7.21 per 
sub, with an additional $0.90 for ESPN2 (Sherman 2016). This has more than doubled from 
ESPN’s 2007 subscriber cost, and far outpacing the cost of other channels, both cable and 
broadcast. At the same time, the major sports league and the broadcast and cable networks have 
for years looked for ways to generate new forms of income through video, while also working to 
preserve their existing and quite lucrative partnerships with conventional media distributors. The 
NFL’s deal with Twitter reflected these dual priorities. Twitter beat out several other kinds of 
companies that were all vying for the contract with the NFL—including Amazon, Verizon, and 
Facebook—despite not bidding the highest amount of money. Twitter’s less competitive offer 
included a proposal for an advertiser revenue split and non-exclusive streaming rights, which 
meant that the NFL could sell the rights to other streaming platforms beyond Twitter.  
In addition, Twitter’s streaming deal continued an ongoing collaboration with the NFL. 
In 2013, the NFL joined as an early “multi-screen” partner in Twitter’s Amplify program, in 
which the NFL authorized various brands to distribute video clips and highlights from its games 
to be circulated on the platform. Twitter’s hashtags serve as an organizational tool for all those 
interested in a particular game, team, player, or in professional football in general. Curating 
attention in this way offers the NFL a form of brand reinforcement. The NFL also sells pre-roll 
video ads that play before the game highlights; the deal with Twitter involved a revenue share of 
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the advertiser money. Verizon Wireless and McDonalds served as the first two major sponsors of 
the program; Microsoft later joined the same year. Each of these companies paid millions of 
dollars for the ad rights, revenue that was split between the NFL and Twitter (Sloane 2014). The 
initial partnership for the 2013-14 season allowed only allowed highlights from the league’s 
Thursday night games. The league expanded those rights to the Sunday games for the following 
season.    
Twitter’s foray into livestreaming is more than a function of technological integration or 
a desire to become a broadcaster. The decision to livestream begins with a partnership, rather 
than an organically grown broadcast division. Further, the partnership with the NFL reflects a 
corporate culture that seems to operate through the cultivation of specific relationships between 
employees. In addition, Twitter’s relationship with the NFL—and with the television industry—
was actively baked into Twitter’s executive hiring practices. On July 1, 2014, Twitter announced 
that it was hiring Anthony Noto as its Chief Financial Officer. Noto had served as the managing 
director of Goldman Sachs’ technology, media, and telecom investment banking group. Part of 
his previous experience at Goldman Sachs’ had been to organize Twitter’s Initial Public Offering 
only a few months prior, in November 2013 (Luckerson 2014). He also had prior experience 
service as a CFO. In January 2008, Noto was hired by the National Football League to serve as 
the first CFO in five years. Often, the Chief Financial Officer is the company interface with Wall 
Street. The CFO is charged with convincing investors that the company is on the right 
(profitable) path. For a social media company like Twitter, this has meant being able to show 
sustained user growth, as well as robust advertising revenue quarter by quarter, year over year. 
Noto is also not the first Twitter employee with a background in television media. Former head 
of the Twitter’s TV initiative Fred Graver came to the company after three decades working in 
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television, including running the Travel Channel. Former head of revenue Adam Bain, whom 
Noto succeeded, came from Fox (McGirt 2013). CEO of BET Networks Debra L. Lee serves on 
Twitter’s Board of Directors. Twitter co-founder and CEO Jack Dorsey also serves on the board 
for the Disney Corporation.   
To examine Twitter’s deal with the NFL it is first useful to look at its major precursor, 
which happened a year prior. The National Football League announced on June 3, 2015 that it 
had sold the exclusive rights to stream a single regular season game to Yahoo for $20 million. It 
was the first time that the NFL, a notoriously tight-fisted organization that closely guards its 
intellectual property, sold broadcasting rights for distribution online. This agreement granted 
Yahoo the right to livestream the game not only in the United States, but around the world, for 
free. Not coincidentally, the game in question against the Buffalo Bills and Jacksonville Jaguars 
would also be played overseas, in London. It would be scheduled such that it streamed on the 
east coast of the U.S. at 9:30 am (2:30 pm in London), precisely three and a half hours before the 
NFL’s typical Sunday games kick off, which is about the duration of a single game.  
Two things are important to note here, as they relate to the broader story about 
livestreaming broadcast television. The first is the centrality of the scheduling process for 
television. This deal with Yahoo was an attempt by the NFL to introduce a new time slot for 
NFL programming into the broadcast schedule. A typical Sunday NFL schedule has a set of 
games on Sundays at 1 pm EST, then another set of games with staggered kickoff times between 
4 pm and 4:30 pm EST, and then an 8:30 pm EST game scheduled for Sunday night primetime. 
Adding the 9:30 am game in London was an experiment in a fourth Sunday time slot. In other 
words, although Yahoo’s distribution mechanisms offered a new and officially sanctioned means 
for watching the NFL, both for its core American audience and for those abroad, this deal largely 
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maintained the traditional temporal control elements of an older medium. The second important 
factor here is how this scheduling paradigm reinforces the Americanism of the sport, even as it 
starts to travel overseas. Specifically, the centrality of the east coast of the U.S. is the standard 
“zero hour” around which the rest of the country itself for this kind of television programming. 
Playing in London opened up the European market for the NFL, while also appeasing the 
scheduling paradigms for the core audience in the United States.  
Having contextualized and described Twitter’s deal with the NFL in the previous two 
sections, I now devote the next four sections to an analysis of the deal, the complications of 
integrating social media platforms with live television broadcasts, and the implications of the 
deal for the future of livestreaming.  
Twitter as Gatekeeper 
The NFL’s interest in expanding interest in American football to international audiences 
corresponds with opening up access to broadcast feeds through the livestreams on Yahoo and 
then on Twitter. With a conventional broadcast, access to the feed is geographically restricted to 
regions in the United States. Such restrictions exist in part because the NFL wants to fragment 
the American market for purposes of selling advertising, but they also exist in part because the 
technological constraints of traditional broadcast technology meant that feeds would only travel 
so far. For NFL fans, the game that one sees depends on where one is located. Games are 
restricted to local markets and surrounding areas, for the most part.  
In entering the video streaming business, Twitter is functioning as a de facto gatekeeper 
for content. However, they seem to be rewriting the industry rules for how a gatekeeper operates. 
For instance, part of the deal with the NFL to stream games was that Twitter would keep the 
streams open not only to Twitter users, but to anyone. Those people interested in watching via 
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Twitter do not need to log into the service, which is different from other sports streaming 
services. Major League Baseball—former parent company to BAMTech, which runs Twitter’s 
streaming technology—has for years offered its own streaming service, which is kept behind a 
strict paywall. Twitter’s openness here is emblematic on the one hand of the broadband-era 
logics of interoperability, as competing business interests can collaborate to create a seamless 
user experience. At the same time, the logic of interoperability is overlaid with the desire to 
monetize attention and user interactions, as well as to produce the very conditions of 
interoperability that such “partnerships” allow in the first place.7 Twitter’s streaming deal pushes 
it further into the role of a broadband-age broadcaster, in the conventional sense of free over-the-
air broadcasting. Their lack of a required login represents Twitter acting as a replacement for 
broadcast networks, at a time when people are shifting away from consuming video through 
traditional television, and when with initiatives like CBS All Access the traditional broadcast 
networks are themselves creating exclusive streaming services hidden behind subscription 
paywalls. In addition, it is expanding the idea of the broadcaster, which had been confined 
mostly within national borders; for Twitter (and indeed for its content partners), there is 
opportunity to cultivate international audiences.  
This question of control over access to live television content is of crucial importance in 
the case of Twitter’s livestreaming of sporting events like the NFL. On Twitter, the game 
becomes disarticulated from geographic location, because anyone anywhere who has access to 
Twitter can watch the game. Even the national borders did not serve as geofences for these 
games, as was the case in chapter two. While travelling in the Philippines in September 2016, for 
instance, I was able to watch one of the games via Twitter on my iPad. Authorized streaming of 
                                                 
7 See Braun 2014, Ananny 2013, Lessig 2006 
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live television broadcasts that are unencumbered by geoblocking are still not commonplace. 
However, a whole host of unauthorized, informal streaming options exist through the internet 
that offer even casual internet users access to live television that is otherwise unavailable through 
other means. Reddit in particular has a devoted community of streamers who tap into live 
broadcasts, funnel them through websites they create to host (and sometimes through YouTube), 
and retransmit them to the broader public through links posted onto Reddit. The idea of Twitter 
as a gatekeeper positions streaming within the familiar constructs around piracy. Such constructs 
need to be refined to consider the cultural practices that streaming represents. In this sense, the 
concept of “access” itself can be instructive. One way of differentiating unauthorized circulation 
of live television from unauthorized downloading of shows and films is the idea that when an 
event—a game or match, an awards show, a debate—happens matters a great deal to those who 
want to watch it. There is an implicit desire to participate in a televised event, which is distinct 
from the sense of theft that piracy discourses perpetuate. As Burroughs and Riggs note, 
“streamers are not ‘pirating’ material as much as they are tactically ‘sneaking into’ the digital 
stadium” (378). In other words, rather than thinking about unauthorized streaming as taking 
someone else’s private property, it should be thought of in terms of being let into someone’s 
party without an invitation.  
Twitter’s deal with the NFL would not threaten to unseat or usurp the traditional 
broadcast networks in the way that Aereo’s service did, for instance. Rather than create its own 
unique “broadcast,” Twitter is instead paying for the right to retransmit the original broadcast of 
NBC or CBS. This triangulation of Twitter, national networks, and content owners is markedly 
different from the more traditional configuration: the network, content owner, and local 
broadcast station. In this sense, Twitter takes the place of the station as the purveyor of content 
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through the “last mile”: the way that the content itself enters the home. Like the station, Twitter 
takes the prepackaged feed from the national network and then becomes the most direct 
distribution intermediary between content and audience. But whereas the local station is bound 
by the restrictions of the geographic market in which it resides, however, Twitter reaches 
markets around the world. So, access restrictions to the game through Twitter is not enforced at 
the level of the broadcast itself, but rather as a function of the availability of Twitter itself. 
Twitter is somewhat geographically restricted thanks to the licensing agreements that it strikes 
with the companies that host its app in their store. Apple’s App Store offers no artificial 
geographic restriction (beyond where they are not available anywhere), but Microsoft’s Xbox 
One makes the app available only in the US, the UK, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico. 
In addition, Twitter’s livestream deal with the NFL interrupted the conventions of live 
television, which is built on the seamless flow of content across time, per the programming 
schedule. What distinguishes the livestream in Twitter’s case is that their access to the broadcast 
feed does not extend beyond the single event: the NFL game, in this example. On a conventional 
broadcast for a game televised on Fox or CBS—the two networks from which Twitter received 
its feed—one tunes into the channel either before or after the game and finds programming 
constantly running. By contrast, once the game concludes, the feed is effectively turned off and 
removed from Twitter. Rather than delineating restrictions on a map, they are instead placed on 
the clock, as it were: the feed is only available on Twitter while the game is on.  
By acting as a direct intermediary, however, Twitter also works to elide its very existence 
in the distribution process, so that ideally viewers are consciously unaware of the platform while 
they are watching (and even as they also use the platform to comment on the live programming). 
The NFL streaming deal is in this sense an experiment in creating a “frictionless” viewer 
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experience, one that lowers the barriers to entry for a potential audience. For instance, just before 
streaming its first NFL game, Twitter also announced that it launched several apps that were 
built for television, including with Amazon’s Fire TV and Fire TV Stick, as well as the 
aforementioned Xbox One. Viewers who use these apps need not actually log into Twitter to 
watch the games. Twitter also pushed to syndicate the livestream: viewers could in theory watch 
the livestream via Twitter’s technology, but on a different website, app, or platform. They have 
been working not only on the necessary tools needed for embedded live video, but also on the 
intricacies of the partnerships. Time Inc. negotiated a syndication deal with Twitter just in time 
for the first Thursday night game in 2016, which would allow Twitter to embed the stream across 
multiple websites owned by Time, including Time.com, the Sports Illustrated site SI.com, and 
two major sports blogs: themmqb.com and fansided.com. This move to syndicate is an effort by 
Twitter to expand its reach beyond its own platform. Syndicating the streaming video follows in 
the footsteps of a prior decision by Twitter to start selling its Promoted Tweets on other sites and 
other apps. A company with an ad campaign on Twitter can move these ads to third-party 
properties; in February 2015 Twitter announced a partnership with Yahoo! Japan and the social 
media site Flipboard. This deal includes the design and message of the ad campaign as well as 
the technologies that allow a message to be seamlessly integrated into the “native” look of the 
third-party site or app.  
Such syndication practices reflect broader trends in online advertising, especially as 
social media becomes more integral to the circulation of digital content and vacuums up more 
advertising revenue. Twitter, Facebook, and other popular social media platforms have opened 
up new tools and teams of employees whose job it is to focus on flattening out advertising 
messages so that it blends into the flow of information on their platforms, through native ads and 
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sponsored content. Facebook created Anthology, “a new group of leading video publishers, who, 
together with the Facebook Creative Shop, will work with brands to produce outstanding 
advertising content for Facebook” (Facebook Anthology). Among these “leading video 
publishers” that partnered with Facebook on Anthology are Funny Or Die, The Onion, Vice 
Media, and Vox Media. These kinds of programs are ways for social media companies to further 
ingratiate themselves into the production process of advertising, by initiating a kind of hybrid 
creative agency that is part in-house and part outsourced to other publishers (Herrman 2016). 
This push by social media has led in turn to more conventional publishers also creating in-house 
creative agencies that produce third-party native advertising. The New York Times Company 
created in 2014 the T Brand Studio, which would produce for marketers like Netflix and Cole 
Haan sponsored content in the form of multimedia articles that would look like the Times own 
journalism, and would live on the Times homepage. Since then, T Brand Studio has shifted focus 
to a creative agency that produces content that can live beyond the Times website. It was a 
response to the industry trends shifting away from marketing on websites like the Times to 
marketing directly on Facebook and Twitter (Moses 2016). 
I now turn to examine some of the most important technical infrastructures that Twitter 
has built or acquired, which lay the foundation for its foray into livestreaming television 
programming, in order to piece together how they fit into the broader circuit of media 
distribution. 
Assembling a Hybrid Technical Infrastructure: BAMTech, Artificial Intelligence, and 
Twitter’s Livestreaming System 
Twitter reoriented itself in several distinct ways throughout the process of becoming a 
livestreaming video platform, in order to reconcile its existing infrastructures with those needed 
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to import broadcast feeds. When it streamed NFL games, viewers saw the same feed they would 
watch if they tuned into CBS or Fox: the same broadcast announcers, sideline reporters, and 
camera shots. To integrate the CBS broadcast feed into its existing infrastructure, Twitter turned 
to BAMTech, a video streaming and technology services company owned by Major League 
Baseball. The company was born out of MLB Advanced Media, which Major League Baseball 
Commissioner Bud Selig formed in 2000 to manage MLB’s online intellectual property and 
web-based ticket sales. In August 2015, BAMTech was spun off of MLB Advanced Media and 
became an independent company that manages video streaming (among other software and 
technology services) for HBO Now, the NHL and World Wrestling Entertainment. Disney 
purchased a one-third stake in BAMTech in August 2016. BAMTech holds a lot of power in the 
livestreaming market; Disney’s bet here is that ownership of BAMTech will make it easier for 
them to launch a video sports platform that integrates much of ESPN’s content, and offer a hedge 
against the continued drop-off in cable television subscriptions (Kline 2016). Twitter has been 
pushing to build out its own internal streaming platform (or “product,” as they call it), in addition 
to partnering with BAMTech on the NFL. Twitter’s first foray into live video coverage was in 
July 2016 with the Wimbledon tennis tournament, in which it streamed live interviews and 
analysis (ESPN owns exclusive rights to air live matches) (Wagner 2016).  
While it operates the technical infrastructure for Twitter, BAMTech’s institutional 
architecture is also a complex web of business partnerships, including across sports leagues. In 
2015, the company started to move beyond purely technological deals, moving instead to co-own 
some of the content itself. They struck deals with the Professional Golf Association and the 
National Hockey League that gave BAM the streaming rights to the content from each. The NHL 
deal gave the league a 7-10 % equity stake in BAM. Many of BAM’s deals have been with 
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content companies that do not have much in the way of in-house distribution technologies. In this 
regard, BAM offers expertise in building out the necessary infrastructure for large-scale 
streaming, which helps content companies save valuable time and money. HBO’s streaming 
project HBO Now, for instance, was originally expected to take nearly three years and cost $900 
billion. After deciding to contract BAM instead, HBO Now was finished in three and a half 
months and cost less than $50 million (Wagner 2016). Twitter’s partnership with BAM is unique 
in this respect (although BAM also struck a deal with Sony’s Playstation Vue as well).  
BAMTech operates the backend of Twitter’s streaming service by managing video traffic 
capacity. As a mode of distribution, streaming is basically media that is displayed as it is 
received in transmission (Sandvig 2015). It is the de facto distribution mode for broadcast 
television, and although it seems ubiquitous and has become normalized for many millions of 
people, streaming video on the internet is a relatively new phenomenon. This creates a disparity 
between consumer expectations and the technical strain on tech companies that engineer the 
streaming infrastructure. As a designated “pioneer” in live streaming video, BAM Tech uses this 
disparity to its advantage. In an interview in 2015 with the tech and media website The Verge, 
BAMTech CEO Joe Inzerillo analogized the difficulty of his company’s objectives with adapting 
to life on a different planet:  
What people forget is that the internet, as a technology, was never designed to do 
something like this—deliver flawless video simultaneously to millions of people . . . I 
liken it to trying to live on Mercury. The plane is completely inhospitable. Every day all 
you’re doing is [fighting] a battle for survival in a place that really does not want you. 
Streaming video on the internet is sort of like that (Popper 2015). 
 
The bravado rhetoric is a function of the corporate culture of many tech-based 
companies, and the Silicon Valley legacy buzzwords of “innovation” and so forth. However 
empty and overwrought such buzzwords may seem, they are quite meaningful for those who 
140 
  
work at such companies, where there is often a deep internalization of the philosophy of problem 
solving. For instance, during a 2015 interview, Joe Inzerillo was asked about how his company 
can be so skilled at “combining technologies from different disciplines” and how they “get at 
that combinatorial approach.” Far from a standard vapid response that often comes from such 
interviews, Inzerillo provided some insight into the ideology behind how he runs his company:  
Fundamentally I’m a big subscriber to the philosophies of [Yale Professor of 
Mathematical Sciences] Benoit Mandelbrot. Mandelbrot had this idea about intellectual 
fortresses. This was the thought that you can’t understand a specific problem outside of 
your disciple. This is a computer science problem, or a hardware problem, or a legal 
problem, for instance. Mandelbrot believe that those intellectual fortresses stifled 
innovation. I believe that this happens today at a more granular level. What you see now 
is that the millennial companies . . . don’t understand the difference between the roles 
(Hendrix 2015). 
 
Inzerillo expresses not only a recognition that a livestreaming infrastructure is a hybrid of 
multiple technological capacities, but a self-conscious desire to structure his company such that 
the employees’ relationships to each other and to their various work problems reflect the way 
that the technologies are assembled.    
Hyperbole aside, the implication here is that BAM Tech has figured out how to stream 
video effectively, and to scale it in such a way that it becomes a seamless viewer experience for 
millions of people. Streaming allows for a more flexible user experience for multimedia; instead 
of downloading a large file, the media can be consumed in bits, as the encoding-decoding 
process takes place. In the wake of the rise of streaming as a normalized protocol on the internet, 
other supplementary technologies could modulate different aspects of the distribution process. 
Adaptive bitrate streaming is one example, in which software can sense the strength of a user’s 
network signal and adjust the quality of the content accordingly. This flexibility helps to reduce 
bottlenecking or buffering, which can disrupt the viewer experience as well as the network itself.  
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Other technical components go into the process of connecting social media to television. 
Twitter uses artificial intelligence, specifically machine learning, for purposes of information 
sorting and curating, to build in their words “a product in which people can easily find new 
experiences to share and participate in” (Dorsey 2016). Twitter created a group of researchers, 
engineers, and scientists called Cortex, which is dedicated to working out the various problems 
of operating their platform at such an international scale by developing new machine learning 
techniques (Twitter Cortex). In conjunction with the development of Cortex, Twitter has 
acquired small startup companies that focus on specific machine learning problems: they 
purchased Madbits in July 2014, Whetlab in June 2015, and Magic Pony Technology in June 
2016, a company that specializes in visual processing by creating “algorithms that can 
understand the features of imagery” (Dorsey 2016). Magic Pony is one of many companies 
working on software that teaches other software—and itself—how to perform tasks without 
needing explicit programming instructions. Magic Pony’s software is useful for improving the 
video experience on Twitter’s platform. Streaming video systems rely largely on compression 
capacities, which can modulate the size of the information packets that flow through the 
transmission circuit based on the underlying bandwidth at given points in that circuit. 
Technologies like those of Magic Pony can work to replicate higher resolution images out of 
lower quality images—analogous to a person’s ability to conjure up an image in one’s mind, 
without having the image in front of them—by “learning” the mechanics behind compression 
languages. They are able to recognize, for instance, statistical patterns in varied resolution 
images and how to translate those patterns into complex characteristics of physical form, like 
edges, textures, lines and curves, and lighting (Knight 2016). 
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In addition to the backend technologies that manage streaming video and the 
experimentation with artificial intelligence, Twitter also offers data aggregation and processing 
services that are translated into the language of conventional television industries to appeal to 
advertisers. For instance, it launched a program with Nielsen in October 2013 called Nielsen 
Twitter TV Ratings that worked to capture the reach and effectiveness of conversation on Twitter 
about television. These ratings measured both the so-called “authors” of the tweets, as well as the 
“audience” for those tweets and the life cycle of the tweets themselves: how and where they 
spread through the social network (Nielsen 2013). At the same time, Twitter’s pitch to 
broadcasters for integrating their two services involves rearticulating the audience in more 
conventional terms: as groups of people who gather in the same place and at the same time, per 
the broadcaster programming schedule. Social media is positioned as offering unique affordances 
that can potentially alter the nature of live television’s traditional advertising revenue model.  In 
particular, Twitter performs as a digital living room—one that is constantly surveilled and 
monitored—which provides not only the video content, but the platform for viewers to speak in 
140 characters. In its push to integrate livestreaming, Twitter works to create an environment that 
encourages the type of private communication once reserved to the living room, but that makes 
such communication public. As Fred Graver, Twitter’s head of TV in 2013, said, using Twitter 
while watching television creates “the world’s biggest couch” (McGirt 2013). Except with 
Twitter, there is an increased level of direct interaction among people that with conventional 
broadcast television were separated by screens. For instance, in the NFL example, Twitter 
becomes a site not just for audiences, but also for players, coaches, team employees and 
ownership, professional sports journalists and amateur sports bloggers, and even representatives 
from advertisers and sponsors of the game. All can and do directly interact on the platform. 
143 
  
Although it will transmit the network broadcast—including national ads—part of the deal 
with the NFL gives Twitter the right to sell its own advertising in the space on the broadcast that 
is typically allotted for local ads. This is in part a response to the popular analytics industry 
rhetoric that audiences have become increasingly fragmented because of the proliferation of 
platforms for distribution and consumption. Moreover, not only are hundreds of millions of 
people using social media, but the companies that operate these sites have worked diligently, and 
sometimes controversially, to normalize the idea that tracking user activity is simply a matter of 
course. For analytics firms, this can be extremely useful, because although traditional television 
ratings required their “Nielsen families” to opt-in to the service—that is, to agree to be tracked in 
the first place—social media users must voluntarily opt-out of tracking. Often, opting out is 
made to be counterintuitive for users, and there can be no fail-safe method for ensuring 
completely that one is not tracked even after doing so. User activity on any of these platforms 
invariably leaves traces, or backchannels of data that social analytics firms mine in order to make 
all sorts of connections between users and brands (Highfield, Harrington, and Bruns 2013). The 
partnership with Nielsen came about as an effort by Twitter to harness the authority of the 
Nielsen name to come up with an industry-standard measurement for social media analytics. At 
the time, several startup companies like Trendrr, SocialGuide, Bluefin Labs and others were 
vying for position in the measurement marketplace, each working to convince companies that 
they had the most accurate and useful means of determining user engagement, and indeed of 
defining what “user engagement” means. 
It has become clear in recent years that social media analytics play an important role in 
success metrics for television programming, representing a new “market information regime” for 
audiences (Kosterich and Napoli 2015). In other words, as an audience measurement system, 
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social media analytics has come to possess a certain amount of authority for participants in the 
audience marketplace. It is now a standard currency for gauging “success” in industry terms. 
This information regime works by inverting the traditional broadcasting logic for distribution. 
This logic worked through a content-centric conceptualization of the process, where distribution 
was first and foremost a matter of foregrounding the importance of the content itself, and then 
finding ways to create and monitor an audience for that content. Success was then measured in 
terms of audience exposure to content. With “social TV,” and with Twitter’s livestreaming 
initiatives, the potential audience already exists and moreover the metric of success shifts from 
“exposure” to “engagement”: it is not simply about whether or not they have seen the 
programming, but how they are interacting with it, talking (and tweeting) about it.  
Periscope and the User-Generated Broadcast 
The decision by Twitter to begin livestreaming mass media content did not come in a 
vacuum, but rather was a calculated response to the underlying usage patterns of its service. 
Furthermore, major media companies perceived in Twitter’s usage trends a threat to the market 
dominance of their professionally produced content. Twitter is a service that exists largely 
through user-generated content, whether those users are individual people or representative of 
larger institutions. As such, it represents a crucial conflict point between formal and informal 
media economies (Lobato and Thomas 2015). But unlike other examples of such a conflict (like 
with Netflix, which does not publish user-generated video but does facilitate informal access 
through geoblocking circumvention), with Twitter and other forms of social media, the formal 
and the informal seamlessly intermingle. Twitter wanted to offer livestreaming on the formal 
front with deals to livestream NFL games and other major events.  
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If in Twitter’s foray into livestreaming it is attempting to become a broadband-era 
broadcaster, it is worth considering how and to what extent logics of streaming and of social 
media reconfigure the traditional logics of broadcasting. Following José van Dijck and Thomas 
Poell, social media logic “refers to the processes, principles, and practices through which these 
platforms process information, news, and communication, and more generally how they channel 
social traffic” (5). For instance, the level of interactivity on the social media platform 
complicates the assumptions about regulation. The broadcast paradigm relied in large part on 
strict control over the windows of distribution. Efforts by viewers to skirt those windows, when 
they happened, largely occurred “elsewhere,” or using methods that were beyond the scope of 
the broadcast business. By contrast, with Twitter’s entrance into livestreaming, social media 
became a catalyst for both authorized and unauthorized streams of broadcast feeds and other 
forms of video programming. One striking example of this is Periscope. 
Twitter acquired the livestreaming application Periscope in March 2015, which allowed 
users to create their own livestreams right from their phones. Twitter built the capacity to 
broadcast via Periscope into Twitter’s platform in December 2016, so that informal livestreams 
now lived in the same place. By mixing the formal with the informal, Twitter thus offers the 
means to circumvent corporate (and legal) access controls while at the same time ensnaring users 
within the digital media industries’ own distribution processes (Ruggs and Burroughs 2016). As 
such, in its turn to a video-centric business model where all users are potential broadcasters of 
“television,” Twitter exposes the linked discontinuities between the traditional media industries 
and social media in the struggle over control of video circulation. This architecture is a hybrid of 
disparate elements that when mixed combine to create a sustained whole. Michael Curtin (2009) 
calls this type of media “matrix media,” and sees it as a point of differentiation between a more 
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conventional media paradigm: “If the classical network era was characterized by centralized 
production and transmission to an undifferentiated mass audience, the matrix era is characterized 
by interactive exchanges, multiple sites of productivity, and diverse modes of interpretation and 
use” (13).  
Periscope is an example of decentralized broadcast or spontaneous distribution, offering 
anyone with a smartphone the opportunity to open up a window into their world, to share video 
of what is happening around them (Ruggs and Burroughs 2016). Almost immediately the app 
became controversial for major content companies and distributors of television, in large part 
because of two separate instances that involved HBO. During the premier of the fifth season of 
Game of Thrones, dozens of Periscope livestreams emerged in which users who were watching 
Thrones would point their camera phone at their television, creating their own broadcasts 
through the Periscope app (Jarvey 2015). Then, on May 2, 2015, boxing fans worldwide watched 
the ring of the MGM Grand as Floyd Mayweather Jr. defeated Manny Pacquiao in what had been 
marketed as “the fight of the century.” The fight was an extraordinarily lucrative event.  It set the 
pay-per-view revenue record by generating over $400 million, which very nearly tripled the 
previous record of $150 million set in 2013 (also for a Mayweather fight) (Associated Press 
2015). In addition, all over the world people had their mobile devices trained to television sets 
and computer screens, and many thousands of Periscope feeds were “broadcasting” the 
Pacquiao-Mayweather fight. As Christina Warren, Mashable’s chief technology reporter, 
recounted in a piece following the fight, Periscope’s map showed streams from all over the 
world, including a stream from a police department in Africa (Warren 2015). 
In the case of Periscope, HBO faced an interesting conflict: it decried the use of 
Periscope to provide unauthorized streams of the fight—to which it (along with Showtime) held 
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exclusive distribution rights in the U.S.—even as it incorporated Periscope into its own 
distribution strategy. HBO published videos through Periscope showing Pacquiao in his locker 
room before the fight (Kelion 2015). The content served as a complement to the fight itself, by 
offering fans an inside look at the boxer's pre-filter rituals. As a means of providing “social 
video”—where users not only can watch content but also interact with each other through live 
commentary—it was both an unmitigated success and a highly controversial means of “piracy.” 
It is the exact sort of interactive event and user experience that many media companies are 
migrating towards, from broadcast and cable networks investing in “second screen” analytics to 
news organizations integrating forms of “citizen journalism.” It was considered such a success 
that then-Twitter CEO Dick Costolo tweeted rather controversially at the end of the fight that 
Persicope itself, rather than Pacquiao or Mayweather, was the big winner of the night (CBS SF 
Bay Area 2015). 
In December 2016, Twitter integrated Periscope’s livestreaming capabilities into its own 
platform, so that users can now broadcast video through the Twitter app itself, rather than 
through Periscope’s standalone app. This convergence underscores the complicated sense in 
which the formal and the informal means of circulation intersect through social media. Not 
would Twitter offer the capacity to act as a formal (NFL streams) and informal (Periscope 
streams) secondary market for the redistribution of television content, but it also deconstructs the 
parameters of the professional “primary” broadcast by giving users the opportunity to create their 
own streams from within the events themselves. For large-scale events like an NFL game, this 
means that the tens of thousands in attendance who potentially own a mobile device could 
redistribute (unauthorized) the copyrighted content from on-site. As such, Twitter pivots from 
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being solely a second screen that is supplemental to the “main event” to acting as a primary 
screen that offers content straight from the source.  
This capacity for user-generated broadcasting reframes the question of access to such 
events by reconfiguring the nexus of access control. Traditionally this nexus is maintained 
through the relationship between the sports league (or the content owner more broadly) and the 
broadcaster, which works to dictate terms of access not just to the event itself—with tiered 
pricing for tickets for instance—but also to the televised feed (Hutchins and Rowe 2010). 
According to conventional broadcaster logic, control over the feed occurs through geographic 
market segmentation that stipulates where the feed is available, as well as the nature of 
exclusivity of the feed: should it be televised via free over-the-air channels, through cable 
channels that require a subscription, or with a direct transaction like pay-per-view, as was the 
case with the HBO boxing match. As social media platforms become more video-centric, 
however, their large-scale international network of connections upsets these practices through a 
relative indifference to such measures of artificial scarcity.  
In this sense, then, Twitter’s deal with the NFL and other professional sporting and non-
sporting events serves as a negotiation between the formal and informal elements of live video 
circulation via social media. For content owners, livestreaming through Twitter is not simply a 
new form of revenue, nor does it only signify access to new and larger audiences; it also a 
represents a capitulation to the breakdown of barriers to access and an opportunity to rewrite new 
ground rules for access on their own terms. Despite claims by social media that they are 
democratizing access, the exercise of power over the rules of use often occurs through 
established legacy media institutions, starting from mainstream “influencers.” For example, in 
August 2015 Facebook launched its own user-generated livestream application called Facebook 
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Live, but the rollout was quite distinct from that of Periscope. Instead of simply opening the app 
up to all users, Facebook’s ostensible beta test gave access to only a select group of celebrities. It 
was a clear effort to not only generate buzz for the new app, as well-known media figures like 
Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson and Serena Williams set about livestreaming the mainstream 
celebrity culture that they represent (with all the requisite endorsement and advertising 
opportunities that such celebrities), but also to tacitly establish certain levels of formal, stylistic, 
and tonal conventions. There is built into these social networks a broadcast-centric way of 
thinking about distribution. Part of the way that something “goes viral” in the first place is when 
it passes through one or some of the few “influencers” on a given platform like Twitter. These 
“influencers” are in effect Internet-era broadcasters. Some form of endorsement by them—a 
retweet, or a mention in a Facebook post—can reach many millions of people.  
These influencers do not simply exist on top of social media platforms; rather, they are 
co-constituted through the platforms. Twitter’s algorithms are programmed to value people with 
large and vibrant social networks in ways that are distinct from other people, thereby erecting a 
hierarchy of social relations where large followings can equate to high levels of “trust.” This 
approach to information processing and filtration goes hand-in-hand with Twitter’s business 
model, which is built around advertising. In the ever-present drive to find the perfect balance 
between monetizing the platform and producing a communication tool that is free, easy to use, 
and popular, the rise of “influencer marketing” makes sense (Carter 2016). Advertisers needed 
an alternative route to reach their audiences, who no longer pay much attention to traditional 
advertising forms.  
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Tech Infrastructures and Livestreaming at the Interface  
While Twitter must maintain a robust interconnected web of back-end infrastructures to 
manage the integration of livestreaming with its existing service, it also has a range of more 
front-end infrastructural technologies that it uses as tools to deal with issues at the level of the 
interface. Much of the impetus for Twitter to use these forms of artificial intelligence is to 
automate the process of content moderation, the filtration and curation processes that sort 
material on its platform, so that such processes can operate more efficiently in “real time” and on 
such an enormous international scale. Traditionally, people rather than technologies performed 
such moderation tasks. Often, these people were volunteers with an emotional stake in the given 
community or network, as is the case now with Wikipedia. Many of these volunteers were 
offered remuneration other than money, such as access to online services for free or for a 
reduced fee; more recently, however, digital labor divisions that specialize in content moderation 
have cropped up both in-house at major companies like Google (Roberts 2017, Postigo 2003). 
Often, this work gets outsourced to firms like Sykes and TaskUs, which tend to employ people in 
the Philippines and India, and pay them low wages. This work is difficult for machines to do, as 
it requires a nuanced level of cultural, linguistic, and imagistic literacy and context in order to 
make accurate decisions about what is and is not acceptable, appropriate, or desirable. This has 
shifted, for Twitter in particular, in the past couple of years from human labor to machine-
targeted work. Twitter continues to acquire small startup companies that specialize in AI and 
“deep learning,” a term for computation systems that can mirror the human brains neurons. 
These systems are useful for visual recognition in both photos and in videos. With livestreaming 
video, it is difficult for distribution platforms to recognize quickly enough what is actually in the 
video in ways that translate into human visual language, and further into the means of connecting 
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users to each other through the videos. Twitter facilitates these means of connections in a 
commercialized space, by linking content to brands and advertising, and then by linking content 
and advertising to users. 
Twitter works to articulate this technological capacity to commercial interests, legal 
regimes, and consumer-user desire, thereby negotiating the synthesis of mass media and social 
media. Part of the impetus to deploy so many resources to content moderation is from social 
pressure from its users (as well as various activist groups, regulatory bodies, and investors) to 
take greater control over the content that flows through its platform. There are some inherent 
contradictions to the way that Twitter approaches livestreaming video, which points to some 
problems with the fundamental assumptions about using social media as a broadcasting platform. 
First, Twitter looks to remove itself from the user experience of the service, preferring to present 
as “neutral” a position as possible, while at the same time cultivating the interactivity that is a 
major part of what defines social media in the first place. Social media interactivity has come to 
mean a breaking down of borders between traditional categories of actors: “regular folks” can 
communicate directly with celebrities, politicians, and brands; producers, consumers, advertisers, 
and distributors all intermingle. But as an entity engaged directly in distribution, Twitter works 
to keep its own levels of interactivity in the background. This includes engineering decisions 
about the system of curatorial algorithms that run on the platform, as well as regulatory decisions 
about how to deal with harassment and abuse. It faces some harsh criticisms for not acting as 
either police or editor—or both—in certain circumstances, including the publicity over then-
candidate Trump threatening to weaponize his followers against Megyn Kelly in 2016, the 
trolling of Leslie Jones following the release of Ghostbusters, and many other examples. In 
addition, livestreaming video requires some level of attendance to copyright laws. Twitter has 
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worked to program certain technologies to this end. For instance, Magic Pony’s technologies can 
be deployed to filter out content like unauthorized copyrighted material, even as they can also 
help to personalize user feeds, thereby filtering in content through collaborative filtering, where 
videos and tweets are recommended for you based on how well your taste profile matches up 
with other users. 
Another technical issue that Twitter faced in integrating live broadcasts of the NFL 
games with its preexisting interface is how to synchronize all screens in order to construct a 
consistent flow of time between the game feed and the separate tweet streams. Getting this aspect 
of the livestream correct was of vital importance, because Twitter was using the game to broaden 
its appeal. In this way, Twitter appropriates legacy media to try to build up credibility as a user-
friendly experience. Moreover, by distributing the broadcast feed over its platform rather than 
possibly reworking the format of a football broadcast by producing its own, Twitter is also 
implicitly attempting to recalibrate the social norms and customs of its users. Claims that social 
media facilitates a certain level of user agency have been critiqued for ignoring the underlying 
infrastructures that allow for user interaction in the first place (Moe, Poell, and van Dijck 2016) 
Rather, what types of content users encounter on Twitter is in part a measure of curation 
technologies and business incentives. Before it began to actively distribute live content, Twitter’s 
platform control worked by constantly negotiating normative behavior that emerged through the 
kinds of tweets that users—both institutional and individual—published. Once Twitter itself 
became a “publisher” by casting feeds of the game, new dynamics emerged that operated 
separate and apart from—but also in conjunction with—the dynamics of curating user-generated 
content (like exercising preferences that foreground certain users or kinds of tweets over others, 
or personalizing user feeds). For instance, using the broadcast feeds from CBS or Fox served 
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offered viewers a degree of comfort in the familiarity of announcers, reporters, and other aspects 
of the in-game viewing experience, even as the means of accessing the game is altered. 
Twitter is not simply chasing live events to incorporate into its platform; rather, it is 
working to create a situation where the act of viewing mirrors the “logic of the event” by 
cultivating a feeling of shared participation during the event itself (Lee and Andrejevic 2014). 
Moreover, this event logic is programmed into the interface itself in order to match the pace of 
the event with the pace of people’s reactions and comments to it. When the integration of the 
feed and the tweet stream works well, Twitter itself recedes into the background. The initial 
launch of the game’s feed proved rocky in this respect. One of the big problems that Twitter had 
to tackle is a basic issue of scale: how to best create a livestream experience where the video is 
not constantly buffering, which produced frustrating delays. Some of the issues that affect this 
technology question were encountered almost immediately after the first game started to stream. 
The video stream was not completely synchronized with people’s Tweets about the game. There 
was a delay between the video as streamed on Twitter and the broadcast on CBS, such that the 
tweets that commented on the game outpaced the flow of the game itself, as the game was being 
broadcast through Twitter. In this way, the Tweets acted as spoilers, detailing audience reactions 
before those who were actually watching the game on Twitter saw the plays. The time delays 
were being tweeted about in real time, and there even seemed to be delays between mobile 
networks or mobile devices, so that one person’s Twitter stream could be at a different point in 
the game from another’s (Hoffman 2016). Conversation on Twitter would then turn from 
focusing on the game to focusing on the way the game was being distributed, and on the 
problems with Twitter itself.  
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In addition to negotiating with the NFL, Twitter also in June 2015 leaked news of a “top 
secret” internal project called Project Lightning, which later debuted as “Moments” once it went 
live to the public. Moments was launched as a curation tool for Twitter. When the company sees 
a lot of conversation about a topic or event, it designs a gallery-like space and brings together 
content on the platform that can be easily found by users when they click or tap on the lightning 
icon on the site or app. The project was overseen by Katie Jacobs Stanton, the head of Twitter’s 
global media operations who runs a team of editors that curates a collection of videos and tweets 
for each “moment.” According to Stanton, the project is a response to what is basically a filter 
and search problem on Twitter’s platform: “the challenge we’ve had over the years is, although 
we have the world’s greatest content, it’s like having a television without a channel guide or 
even a remote control. There’s no way to really find it or contextualize the content. So [Project 
Lightning] is this beautiful vessel for us to surface great content and make it more delightful” 
(Honan 2015).  
This problem of how to manage information is not a new one for Twitter, or for social 
media in general. In one sense, Moments is Twitter masquerading as a newspaper by standing in 
as Twitter’s front page. The editorial decisions, Stanton points out, are made by people rather 
than being solely automated. This feature adds a mass media layer on top of the personalization 
of the person-to-person capacities that Twitter offers, thereby integrating the two logics into 
Twitter’s interactive commercial economy (Lee and Andrejevic 2014). As reported by The Wall 
Street Journal at the time, these measures are consistent with Twitter’s overall corporate strategy 
to “complement TV networks. By streaming these events, it could help a broadcaster draw the 
so-called Millennial generation back to TV—18-25 year-olds that these days spend more time on 
their mobile devices and are the biggest demographic group on Twitter” (Koh 2015). On the 
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other hand, there is evidence to suggest that in fact internet-based streaming platforms have been 
leveraged against the networks by the NFL, even as Twitter looks to work with the networks in 
tandem. Using streaming platforms as an alternative to television distribution is a way to drive up 
the prices for games, which are expensive for networks.  
Part of the integration of social media and television is a shift in the navigational logics of 
the content business. There is a tension between so-called “push media” and “pull media” that 
can be partially reconciled at the intersection of social media platforms, mobile devices, and 
mobile apps. Pull media assume a gravitational magnetism, where people are attracted to a 
particular place in order to consume content. Push media, by contrast, seeks out the audience, 
like the push notifications that pop up on one’s phone, where an app will alert the user that 
something has happened that demands the user’s attention, whether this is a breaking news story 
from the CNN app or an alert that a friend has tagged the user in a post on Facebook. In this 
sense, then, Twitter’s livestreaming of NFL games signals a move to go where people are, rather 
than to bring people to where the content is. Push media has been a staple business practice for 
Web 2.0, which reflected a shift from the relative stasis of Web 1.0, where sites kept their 
interconnections to a minimum and running in the background, to a more pronounced increase in 
“the social” as reflected through software applications. Far from a purely technological shift, 
however, the ethos behind Web 2.0 reflected a shift in commercialism on the Web that wanted to 
harness “human interactions that grow semi-organically” (Everitt and Mills 2009). 
The app provides a distinct mode of information delivery from the web browser. The 
interface design is important here: the ability to scale down information from a horizontally-
oriented computer screen to a vertically-oriented, and typically much smaller, mobile screen. In 
addition, the decisions to give the app an assertiveness with the user, via push notifications, alters 
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the nature of the relationship between user and information by addressing what had been a rather 
fundamental question for content owners, advertisers and marketers, and consumer technology 
companies. They all had understood how to manage the user—and how to give the user a degree 
of autonomy in use—but what about how to get the user to use in the first place. The drug and 
addiction parallels here are not incidental, in this sense, and represent another valence of the 
“push” media (mirroring the drug pusher). The push notification initiates the interaction between 
user and media. This “appification” of content paradoxically builds in some of the logics of 
broadcasting, by “channeling” user attention into a more structured environment (Lee and 
Andrejevic 2014).   
Conclusion 
And so here we find two entities that each represent titanic and powerful media 
paradigms joining forces, as it were. Broadcast television (manifested here through the NFL), a 
highly-concentrated industry operating on top of a publicly-owned infrastructure, actively 
converges with Twitter, a social media platform with the capacity to give voice to “the many,” 
running on top of a privately-owned infrastructure. In much academic literature that details the 
various economic, technological, legal, and cultural dynamics of internet-based media in “the 
digital age,” social media platforms like Twitter are often juxtaposed with legacy media 
structures in order to emphasize various points of similarities and departures in how media 
operate. Often, this has meant looking at supersession: the way in which one paradigm of 
distribution has overtaken another. For instance, van Dijck and Poell discuss how mass media 
logic get subsumed by social media logic. One emblematic concept in this transition is the shift 
from programming to programmability. Where programming refers to one-way traffic in 
information defined as “the ability of a central agency to manipulate content in order to define 
157 
  
the audience’s watching experience as continuous flow,” programmability refers to two-way 
traffic, defined as “the ability of a social media platform to trigger and steer users’ creative or 
communicative contributions, while users, through their interaction with these coded 
environments, may in turn influence the flow of communication and information activated by 
such a platform” (van Dijck and Poell 5) But in some ways, social media and broadcast have 
begun to co-constitute each other. For instance, CBS News Political Director John Dickerson 
said in February 2017 that broadcast and cable media stations often set the agenda for the 
morning conversations based on Trump tweets.  
It makes sense then that social media companies and television broadcasters are 
seemingly natural bedfellows, as both traffic in the marshalling of large numbers of people into 
the same space, and at the same time, thereby driving a “sense of collective immediacy and 
participation” (Couldry 2002). Furthermore, the migration of television onto the internet via 
social media is an important counterpoint to the historical construction of internet architecture 
itself. As Christian Sandvig notes, the internet was born not simply out of the principles of peer-
to-peer distribution. There was a concerted effort in the 1960s to fashion the internet as the anti-
television. Sandvig notes a lesser known paper of internet pioneer J.C. Licklider called 
“Televistas,” which he prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television in the 
late 1960s. The problem with the technological system of broadcast television, according to 
Licklider, is that it is homogenous and its traffic flows one way: “ . . . the main intrinsic defects 
of broadcast television are that it offers everyone the same thing and does not give viewers a 
direct way of participating . . .” (Sandvig 2015). He offered an alternative vision of a more 
selective set of infrastructures—the ideas behind the internet—that were based in an architecture 
of participation and choice. 
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More pointed questions arise, however. What to make of the seeming massification of 
social networks? Or the hybridized broadcast-broadband infrastructure at the heart of 
livestreaming? This transformation of social media is not simply the “next logical step” in its 
evolution, given the increased capability of infrastructural technologies and consumer electronics 
to operate faster, process more data, and handle richer forms of media. Nor is it merely a 
response to consumer demand for more options for video consumption. Instead, it is a largely 
intentional re-engineering of the medium that combines privatized commercial interests—the 
ability to assemble large audiences for relatively few sources of content—with technical 
decisions that dictate rules for how content flows and the nature of user interaction.  
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Moving Distribution Forward: Amazon vs. Google and the Battle Over “Intelligent” 
Distribution  
The three preceding chapters analyze the development of streaming services that circulate 
television programming over the internet, and across geopolitical and commercial borders. 
Through the case studies of Aereo, Netflix, and Twitter, I highlight a series of conflicts or 
collaborative initiatives between conventional power brokers of the television industries, outsider 
technology companies, and hybrid entities. Each of these cases exposes a distinct set of 
ramifications for the underlying conditions of contemporary media distribution. First, my 
analysis of the Aereo lawsuit demonstrated how legacy regulatory paradigms in the United States 
that dictate terms about the circulation of popular culture continue to be co-opted by traditional 
media institutions as well as new technology startups. The outcome of legal battles between 
Hollywood and Silicon Valley determine, in part, the shape of future models of media access. 
Second, traditional local, national, and international constraints on access to popular culture are 
stressed by the proliferation of broadband internet service and the expansion of major 
entertainment companies with global aspirations, as the Netflix case study shows. Third, such 
companies must attend to the seismic shifts reshaping content circulation on the internet, as 
social media companies like Twitter and other gatekeepers work to become the platform upon 
and through which all online activity takes place, including access to and participation in live 
media events.  
This final chapter is shorter and more speculative. I present a case study of a conflict 
between Google and Amazon over the compatibility of cross-platform streaming media, in order 
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to analyze the emergence of smart home devices—especially smart speakers like the Amazon 
Echo and the Google Home—as vehicles for media distribution. Each of the case studies in this 
dissertation considers attempts by commercial entities to control and normalize technologies of 
the home, in particular personal computers of all shapes and sizes, including smart phones, 
laptops, video game consoles, tablets, media players, and televisions. Whereas the previous three 
chapters focus their attention elsewhere—to regulatory paradigms, international content licensing 
practices, and social media’s entrance into livestreaming—this chapter shifts focus to these 
consumer electronic devices and the systems of networked technologies that undergird their 
increased interconnection in the still-nascent “smart home.” This chapter takes the smart speaker 
as its central focus, to analyze how Google and Amazon are attempting to turn it into the main 
hub of this interconnection. Not only does the smart speaker serve as a control center for the 
circulation of media, it also represents a gateway to other smart home devices that might monitor 
and regulate the other household functions like temperature, lighting, food inventory, laundry, 
and security. Moreover, by focusing on Google and Amazon, I expand the scope of the previous 
chapters to reflect the staggering ambitions of these two corporations: whereas the earlier cases 
focused on companies’ attempts to develop streaming services, Google and Amazon are working 
to become all-purpose distribution ecosystems.  
These two tech giants hold an increasing amount of influence over the distribution of not 
only television, but all types of media, and indeed all forms of “data” in ways that none of the 
other companies chronicled in the previous chapters can rival. Aereo operated largely as a 
distribution application, facilitating the circulation of content. With its recent move into the 
licensing and then production of original programming, Netflix has become more of a vertically 
integrated company, exercising control over multiple stages of the supply chain. Twitter turned 
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into a platform for both watching and contributing to conversations about programming. By 
contrast, Amazon and Google are attempting to streamline all aspects of media distribution into a 
singular circuit. Both companies operate a streaming platform and are continuing to ramp up 
production of television programming. In addition, both are attempting to control as much of the 
underlying distribution infrastructure as possible, the hardware and software. With Amazon Web 
Services, Amazon has a clear and overwhelming head start on cloud computing platforms, upon 
which companies like Netflix rely for logistical support of streaming traffic. Google is investing 
more resources into its Google Cloud Platform, in an effort to catch up. On the other hand, 
Google is firmly ahead of Amazon in mobile computing, with the dominance of its Android 
operating software as well as the growing sales of its Google Pixel smartphones.  
Both companies have a successful line of media streaming players, namely Google’s 
Chromecast and Amazon’s Fire TV devices. Recently, both companies have also moved into 
engineering voice-activated smart home products, including the hardware devices—like smart 
speakers with a video screen such as Amazon’s Echo Show and Google’s Home—and the 
underlying “personal assistant” software—Amazon’s Alexa and Google’s Personal Assistant. 
Individually, these ventures represent areas of business growth in their own right. Collectively, 
they fortify the flagship enterprise of each company—e-commerce for Amazon and search for 
Google—and by extension Amazon’s and Google’s control over data, the tech world’s gold 
standard currency. Amazon and Google each leverage their ability to effectively harvest the ever-
expanding ocean of data to reinforce their power in existing markets for the distribution of goods 
and services (including media), while also muscling into emerging, ancillary markets as well, 
like those for voice-activated smart devices.   
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Amazon and Google have made a series of decisions in recent years about whether or not 
to allow their streaming products or services to be sold, operate on, or be accessible through the 
other’s platforms. In December 2017, Google decided to remove YouTube from Amazon’s 
media players, including the version of the Amazon Echo smart speaker that comes with a video 
screen. Such decisions have caused an on-going conflict between Amazon and Google, which 
offers analytical opportunities that perfectly align with this dissertation’s concern over the 
reconfiguration of content access. This chapter analyzes this conflict through an analysis of the 
smart speaker, in order to address how networked technologies that circulate traditional media 
forms overlap with conduits for networked access to more than just programming. I begin this 
chapter with an introduction to one important aspect of the on-going conflict between Google 
and Amazon: Google’s removal of YouTube from Amazon’s Echo Show. I then transition to an 
analysis of the development of the Echo Show and other smart speakers, and of the role that such 
devices—and the underlying, voice-activated artificial intelligence software—are playing in the 
smart home ecosystem.  
By doing so, I expand the overall trajectory of the dissertation as it relates to internet 
television. The Aereo case study served as a rudimentary example of circulating “old media” 
over the internet. It was broadcast-centric, involving broadcast networks, local television 
stations, antennas, and regulatory statutes enacted in the early days of cable television. The 
Netflix chapter expands the scope, shifting focus to a Silicon Valley company looking to upend 
conventional models of television distribution and production while simultaneously attempting to 
become a global media network. While I use Netflix to examine the fragmentation of distribution 
markets on the internet, this chapter also is still cloaked in the formations of old media, 
especially television. The Twitter chapter enlarges the scope by incorporating social media into 
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the distribution of television. Like both Aereo and Netflix, Twitter entered into the distribution of 
television content from outside the “closed broadcast-cable-satellite circle” described by Barry 
Diller in the Aereo chapter. Unlike Netflix, Twitter had a preexisting business and service that 
existed beyond television, even as it was also invariably linked to the television industries in all 
sorts of ways, including second screen initiatives. By integrating its livestreaming initiative into 
its platform for user-generated content, Twitter created an entire ecosystem of the television 
experience by facilitating the ability to watch, react to, and follow journalistic coverage of 
programming—and even generate unauthorized retransmissions—all in the same place.  
Google and Amazon are the next step in the expansive trajectory of media distribution 
that I trace in this dissertation. By focusing on their conflict over platform interoperability and 
the development of the smart speaker with a screen, I progress from a consideration of a 
television ecosystem (in the case of Twitter) to a consideration of how the circulation of 
television fits into a much larger distribution ecosystem that extends far beyond traditional media 
industries. I chose television as the primary mode for understanding all of these changes, in the 
first place, because it serves as such an important bridge between older but still present 
twentieth-century technological formations and more emergent formations from the twenty-first 
century. Thus, this dissertation uses the circulation of television over the internet to identify post-
internet circuits of media distribution and analyze their constitution. For Google and Amazon, 
media content circulation is incorporated into—and subsumed by—an entire ecosystem of 
networked technologies that becomes embedded in the (smart) home.  
Google and Amazon are working to centralize control over this ecosystem. To 
counterbalance the theme of centralization, I end this chapter with a brief consideration of 
blockchain technologies. A blockchain is a distributed catalogue of data records, where each 
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record is constituted as an encrypted block of code. Proponents of blockchain technologies 
highlight its core functionality and utility as a means of decentralized control, offering a vision of 
the future that is a direct antidote to the forces of consolidation and conglomeration that Amazon 
and Google represent. The blockchain technology reframes distribution in terms of indexes and 
transactions, rather than flow or scheduling.  I speculate on the role that blockchain tech might 
play in the future of distribution, and how future media research might engage with blockchain 
tech as a useful object of analysis.  
From Distributor to Destination 
 In early December 2017, Google announced that it would remove YouTube from 
Amazon media players, including the Amazon Echo Show, their smart speaker with a screen 
(Nicas 2017). Google claimed that this move was in retaliation for Amazon’s decision to not sell 
Google products—like the Google Home smart speaker or the Chromecast media-streaming 
player—that compete with Amazon’s own devices. This move was just the latest in an ongoing 
dispute over the terms under which each company could operate on the other’s platform that has 
stretched back for years. For instance, Amazon had already blocked its Prime Video service from 
being used on Google Chromecasts. It also built workarounds that allowed users of the Echo 
Show to access the YouTube website through a web browser, to evade Google’s removal of 
YouTube’s platform-native app. Such workarounds violated YouTube’s terms of service, Google 
argued. In a response to Google’s announcement that it would remove YouTube from Amazon’s 
devices, Amazon argued that “Google is setting a disappointing precedent by selectively 
blocking customer access to an open website” (Dastin 2017). The maddening fragmentation of 
the streaming ecosystem is on full display in this dispute. This fragmentation is further 
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exasperated by the diversity of networked technologies in play, including the websites, 
applications, devices, and platforms that are run by Google and Amazon.  
 At the center of this dispute is the Amazon Echo Show, one model of Amazon’s line of 
smart speakers. Google also has a line of smart speakers called the Google Home. These smart 
speakers are “home assistants” that through voice activation can execute an ever-growing list of 
actions, including playing music, radio, or video services, facilitating online shopping, and 
serving as a phone for calling other Home or Echo devices. Amazon first released its Echo 
devices to Amazon Prime members in November 2014—then to the general public in late June 
2015—while Google’s Home devices launched in the United States in November 2016. 
Although they are currently marketed largely as devices for consumer convenience in the 
home—and in particular as vehicles for the circulation of media content—both the Echo and the 
Home are Amazon and Google’s attempt to establish control over the emerging “smart home 
ecosystem” (Gibbs 2018). The speakers are able to connect to a relatively limited but growing 
suite of software applications—akin to a laptop or mobile device connected to the internet—as 
well as other devices in the smart home, including the temperature gauge, lighting system, door 
locks and doorbell, security system, kitchen appliances, and smart TVs. The smart speaker would 
then operate as a central hub controlling the domesticated version of the internet of things, 
facilitating machine-to-machine communication throughout the home and connecting back to the 
cloud computing systems owned and operated by Amazon and Google. The dispute over 
YouTube therefore has implications for the way that Amazon and Google are reconfiguring 
access that are broader than the availability of a video streaming service.  
For instance, the openness of these proprietary ecosystems remains a major question 
going forward. Google’s withholding YouTube as a retaliatory measure suggests a possible 
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lockdown of the smart home ecosystem through a pay-to-play arrangement between businesses. 
Both Amazon and Google insist that they plan to resolve the dispute over YouTube in short 
order, implying that they are working out a set of terms that would restore the streaming service 
to the Echo Show. It is worth lingering here to consider the parameters that Google and Amazon 
might set around these terms. Such considerations lay the groundwork for moving discussions 
about distribution forward, to encompass the interconnectedness of each company’s proprietary 
ecosystem (and of the interconnectedness across ecosystems). On the one hand, this dispute 
appears to be akin to the carriage arguments between networks and broadcasters over 
retransmission fees from the Aereo case study. YouTube is the internet analogue to the broadcast 
networks, which are freely accessible over-the-air. As discussed earlier, the rise of 
retransmission consent fees coincided with the proliferation of distribution outlets for 
programming, first with cable and satellite and then with more recent internet-based services for 
live TV (including, of course, YouTube itself). Despite the veneer of “disruption” that seemed to 
be caused by the internet, however, the negotiations over retransmission fees have always been 
couched in content-centric terms: these disputes are about recalibrating the financial worth of 
intellectual property in an age of distribution abundance, rather than scarcity.  
Such comparisons are worth considering, because retransmission consent becomes a way 
to think through the responsibilities that those companies who control distribution platforms do 
and should have to the people for whom such platforms serve as fundamental means of 
information access and communication. Retransmission consent ties emerging internet-based 
distribution services back to “old media” formations like broadcast television to serve as a 
reminder of the principles that in theory—if not wholly in practice—govern digital information 
infrastructures. Retransmission consent also illustrates the complications inherent to circulating 
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content over the internet on the back of public airwaves. It is an issue that has become financial 
in nature, given the aggressive rise of retransmission fees, but this financial valence serves to 
underscore what is at heart a basic problem of communication. The accumulation of these fees 
reveals the power dynamics at play in decisions about who can use digital information 
infrastructures to communicate in the first place, and the conditions under which such 
communication is allowed. 
In the case of Amazon and Google, however, this framing is limiting because it fails to 
take into account the place of streaming video in the broader ecosystem that Amazon and Google 
are cultivating. As Danny Kimball (2015) argued with respect to sponsored data and zero-rating 
practices with mobile devices, these kinds of disputes signal a more aggressive shift by Google 
and Amazon away from conduits of communication practices (search for Google and retail 
shopping for Amazon) and toward roles as media distributors, where they charge providers of 
“content” (broadly defined) to connect to users. But this role is just one smaller aspect of Google 
and Amazon’s ambitions. As internet connectivity continues to shift from computer, phone, and 
television screens to an ever-expanding array of devices through the Internet of Things, both 
Amazon and Google are jockeying to become not only fundamental gatekeepers that control the 
growth and operations of networked technologies, but also to create interconnected products and 
services that become destinations in their own right. In this respect, Google has come a long way 
since an infamous 2004 Playboy interview with founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin, in which 
Page declared “we want you to come to Google and quickly find what you want. Then we’re 
happy to send you to the other sites. In fact, that’s the point. The portal strategy tries to own all 
of the information” (Sheff 2009). Amazon developed in much the same way: as a pass-through 
point for connecting buyers and sellers. Thinking about the YouTube dispute in these terms 
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shifts the focus away from the old media formulations, like content carriage. Instead, removing 
YouTube from the Amazon Echo Show represents a power play over the growth and strength of 
a self-contained (if interconnected) proprietary ecosystem, where each company becomes a 
destination rather than a middleman. Moreover, the destination is grafted onto the (smart) home 
itself, built into not just the media screens and audio players but also the appliances, electricity, 
and architectural infrastructure.  
Amazon’s Alexa and the Rise of Voice-Activated Operating Systems 
The “personal assistant” software on the Google Home and Amazon Echo devices serves 
as the connection between the user and the devices. The assistant also is the central software hub, 
controlling all of the devices that are connected within a given space (the home, in this case). 
Amazon’s assistant is named “Alexa.” Alexa has a growing array of “skills” (for Google’s 
personal assistant, the equivalent capacities are called “actions”), which are recognizable 
commands that prompt the software to take some action: to launch Spotify, play the radio 
through Tune-In, dim the lights of a connected room, look up information, offer driving 
directions, tell a joke, and so forth. These skills were initially the result of an open-source 
hackathon from a community of application developers outside of Amazon, which Amazon then 
parlayed into its own community tool for developers called Echoism.io. This community tool 
enabled developers to integrate Alexa Voice Services into outside connected products. Amazon 
even offered tutorials and templates on skill building for early-stage developers. Google opened 
a similar website for developers interested in creating “actions” for its Google Assistant. These 
skills then become integrated into the broader proprietary network of interconnected devices and 
software owned by Amazon and Google.  
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In addition to the developer toolkit, Amazon has invested quite a bit of money into 
fostering development of Alexa skills. A few days after releasing the Echo speakers to the public 
in June 2015, Amazon launched a $100 million Alexa Fund to invest in startups interested in 
integrating and developing for Alexa. In November 2017, Amazon invested another $100 million 
into the Alexa Fund, this time in support of international expansion efforts. This is part of an 
aggressive growth plan for Alexa services, which moved into the United Kingdom and Germany 
in late 2016, India in October 2017, Japan in November 2017, Canada in December 2017, and 
Australia and New Zealand in early 2018. As of August 2017, the Alexa Fund had backed over 
20 startups, according to The Wall Street Journal (Haggin 2017). Just as the skills developed 
from the toolkit become integrated into Amazon’s proprietary network, these startups become 
organizational nodes in Amazon’s conglomerated network. The startups create standalone 
businesses that also serve as Amazon “partners” by funneling new technologies that create new 
opportunities for amassing and analyzing valuable user data.   
(As an aside, the Alexa Fund has also infiltrated higher education. In March 2017, 
Amazon announced the launch of the Alexa Fund Fellowship, which promises to support the 
development of academic programs in a number of engineering fields related to artificial 
intelligence and voice technologies. The fellowship program launched with four universities: 
Carnegie Mellon University, University of Waterloo, University of Southern California, and 
Johns Hopkins University. Each university receives cash funding, Alexa-enabled devices, and 
“mentorship from the Alexa Science teams to develop a graduate or undergraduate class 
curriculum” (Amazon Alexa Fund Fellowship). In addition, in 2017 Amazon held its first Alexa 
Prize competition, open to teams of universities research students from around the world. The 
competition asked teams to build a “socialbot” using conversational artificial intelligence that 
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could “coherently and engagingly with humans on popular topics such as Sports, Politics, 
Entertainment, Fashion and Technology for 20 minutes” (Alexa Prize Proceedings). Google also 
has a number of collaborations with higher education—including Stanford and U.C. Berkeley—
and startup labs that work on issues related to artificial intelligence. The connections between 
media and technology firms and sectors of (higher) education are underexplored in this 
dissertation, but they are worth monitoring as contemporary understandings of what internet-
based media distribution is and how it works continue to expand beyond conventional media 
industries and entities.) 
Amazon’s Alexa serves not only as a piece of software, but as an entire operating system: 
the central piece of software that allows other applications to interact with the device’s hardware. 
As such, this voice-activated artificial intelligence software represents the latest “platform war,” 
following on the heels of computer operating systems (Windows vs. Mac), phone operating 
systems (Android vs. iOS), mobile phone hardware (Apple vs. Samsung), and even social media 
(Facebook vs. MySpace, then Google, then Twitter, and so forth). Although Apple’s Siri and 
Microsoft’s Cortana continue to develop as voice-activated interfaces, Google and Amazon have 
staked their claim in the past few years as the companies with the predominant voice 
technologies. Such software is meant to be a one-stop shop, a central control that folds media 
forms like television and music into the language of actionable commands. Cornering this market 
then becomes an important strategic initiative for building out a functional, profitable smart 
home ecosystem. Not only does strong voice-activated AI software offer new avenues for 
developers to reach consumers (and thus new opportunities for generating valuable data), but 
such development takes place on Amazon’s (or Google’s) terms, according to the specifications 
and requirements of the Alexa platform.  
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The personal assistant software is increasingly becoming disarticulated from the 
hardware (the Echo or, in Google’s case, the Google Home) as well. Amazon and Google are 
both working to integrate their personal assistant software into more computers, home 
appliances, automobiles, and other technologies. Each new device then becomes an 
experimental, ancillary market in their own right, but these markets are also already tied back 
into the Alexa (or Google Assistant) world. They are even mixing one company’s hardware with 
another’s software in some cases, as when Amazon announced in March 2016 that Alexa had 
been integrated into Google’s Nest, a smart home thermostat. Such an example is a conspicuous 
splintering of ecosystem control, where one corporation produces the device—and the software 
that runs the Nest—and the other runs the software that connects the device to others. The 
implications for the management of the valuable consumer data produced by the use of the Nest 
in this example are not fully clear, but offers interesting possibilities for future research. To what 
extent does the Nest’s underlying software communicate with Alexa? Are they sharing consumer 
data? What are the terms under which such sharing is allowed? Although Google and Amazon 
are in competition over the future of the smart home, such distribution arrangements are very 
likely to continue because they maximize the network effects—where the usefulness of a service 
increases with each new user—of both hardware and software. Moreover, the nascent stages of 
market development, when users of Alexa products and smart home devices are still “early 
adopters,” would seem to necessitate such experimental distribution arrangements, since market 
control is still somewhat up for grabs.  
 Amazon has had a leg up on Google in the development of personal assistant artificial 
intelligence for a few years. One of the major stories from both the 2016 and 2017 Consumer 
Electronics Shows was the seeming ubiquity of Alexa; in 2016 The Verge reported on Amazon’s 
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“stealth” takeover of the smart home via Alexa-connected technologies (Statt 2016), while in 
2017 Wired reported that “You can’t walk the sprawling floor of the Las Vegas Convention 
Center without tripping over a speaker, an appliance, or even a robot or two that supports Alexa” 
(Pierce 2017). Google has reportedly ramped up its efforts at the 2018 CES, announcing a series 
of tech that integrate with Google Assistant. More importantly, Google reportedly came to CES 
2018 with an aim to be as visible as possible: it reportedly built an enormous installation in the 
convention center parking lot, wallpapered the Vegas monorail in advertising for Google 
Assistant, and plastered “Hey Google” on billboards all over the area (Pierce 2018). Google is 
aggressively attempting to catch up to Amazon in partnering with manufacturers of voice-
activated devices, after Amazon had a two-year run in which it successfully integrated Alexa 
across a wide spectrum of products.  
 Until 2018, both Google and Amazon have been inconspicuously present at the 
Consumer Electronic Shows the past few years. Neither, tech giant had an official booth set up in 
one of the largest annual worldwide tech tradeshows. The reason for their absence bridges the 
software question with a set of issues related to hardware in this dispute. The Internet of Things 
consists of an ever-expanding range of networked technologies, including an assortment of 
connected hardware. Google and Amazon have taken slightly different tracks when it comes to 
the internal development of smart hardware, despite the fact that both produce media players and 
smart speakers. For instance, Google was able to successfully launch an array of smartphones as 
part of an internal phone service initiative called Project Fi. By contrast, although Amazon 
briefly entered into the smartphone market with its Amazon Fire phone in 2014, the failure of 
that venture appeared to shift Amazon’s priorities toward hardware partnerships rather than 
internal hardware development. It also offered some lessons for the importance of being first in a 
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given market, which it then applied to the smart speaker. While the smartphone market has 
largely been cornered for years by Apple and Samsung, the smart speaker market seemed wide 
open. More specifically, however, the smart speaker market also represented an opportunity to 
experiment with a central hardware hub that would serve to connect the rest of networked 
devices in a future-oriented smart home. Neither Google nor Amazon seems too interested in 
producing or owning much of the other hardware in a smart home, however, with a few 
exceptions (including the Google Nest). Instead, both seem to approach hardware largely through 
partnerships with third parties, which largely explains their strategy at the Consumer Electronics 
Show the past few years. Google’s Assistant and especially Amazon’s Alexa are present 
everywhere at CES, even if the companies themselves seem to be absent. It is in the embodiment 
through hardware of their AI software that Amazon and Google start to make their mark. Their 
interest in staying largely behind the scenes at the tradeshows—even as media outlets and tech 
blogs offer effusive coverage of their respective dominance in this space—mirrors the ultimate 
goal in this platform war: to become the standard platform, into which all other applications 
must build.  
Yet despite the utopic idea of rendering electronic activity into a universal brain, whose 
or what software is operable continues to be a largely commercial decision. Amazon’s outcry 
over Google’s decision to set “a disappointing precedent by selectively blocking access to an 
open website,” by removing YouTube from Amazon’s smart devices highlights the economic 
pressures that constitute much of the artificial boundaries that still exist for digital distribution. 
Amazon has for years refused to allow its own Prime Video applications to be compatible with 
Google’s Chromecast media player, even though that same application is available through 
Microsoft’s Xbox, Sony’s Playstation, a variety of smart TVs from different manufacturers, 
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Roku, and many other media players. The mobile application for Prime Video on Apple’s iOS 
allows video playback—and downloading videos for offline playing—but only for videos 
catalogued as included with a Prime subscription. Other videos that need to be bought or rented 
are available on the iOS app only as search options. Users—even Prime subscribers—cannot buy 
or rent those titles through the app, but they can add such titles to their “watchlist” and later 
complete the purchase via the website or through a fully functional version of the application, as 
found on any of the other media players.  
The fragmentation of this functionality, where different versions of the same application 
exist across multiple platforms, and sometimes do not operate at all on certain platforms, 
underscores the fundamental reality that both Amazon and Google view video distribution as a 
kind of trojan horse for getting people to use—and produce valuable data through—their 
software services. Both Google and Amazon started outside the world of television; what 
attracted them to media distribution is the opportunity to continue to harvest consumer data that 
they can then leverage into new software and hardware. Much of this data comes from the 
integration of artificial intelligence software into preexisting distribution circuits, including those 
that circulate television and film. Thinking about distribution in this way offers the potential for 
new objects of analysis for the study of distribution. For instance, rather than considering how 
gatekeepers structure access to screen content and its circulation over the internet—an animating 
force of much of this dissertation, to be sure—focus might turn instead to how the act of media 
gatekeeping becomes entangled with the development of broader systems of networked 
technologies like the Internet of Things. Here, distribution morphs from connecting viewers to 
content into connecting data to corporate structures of data analysis.  
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Internet Distribution 2.0: Blockchain and Distributed Decentralization 
 Consolidating control over voice-activated artificial intelligence software in the hands of 
two multinational corporations—especially the preeminent purveyors of online retail and 
search—clearly has profound implications for the future of internet distribution. Over the years, 
video creators have cried foul when Google implements changes to its algorithms. Google’s 
made a series of algorithm changes in early 2017 that caused many creators to lose a significant 
amount of ad revenue, and inspiring the term “adpocalpyse” (Weiss 2017). Amazon has also 
been known to exert its distribution power over retailers, offering perks to companies that agree 
to their partnership terms in ways that can handicap those who choose not to become partners, by 
for instance allowing third-party resellers to sell their products and elevating partner visibility in 
the online search results (Satariano 2014).  
 A number of initiatives are underway that look to disengage media—and any instance 
where data of any kind is stored, transacted, moved, or otherwise processed—from this model 
centralized control. The biggest current buzzword promising technologies of “true” 
decentralization—like the P2P networks of Bittorent or other file sharing communities—is a 
blockchain, whose most famous current application is with cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. A 
blockchain is a distributed catalogue of data records, where each record is constituted as an 
encrypted block of code. These blocks of code are open to all computers on the network, which 
independently verify the information stored in those blocks through what is typically a “mix of 
cryptography and game theory” (Church 2017). Each node in the network has a copy of the 
database of records, making it much harder to falsify, hack, or otherwise modify the contents of a 
single block.  
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 Blockchain represents the clearest link between two fundamental problems underlying 
the commercialization of media distribution: the concerns over intellectual property rights and 
over transparency about the operational mechanisms that circulate content to consumers. Each of 
the preceding case studies analyzes how these two problems have manifested as television 
programming is distributed over the internet: Aereo’s attempt to retransmit live local television 
without paying the networks, Netflix’s role in policing—or ignoring—the circumvention of 
geoblocking, and Twitter’s ability to facilitate both sanctioned and unsanctioned livestreams of 
the same event by leaving its platform open to all kinds of users. This link is most acutely felt 
when blockchain is contexualized in terms of the emergence of new tech gatekeepers like Google 
and Amazon, as well as Twitter and Netflix, and other companies like Facebook that receive less 
attention here. The blockchain technology theoretically solves these problems by treating 
distribution in terms of indexes and transactions, rather than widespread flow or structured 
scheduling. Thinking about distribution in this way reframes the problem that content rights 
holders have in each of these cases in terms of verification: the ability to authenticate and 
account for where a digital (and thus nearly infinitely reproducible) copyrighted work circulates 
on the internet and what entity facilitates that circulation.  
In terms of media content, the decentralization represented by blockchain suggests a 
renewed interest in building tools and systems that maximize what continues to be an idealized 
gold standard in internet distribution: disintermediation, or the promise that the open 
programmability of the internet would breakdown conventional media barriers. In the case of 
media industries, disintermediation is framed in terms of creators and audiences interacting more 
directly. As this dissertation makes clear, the many interconnected nodes of a distribution circuit 
either have been or are in the process of being cornered by entities that want to capture as much 
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detail as possible about every step in the circulation of media content online. The apparently 
seamless experience of online distribution is in reality often “characterized by blockage” (Lobato 
and Meese 2016). This blockage tends to be the result of an enactment of commercial power, or 
disputes among power brokers that limits or shuts down access. Meanwhile, a recent op-ed in 
The New York Times offers a utopic description of a typical transaction that takes place through 
the blockchain:  
The whole exchange takes no more than a few minutes to complete. From my perspective 
the experience barely differs from the usual routines of online life. But on a technical 
level, something miraculous is happening—something that would have been 
unimaginable just a decade ago. I’ve managed to complete a secure transaction without 
any of the traditional institutions that we rely on to establish trust. No intermediary 
brokered the deal; no social-media network captured the data from my transaction to 
better target its advertising; no credit bureau tracked the activity to build a portrait of my 
financial trustworthiness (Johnson 2018).  
 
Moreover, the blockchain might serve as an interesting technological means of 
reconciling the competing economic imperatives of scarcity and abundance. In terms of 
cryptocurrency, one capacity that blockchain holds is that its record logs enable it to preserve the 
rivalrous, exclusive nature of the currency: in other words, rather than infinitely multiply the 
digital currency, the blockchain carefully catalogues any transaction to ensure that when the 
“money” enters the receiver’s possession it also leaves the sender’s. This problem has been at the 
forefront of digital media distribution for years, as content owners continue to worry about 
replication through online piracy and copying. Such concerns were paramount in sparking the 
rise of streaming services, which normalized the consumer interaction with content through a 
model of access rather than ownership.  
The music world has started toying with the possibilities of blockchain technologies in 
terms of reconciling how to maximize the capacity for abundance in internet distribution while 
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also adhering to the economics of scarcity that make up the financial backbone of the industry. 
For Grammy-winning musician Imogen Heap, the blockchain represents a chance to standardize 
and streamline the process of cataloguing ownership data of music, so that the process of 
documenting and paying royalties from streaming services can become more transparent and 
comprehensive (Heap 2017). Such a system—which is more theory than practice at this point—
would build a universal database of music with a complete set of metadata about each song (or 
album or artist), including information on production and ownership. Moreover, this database 
would be inherently tied to a mode of exchange, as the cryptographic work of filling each 
“block” with info on music is rewarded with the blockchain’s underlying currency: in the case of 
music, this currency is called “Musicoin.” This mode of exchange manifests in the form of a 
“smart contract,” which is basically a layer of coded commands on top of the metadata about the 
music. In other words, the smart contract not only describes what information is inside the block, 
but also what actions—an exchange of currency, for example—should be undertaken when 
someone wants to listen to that music. At its most basic, this system represents a more secure 
form of peer-to-peer distribution imbued with the principles of the capitalist mode of production.  
More recently, a new decentralized network called VideoCoin emerged for integrating 
blockchain technology into digital video. While proponents like Imogen Heap market Musicoin 
as a useful system for connecting artists to fans while fixing remuneration issues for musicians, 
VideoCoin takes a different approach to how blockchain technologies can be translated to the 
distribution of video. In a blogpost introducing VideoCoin, CEO Halsey Minor focuses on how 
VideoCoin offers a more effective means of managing the networked computing power 
necessary to encode, store, and distribute video. VideoCoin addresses two fundamental 
“problems” of networked video distribution (Minor 2018). First, while there are plenty of video 
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cloud providers like Amazon Web Services or Google’s Cloud Platform, there is also an 
overabundance of unused servers, resulting in inefficient energy administration and wasteful 
spending by video-based businesses. Second, the vast majority—Minor claims up to 80 
percent—of internet bandwidth is video. To address these issues, VideoCoin assembled a 
decentralized network of computers and servers, as well as an incentive structure for those 
computer and server owners to get paid (in VideoCoin) in exchange for allowing some or all of 
their computing power to encode, store, or distribute video.  
Minor is trying to commercialize this network in part by mobilizing interest from the 
conventional television industries. VideoCoin’s Head of Strategy, for instance, is Seth Shapiro, 
formerly of Disney and DirecTV, who apparently also serves as the Governor of Interactive 
Media for the Academy of Television Arts & Sciences, as well as an Adjunct Professor in the 
School of Cinematic Arts at the University of Southern California. Such a venture offers 
interesting research potential, pushing discussions of media distribution into more “material” 
directions by focusing on the political economy of computing power as an underlying condition 
of the circulation of media content.  
Skepticism abounds over the viability and scalability of incorporating blockchain into the 
digital music streaming ecosystem. Still, the impulses behind experimenting with blockchain 
without sacrificing the affordances of an international media streaming service reflect a broader 
pushback against the kinds of distribution blockages examined in this dissertation. That 
pushback recognizes the positive “network effects” of a service like Spotify, Netflix, or 
Twitter—or Google and Amazon—but rejects the essentially closed, privatized nature of the 
underlying aggregation of user data on which such services are built. As such, blockchain 
represents efforts to reset the conditions of internet distribution into a hybrid version of today’s 
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commercialized system with the pre-commercialized version of the internet, where information 
exchange was not predicated on the monetization of user data. Such experiments continue to 
proliferate and mark a wealth of new research opportunities moving forward.  
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Afterword 
In this dissertation, I have focused on discrete forms of media, technology, and popular 
cultural forms, such as Aereo’s local broadcast retransmissions, Netflix’s regional content 
libraries, Twitter’s livestreams of sporting events, and domestic streaming platforms marketed by 
Google and Amazon. As a trajectory for this dissertation, I have moved from older paradigms of 
media distribution in broadcasting to all-purpose distribution ecosystems of networked 
technologies. I have acknowledged the ongoing influence and importance of legacy media 
models within emergent ones. Media distribution is a useful analytical category for assessing 
these developments, because it emphasizes accounting for what resources are deployed in the 
circulation of media, evaluating how they are deployed, and toward which ends. But scholarly 
analyses of these developments tend to be couched in terms of conventional ideas about what 
constitutes a media industry and what does not. In the process of writing this dissertation—
starting with broadcast networks and working through to sketches of blockchain technology—I 
have tried to push the limits of my own understanding of both “media” and “distribution” as 
analytical categories. I conclude here with a few observations and questions that are meant to 
invoke further inquiries into the expansive stakes of media distribution. In particular, I gesture 
toward areas and sectors that were overlooked or underemphasized in the dissertation. The point 
is to consider these developments together, and in concert with the examples from this 
dissertation’s case studies, rather than to isolate each of the following examples on their own. 
What might happen if media industry studies began to incorporate objects of analysis that exist 
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beyond—but are inextricably tied into—traditional media industry forms (like television, music, 
film, video games, or radio)? How might a focus on “distribution” help us understand the full 
scope of the cluster of changes occurring in the technological mediation of commercial popular 
culture?  
Contemporary media distribution encompasses any number of other areas of social life, 
especially as major media and technology companies continue to extend into sectors including 
healthcare, medicine and pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, robotics, education, governmental 
administration, voting, law enforcement, public safety and security, the military, public and 
private transportation, finance, agriculture, and space exploration. The “Big Five” tech 
companies—Alphabet’s Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft—are investing in 
many of these areas, while startup ventures often leverage the popular discourse of Silicon 
Valley by piggybacking off the ubiquity of certain brands to analogize their own existence: “It’s 
like Uber but for . . .” or “it’s Netflix for . . .”  
Healthcare is one area ripe with developments involving distribution circuits and 
consumer technologies. For instance, in late 2007 Microsoft launched HealthVault, a web-based 
system for storing personal health records. Microsoft marketed HealthVault as a centralized 
place for people to store medical records, making the records instantly mobile, easy to transfer 
between healthcare providers, and easy to aggregate records from multiple providers. Microsoft 
worked hard to ensure that privacy and confidentiality were maintained, taking a number of 
security measures including encrypting all data. Moreover, in the intervening years Microsoft has 
offered opportunities for tech startups to partner through HealthVault, which it now refers to as a 
“unique, feature-rich development platform for consumer and patient engagement” (Microsoft 
2017). Thus, Microsoft is using the area of personal health records as a pretext for inviting 
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software developers to create applications that are compatible with HealthVault and to transform 
how forms of “content” (in this case, health records) circulate on its platform. In 2011, Microsoft 
even enabled social media authentication by linking HealthVault with Facebook, and in the 
process recognizing “Facebook’s central role in people’s lives by allowing users to sign into 
HealthVault using their Facebook credentials” (Bishop 2011). Facebook’s role as a central portal 
facilitating all kinds of online activities is apparent here. In addition, a driving force behind 
Facebook’s success—the sense of connectivity the platform engenders—is being built into the 
very fabric of marketing, and into the discourse connecting marketing companies to the 
industries they service, including health care. The website for the 7th Content Marketing for Life 
Sciences conference describes the aim of the event:  
As digital health develops into a commoditized product, pharma organizations are evolving from 
being product-oriented companies toward becoming solution providers. This progression impacts 
far more than how content is disseminated — it shapes how content is developed, designed, 
personalized, targeted and reviewed internally. It even influences the channels that content is used 
on, the platforms it is shared through, and the devices customers use to interface with it (7th 
Content). 
 
This (almost nauseating) level of techspeak suggests just how much networked healthcare 
extends into the mobile body. Consumer electronic devices become more than technical 
prosthetics that extend people into the world, but also help people, healthcare professionals, and 
companies to monitor bodily functions, fitness, and wellbeing.  
Of course, wearable tech like FitBit is doing the same kind of monitoring, but also 
operates through gamification, whereby the impetus to use the FitTit comes from the promise of 
a reward like meeting one’s step goals for the day. Meanwhile, virtual reality and augmented 
reality technologies—so beloved by gamers (and the film industry, with their experimentation 
with 3D)—are steadily becoming more popular tools for therapy, as means of not only 
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monitoring one’s health but also finding flaws and fixing them. Studies about VR’s possible role 
in therapy go back to at least the 1990s, but use of such technologies is still not widespread.  
In November 2017, the Food and Drug Administration approved a pill that is equipped 
with transmission sensors that give doctors and other healthcare providers information about 
when or whether patients ingest their medicine. Sensors can transmit information about when 
pills are taken to a smartphone app that is accessible to a patient’s doctor and “up to four other 
people, including family members” (Belluck 2017). Such networked medicine shifts the 
distribution focus found in the last chapter of this dissertation—technologies of the “smart 
home”—to that of the body itself. The two-way communication of recent media technologies 
that are used in the distribution of popular culture—where users of a streaming service like 
Netflix are providing useful data to the company as they make their content preferences and 
viewing habits known—gets embedded within the body itself in the case of these “digital” pills. 
Another area where such developments are occurring is in urban development. For 
instance, Google’s “corporate sibling” Sidewalk Labs agreed in late 2017 to a controversial 
urban revitalization plan in Toronto that would create a mini “smart city,” and which Canadian 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau argued would make “technologies that will help us build smarter, 
greener, more inclusive communities” (Austen 2017). This project demonstrates how the 
management of people, cars, and other mobile objects circulating through a given space is 
increasingly subject to the same technology and concerns of contemporary media distribution, 
for instance cataloguing purchases and traces of movement that can be used in data analysis to 
more effectively “personalize” services. Informal video distribution has of course also 
infamously made its way into everyday interactions with policing, as the mobile applications of 
social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook offer people a way to broadcast their (often 
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tragic) interactions with law enforcement. Such recordings offer video documentation of 
interactions that are also always distributed to an audience. Such functionality extends beyond 
social media as well. The ACLU of North Carolina has developed an application called Mobile 
Justice NC that offers the same recording and broadcasting functions, but rather than transmit to 
an audience of “friends” or “followers,” the Mobile Justice NC app connects directly to the 
ACLU. The ACLU markets this application as a tool for ensuring transparency in how law 
enforcement officials interact with people in everyday life, recalling discussions about 
disintermediation in conventional distribution. In the event that an interaction with law 
enforcement goes wrong, a user of the Mobile Justice NC app is automatically patched into the 
ACLU’s network of advocates, bypassing third party “intermediaries” that might corrupt video 
evidence along the way.  
Education is another sector that is increasingly resembling media distribution. The South 
by Southwest conference, for instance, expanded into education in 2011, the twenty fifth 
anniversary of the conference’s first run. The conference uses education as a broad backdrop 
against which participants can discuss new frontiers for integrating technologies into the 
classroom, bringing together educators, tech businesses that create products and services for 
education, and governmental and non-profit organizations. Education is of course a focal point of 
paramount importance for integrating distribution technologies. Not only are technologies 
developed to help facilitate teaching and learning of specific educational curricula, but also 
deploying such technologies in the classroom means exposing younger people to how they work, 
thereby normalizing their use. Moreover, major tech companies like Google have also launched 
standalone educational websites and services that purport to serve as one-stop shops for 
technological pedagogy. Visit “Grow with Google” and choose from among any number of 
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different initiatives, under such rubrics as “learn new skills,” “grow my business,” “help my 
students,” or “scale my startup.” Such initiatives operate as massive scale, and integrate 
conventional forms of media—like video tutorials—into their lessons.   
Meanwhile, Amazon has continued to aggressively leverage its strength in digital 
consumer data and e-commerce into more industries. For instance, it extended into retail grocery 
with the purchase of Whole Foods, is preparing to launch a merchant shipping service to rival 
UPS or FedEx, and recently began talks with JPMorgan Chase & Co. about entering consumer 
banking services. While Amazon grows into new sectors, Apple responded to slowing iPhone 
sales by experimenting with marketing to younger people through YouTube channels when it 
launched the iPhoneX. Apple bypassed many of the mainstream media and tech bloggers who 
normally receive iPhones to review prior to the launch, which helps to spread the word among 
established Apple-philes. Instead, it sent iPhones to popular personalities on YouTube, so they 
could create review videos, in the hopes of attracting new customers. Google ran into hot water 
with its own expansion efforts in the summer of 2017, when the European Union ordered it to 
pay 2.4 billion euros for violating antitrust laws about how it displays shopping ads. It was one 
of many regulatory moves beyond the U.S. aimed at curbing the unchecked growth of major tech 
companies.  
These are just a small sample of sectors beyond conventional media industries and media 
formations where the stakes of contemporary distribution—and of distribution circuits—are 
brought to bear. Such examples offer an array of paths forward for future projects that 
researchers from a “media studies” perspective might provide some interesting, innovative, and 
worthwhile insight into.  
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